<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV>Kevin,<BR><BR>"I can't see what's so highly absurd about failing mono-append. It's<BR>basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that doesn't seem<BR>especially more important. Is it absurd to fail mono-raise?"</DIV>
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<DIV>The absurdity of failing mono-append is compounded by the cheapness of</DIV>
<DIV>meeting it. As with mono-add-plump the quasi-intelligent device is given</DIV>
<DIV>simple and pure new information. Being confused by it is simply unforgivable</DIV>
<DIV>*stupidity* on the part of the quasi-"intelligent" device.</DIV>
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<DIV>Regards mono-raise, I would say that failing it is obviously 'positionally absurd'</DIV>
<DIV>and 'pairwise absurd' but perhaps not 'LNH absurd'. We know that it isn't </DIV>
<DIV>"absurd" in the sense that mono-add-plump and mono-append is, because it is </DIV>
<DIV>failed by a method that has a "maximal set" of (IMO) desirable criterion compliances .</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>> Can I take it then that you no longer like <BR>> "CDTT,Random Ballot", which does award<BR>> a probability "pie"?<BR><BR>"Sure. Does your question mean that this really is how you view the<BR>difference between CDTT and Mutual Majority, is in terms of the candidates<BR>of the winning set sharing a probability pie?"</DIV>
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<DIV>Not exactly. No-one has ever suggested "MM,Random Ballot" as a good method and few<BR>have suggested that sometimes the clearly most appropriate winner is not in the MM set<BR>(as I have regarding the CDTT set).</DIV>
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<DIV>> The criterion/standard is an end in itself. Not<BR>> everything is about the strategy game.<BR>> Higer SU with sincere voting and sparing the method<BR>> common-sense (at least) difficult -to-counter complaints <BR>> from the positional-minded are worthwhile accomplisments.<BR><BR>"This strikes me as an unusual amount of paranoia that the method's<BR>results can't be explained to the public's satisfaction unless it's<BR>similar to Approval."</DIV>
<DIV><BR>It isn't just "the public". It is myself wearing my "common-sense positional" hat. And it isn't just</DIV>
<DIV>"Approval", it's 'Approval and/or FPP'.<BR><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Chris Benham<BR><BR><BR></DIV>
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</FONT><BR>Hi Chris,<BR><BR>--- En date de : Jeu 15.1.09, Chris Benham <<A href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" ymailto="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</A>> a écrit :<BR>> Kevin,<BR>> <BR>> You wrote (12 Jan 2009):<BR>> <BR>> "Why do we *currently* ever bother to satisfy<BR>> difficult criteria? What do <BR>> we mean when we say we value a criterion? Surely not just<BR>> that we feel <BR>> it's cheap?"<BR>> <BR>> When simultaneously a criterion's satisfaction's<BR>> cost falls below a certain <BR>> level and its failure reaches a certain level of <BR>> absurdity/silliness I start to<BR>> lose sight of the distinction between "important for<BR>> its own sake" and "very<BR>> silly not to have because it's so cheap".<BR>> Mono-add-plump (like mono-append)<BR>> is way inside that territory. <BR><BR>I see. I don't think I value
criteria for this sort of reason. If I insist<BR>on a criterion like Plurality, it's because I don't think the public<BR>will accept the alternative. And these two criteria are relative, so<BR>that in order to complain about a violation you have to illustrate a<BR>hypothetical scenario in addition to what really occurred.<BR><BR>I can't see what's so highly absurd about failing mono-append. It's<BR>basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that doesn't seem<BR>especially more important. Is it absurd to fail mono-raise?<BR><BR>> "If you need to identify majorities, then the fact<BR>> that a ballot shows<BR>> no preference between Y and Z, is relevant<BR>> information."<BR>> <BR>> In my view a voting method *doesn't* need to<BR>> specifically "identify majorities", so it<BR>> isn't. (The voting method can and should meet<BR>> majority-related criteria 'naturally'<BR>> and obliquely.)<BR><BR>But we aren't even
talking about voting methods, we're talking about<BR>sets. You have basically criticized Schulze(wv) even though it naturally <BR>and obliquely satisfies majority-related criteria.<BR><BR>> >But even if the quasi-intelligent device is mistaken<BR>> in treating them as<BR>> >relevant, then that is a much more understandable and<BR>> much less serious a <BR>> >blunder than the mono-add-plump failure.<BR>> <BR>> "Ok. I still don't really see why, or what makes<BR>> the difference."<BR>> <BR>> Imagine the quasi-intelligent device is the captain of a<BR>> "democracy bus" that takes<BR>> on passengers and then decides on its course/destination<BR>> after polling the passengers.<BR>> <BR>> Imagine that as in "situation 1" it<BR>> provisionally decides to go to C, and then as in <BR>> "situation 2" a group of new passengers get on<BR>> (swelling the total by about 28%) and
