<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV>Kristopher,<BR>All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial. Smith,IRV has in </DIV>
<DIV>common with IRV but not the other well-known Condorcet methods</DIV>
<DIV>that a Mutual Dominant Third winner can't be buried. But like all other<BR>Condorcet methods it is not absolutely invulnerable to Burial like IRV.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>37: A>B</DIV>
<DIV>31: B>A</DIV>
<DIV>32: C>B</DIV>
<DIV><BR>B is the CW, but if the A>B voters bury B by changing to A>C then</DIV>
<DIV>the Smith,IRV winner changes from B to A.<BR><BR>For the advantage over IRV of the difference between Smith and</DIV>
<DIV>Mutual Dominant Third (MDT), we lose Burial Invulnerability and<BR>Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help and Mono-add-Top.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>So I think the argument that Smith,IRV is really much better than the</DIV>
<DIV>simpler plain IRV is weak. Likewise the case that Smith,IRV is the</DIV>
<DIV>best Condorcet method.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"Is it possible to make a monotonic method that's resistant to burial?"</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Yes, FPP fills that bill. Other methods have incentives to "bury" only<BR>by truncating, not order-reversing. (According to a definition I'm not</DIV>
<DIV>entirely happy with this qualifiies as "burying"). I have in mind the methods</DIV>
<DIV>that met Later-no-Help and not Later-no-Harm, such as Bucklin and</DIV>
<DIV>Approval.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Chris Benham</DIV>
<DIV><STRONG></STRONG> </DIV>
<DIV><STRONG></STRONG> </DIV>
<DIV><STRONG></STRONG> </DIV>
<DIV><STRONG></STRONG> </DIV>
<DIV><STRONG>Kristofer Munsterhjelm</STRONG> wrote (Tues.Nov.25):</DIV>
<DIV>As we know, Smith,IRV is resistant to burial (hence my statement of "if <BR>you're going to have IRV, have Smith,IRV", since you gain Condorcet <BR>compliance). I also think Minmax-elimination is resistant to burial (at <BR>least it elects the "right" candidate in your Mutual Dominant Quarter <BR>example).<BR><BR>However, IRV is nonmonotonic. Is it possible to make a monotonic method <BR>that's resistant to burial? Dominant Mutual Third resistance? Dominant <BR>Mutual Quarter? It would give very unintuitive results, but might be <BR>needed if most of the electorate go "on a burial spree". I know of no <BR>method that actually has these properties, though; the method I called <BR>"first preference Copeland" was shown to be nonmonotonic as well <BR>(incidentally, by you: <BR><A href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007"><FONT
color=#0000ff>http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007</FONT></A><BR>-January/019135.html )<BR><BR>(FPC is the method that, for each candidate, its penalty is the sum of <BR>the first preference votes of the ones that pairwise beat it. Whoever <BR>has least penalty wins.)<BR></DIV></div><br>
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