<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>Seems clear that robert bristow-johnson wrote clear thoughts but, seems to me, we need a clearer review. </div></div><div><br></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1; ">While electing from a district multiple members for such as a legislature (PR) is important, I skip that to concentrate on electing such as mayors and governors.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Candidate identification:</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Via petition - a wannabe who cannot demonstrate interest via petition is likely not worthy of election (though petition rules can be excessively demanding).</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Via primary - almost essential to agree on a single candidate for any party for FPTP, since multiple candidates for the party would have to share votes of party backers. Questionable whether worth the expense for other election methods. Does not solve all of FPTP's problems since multiple parties can back competing candidates.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Via write-in - should be permissible, though likely to win only with the special effort that backers may find worthwhile in special cases.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">FPTP: NO method, such as FPTP, that supports only bullet voting should be used for electing an officer. While many elections may need nothing more to satisfy their voters, this cannot be predicted when deciding on a method.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Bullet voting: Many voters, in many elections, may see bullet voting as satisfying their needs. They should be permitted this and not penalized for doing it. Still, they should know what is available from the method used, to be able to take advantage of this when they see need.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Non-bullet voting: Some voters, in some elections, will want to show preference for more than one candidate over the less desirable - election methods offer:</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Rating - these candidates can be distributed from best liked to barely worth mentioning. Choosing ratings can get tricky, for ratings too close to each other make it easier for the one rated lower to win because of what other voters have rated them.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Ranking - equal ranking implies equal desirability while higher ranking asserts greater desirability for higher ranks - but says nothing about how much more desirable they may be.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Note that if the higher ranked truly deserve it, more voters can be expected to join in the higher ranking.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Approval: All approved share equal ranking or rating over those not approved - but voter cannot express unequal liking here.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">IRV: Voting is ranking. Vote counting initially considers candidate most liked from each voter. If this does not produce a winner, recount the ballots based on remainder after excluding the least liked candidates. </span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Among its problems consider awarding to other than the one best liked. In the example below for Condorcet IRV will see B as weakest among those it sees as best liked (45A, 29C, 26B), letting A win (45A, 44C).</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Range: A major rating method. </span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Condorcet: A major ranking method (or collection of methods, since there is debate as to how to respond to cycles). Since all ranking by each voter gets counted, counters know for each pair of candidates which is voted as better liked, and by how many. The candidate that is best liked in each of its pairs wins. If there is no such candidate, we have a cycle such as A>B>C>A to analyze - knowing that each cycle candidate would win if compared only with non-cycle candidates. Building the following with reference to Wikipedia (remembering that either margins or winning votes can be used in the deciding):</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">100 votes:</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">45A</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">11B</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">15B,C</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">29C,B</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: -webkit-sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 19px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div style="margin-top: 0.4em; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0.5em; margin-left: 0px; line-height: 1.5em; ">The pairwise defeats are as follows:</div><ul style="line-height: 1.5em; list-style-type: square; margin-top: 0.3em; margin-right: 0px; margin-left: 1.5em; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; list-style-image: url(http://en.wikipedia.org/skins-1.5/monobook/bullet.gif); margin-bottom: 0.5em; "><li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em; ">B beats A, 55 to 45 (55 winning votes, a margin of 10 votes)</li><li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em; ">A beats C, 45 to 44 (45 winning votes, a margin of 1 vote)</li><li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em; ">C beats B, 29 to 26 (29 winning votes, a margin of 3 votes)</li><div><br></div></ul></span></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: -webkit-sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 19px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div style="margin-top: 0.4em; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0.5em; margin-left: 0px; line-height: 1.5em; ">Using the winning votes definition of defeat strength, the defeat of B by C is the weakest, and the defeat of A by B is the strongest. Using the margins definition of defeat strength, the defeat of C by A is the weakest, and the defeat of A by B is the strongest.</div><div style="margin-top: 0.4em; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0.5em; margin-left: 0px; line-height: 1.5em; ">Using winning votes as the definition of defeat strength, candidate B would win under minimax, Ranked Pairs and the Schulze method, but, using margins as the definition of defeat strength, candidate C would win in the same methods.</div><div style="margin-top: 0.4em; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0.5em; margin-left: 0px; line-height: 1.5em; ">If all voters give complete rankings of the candidates, then winning votes and margins will always produce the same result. The difference between them can only come into play when some voters declare equal preferences amongst candidates, as occurs implicitly if they do not rank all candidates, as in the example above.</div></span></span></div><div><br></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Runoffs: Essential with FPTP unless one candidate receives a majority vote, for there is too great a chance for best-liked to not receive the most votes. Top-two runoff weakness is the chance for FPTP to have seen true best-liked as third. Of less value for methods that let voters better express their desires.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">General: I have not tried for a full list of methods, though these deserve major consideration.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Method needs to be simple and properly earn trust of voters.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"> Giving extra value to voter's first choice can hurt more than it helps - voter can want equal power in deciding among major candidates, AND to do best possible for a minor candidate.</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;">Dave Ketchum</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1;"><br></span></div></body></html>