<BR>> they are openly polled and they all say "we want to go<BR>> to C, and have nothing else to say"<BR>> and then the captain announces "in that case I'll<BR>> take the bus to B".<BR>> <BR>> Would you have confidence that that captain made rational<BR>> decisions on the most<BR>> "democratic" (best representing the<BR>> passengers' expressed wishes) decisions?<BR>> I and I think many others would not, and would conclude<BR>> that the final "B" decision<BR>> can only be right if the original "C" decision<BR>> was completely ridiculous. Or would you<BR>> be impressed by the captain's wisdom in being properly<BR>> swayed by the new passengers'<BR>> indecision between A and B?<BR><BR>However I answer doesn't make any difference, because the question is<BR>why this crosses the boundary of clear badness while failures of <BR>mono-add-top and Participation do not. You have to write a bus
story<BR>that illustrates a mono-add-top failure but which seems intuitively<BR>more reasonable.<BR><BR>> "Anyway, you already said there was no way to explain<BR>> why it isn't<BR>> completely absurd for Mutual Majority to behave as it does.<BR>> I don't<BR>> think that whether Mutual Majority's behavior is absurd<BR>> should depend<BR>> on whether you remember that Mutual Majority has this<BR>> behavior."<BR>> <BR>> I mistakenly thought the question was redundant and<BR>> answered too hastily. I withdraw<BR>> my statement and instead just say that for the time being I<BR>> can't think of one.<BR><BR>Ok.<BR><BR>> "Never mind ....that real elections don't award<BR>> divisible pies."<BR>> <BR>> Can I take it then that you no longer like <BR>> "CDTT,Random Ballot", which does award<BR>> a probability "pie"?<BR><BR>Sure. Does your question mean that this really is how you view the<BR>difference
between CDTT and Mutual Majority, is in terms of the candidates<BR>of the winning set sharing a probability pie?<BR><BR>> >"This is a negative because it suggests that your<BR>> >positional criterion will be self-defeating."<BR>> > <BR>> >How can it possibly be "self-defeating"? <BR>> What<BR>> >is there to defeat?<BR>> <BR>> "I thought there was some intention behind your<BR>> criterion. You talk about<BR>> the "clearly strongest candidate" so I assumed<BR>> this idea is important to<BR>> you."<BR>> <BR>> Yes, by "strongest" I mean "voted<BR>> strongest on presumably sincere ballots".<BR>> <BR>> "If insisting on electing the "clearly strongest<BR>> candidate" creates incentives that *change* <BR>> who this candidate is, then what have you<BR>> accomplished?"<BR>> <BR>> The criterion/standard is an end in itself. Not<BR>> everything is about the
strategy game.<BR>> Higer SU with sincere voting and sparing the method<BR>> common-sense (at least) difficult <BR>> -to-counter complaints from the positional-minded are<BR>> worthwhile accomplisments.<BR><BR>This strikes me as an unusual amount of paranoia that the method's<BR>results can't be explained to the public's satisfaction unless it's<BR>similar to Approval.<BR><BR>> "I would say that I don't think the CDTT is that<BR>> much more valuable, than<BR>> the combination of MD and SFC, especially if you use<BR>> pairwise definitions<BR>> of these two."<BR>> <BR>> Doesn't SFC also bar C from winning in my<BR>> "situation 2" election?<BR><BR>Yes. I'm just saying that defending the CDTT, with everything that it<BR>implies, isn't my preference, and I may not be doing justice to it. If<BR>it were sufficient for purposes of the discussion, it would be better to<BR>discuss SFC.<BR><BR>> >Well since Condorcet
is incompatible with LNHarm, that<BR>> >doesn't explain why Condorcet fans should like it.<BR>> <BR>> "I don't agree. There are various degrees to which<BR>> Condorcet methods fail<BR>> LNHarm."<BR>> <BR>> I think that like FBC, LNHarm's value is greatly<BR>> reduced if it isn't an absolute<BR>> guarantee. <BR><BR>I agree, when it comes to trying to sell a method to others.<BR><BR>> To me more valuable than either LNH by itself is<BR>> that they both be<BR>> in balance. If they can't be in balance I prefer the<BR>> LNHarm problem to be <BR>> worse than the LNHelp problem. In other words I dislike<BR>> random-fill incentive<BR>> much more than truncation incentive.<BR><BR>I think the WV methods are in decent balance here, at least when voters<BR>are informed.<BR><BR>> >25: A>B<BR>> >26: B>C<BR>> >23: C>A<BR>> >26: C<BR>> >100 ballots (majority threshold =
51)<BR>> ><BR>> >B>C 51-27, C>A 75-25, A>B 48-26.<BR>> > <BR>> >In Schulze(Winning Votes), and I think also in any<BR>> method<BR>> >that meets "beatpath GMC" and mono-raise, the<BR>> 26C truncators can <BR>> >virtually guarantee that C be elected by using the<BR>> "random-fill" strategy. <BR>> >That is silly and unfair.<BR>> <BR>> "They have to vote for A,.."<BR>> <BR>> With no change to the other ballots, only 4 of the 26C<BR>> ballots have to change <BR>> to C>A for Schulze(wv) to elect C (even if the other<BR>> 22C change to C>B).<BR>> <BR>> "They have to vote for A, and the B voters have to<BR>> give those C <BR>> preferences, which they shouldn't (if they have the<BR>> same quality of<BR>> information as the C voters)."<BR>> <BR>> The only "quality of information" these C voters<BR>> need is that
the method has<BR>> a 0-info random-fill incentive.<BR><BR>I wonder if there is a simple way to see that it really has this<BR>incentive.<BR><BR>I didn't realize your complaint about unfairness pertained to the<BR>zero-info situation. Still, perhaps the unfairness is to the voters<BR>who have actual preferences and can't sincerely truncate or random-fill.<BR><BR>Kevin Venzke<BR><BR><BR><BR></DIV></DIV></div><br>
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