<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV>Kevin,</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>You wrote (12 Jan 2009):</DIV>
<DIV><BR>"Why do we *currently* ever bother to satisfy difficult criteria? What do </DIV>
<DIV>we mean when we say we value a criterion? Surely not just that we feel </DIV>
<DIV>it's cheap?"</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>When simultaneously a criterion's satisfaction's cost falls below a certain <BR>level and its failure reaches a certain level of absurdity/silliness I start to</DIV>
<DIV>lose sight of the distinction between "important for its own sake" and "very<BR>silly not to have because it's so cheap". Mono-add-plump (like mono-append)</DIV>
<DIV>is way inside that territory. </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"Condorcet isn't incompatible with mono-add-top."<BR><BR>Oops, sorry I forgot that, but it is incompatible with Participation. MinMax(Margins)</DIV>
<DIV>meets mono-add-top.</DIV>
<DIV><BR>"If you need to identify majorities, then the fact that a ballot shows<BR>no preference between Y and Z, is relevant information."<BR></DIV>
<DIV>In my view a voting method *doesn't* need to specifically "identify majorities", so it</DIV>
<DIV>isn't. (The voting method can and should meet majority-related criteria 'naturally'</DIV>
<DIV>and obliquely.)</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>><I> But even if the </I><I>quasi-intelligent device is mistaken in treating them as<BR></I>><I> relevant, then that is a much </I><I>more understandable and much less serious a <BR>>blunder than </I><I>the mono-add-plump </I><I>failure.<BR></I><BR>"Ok. I still don't really see why, or what makes the difference."</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Imagine the quasi-intelligent device is the captain of a "democracy bus" that takes<BR>on passengers and then decides on its course/destination after polling the passengers.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Imagine that as in "situation 1" it provisionally decides to go to C, and then as in </DIV>
<DIV>"situation 2" a group of new passengers get on (swelling the total by about 28%) and </DIV>
<DIV>they are openly polled and they all say "we want to go to C, and have nothing else to say"<BR>and then the captain announces "in that case I'll take the bus to B".</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Would you have confidence that that captain made rational decisions on the most<BR>"democratic" (best representing the passengers' expressed wishes) decisions?</DIV>
<DIV>I and I think many others would not, and would conclude that the final "B" decision</DIV>
<DIV>can only be right if the original "C" decision was completely ridiculous. Or would you</DIV>
<DIV>be impressed by the captain's wisdom in being properly swayed by the new passengers'<BR>indecision between A and B?</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"Anyway, you already said there was no way to explain why it isn't<BR>completely absurd for Mutual Majority to behave as it does. I don't<BR>think that whether Mutual Majority's behavior is absurd should depend<BR>on whether you remember that Mutual Majority has this behavior."<BR></DIV>
<DIV>I mistakenly thought the question was redundant and answered too hastily. I withdraw<BR>my statement and instead just say that for the time being I can't think of one.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"Never mind ....that real elections don't award divisible pies."</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Can I take it then that you no longer like "CDTT,Random Ballot", which does award</DIV>
<DIV>a probability "pie"?</DIV>
<DIV><BR>><I> "This is a negative because it suggests that your<BR></I>><I> positional criterion </I><I>will be self-defeating."<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> How can it possibly be "self-defeating"? What<BR></I>><I> is there to defeat?<BR></I><BR>"I thought there was some intention behind your criterion. You talk about<BR>the "clearly strongest candidate" so I assumed this idea is important to<BR>you."<BR></DIV>
<DIV>Yes, by "strongest" I mean "voted strongest on presumably sincere ballots".</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"If insisting on electing the "clearly strongest candidate" creates incentives that *change* <BR>who this candidate is, then what have you accomplished?"</DIV>
<DIV><BR>The criterion/standard is an end in itself. Not everything is about the strategy game.</DIV>
<DIV>Higer SU with sincere voting and sparing the method common-sense (at least) difficult </DIV>
<DIV>-to-counter complaints from the positional-minded are worthwhile accomplisments.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"I would say that I don't think the CDTT is that much more valuable, than<BR>the combination of MD and SFC, especially if you use pairwise definitions<BR>of these two."</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Doesn't SFC also bar C from winning in my "situation 2" election?</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>><I> Well since Condorcet is incompatible with LNHarm, that<BR></I>><I> doesn't explain why Condorcet </I><I>fans should like it.<BR></I><BR>"I don't agree. There are various degrees to which Condorcet methods fail<BR>LNHarm."</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I think that like FBC, LNHarm's value is greatly reduced if it isn't an absolute</DIV>
<DIV>guarantee. To me more valuable than either LNH by itself is that they both be</DIV>
<DIV>in balance. If they can't be in balance I prefer the LNHarm problem to be <BR>worse than the LNHelp problem. In other words I dislike random-fill incentive</DIV>
<DIV>much more than truncation incentive.<BR><BR><BR>><I> 25: A>B<BR></I>><I> 26: B>C<BR></I>><I> 23: C>A<BR></I>><I> 26: C<BR></I>><I> 100 ballots (majority threshold = 51)<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> B>C 51-27, C>A 75-25, A>B 48-26.<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> In Schulze(Winning Votes), and I think also in any method<BR></I>><I> that meets "beatpath GMC" and mono-raise, </I><I>the 26C truncators can </I></DIV>
<DIV><I>>virtually guarantee </I><I>that C be elected by using </I><I>the "random-fill" strategy. </I></DIV>
<DIV><I>>That is silly and </I><I>unfair.<BR></I><BR>"They have to vote for A,.."</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>With no change to the other ballots, only 4 of the 26C ballots have to change </DIV>
<DIV>to C>A for Schulze(wv) to elect C (even if the other 22C change to C>B).</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"They have to vote for A, and the B voters have to give those C <BR>preferences, which they shouldn't (if they have the same quality of<BR>information as the C voters)."<BR></DIV>
<DIV>The only "quality of information" these C voters need is that the method has</DIV>
<DIV>a 0-info random-fill incentive.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Chris Benham <BR></DIV>
<DIV><BR><BR><BR><BR> </DIV>
<DIV><BR> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV></div><br>
<hr size=1>
Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox. <a href="http://au.rd.yahoo.com/galaxy/mail/tagline2/*http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox" target=_blank>Take a look</a>.</body></html>