<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV>Kevin,</DIV>
<DIV>I've always thought that the main value of mono-raise is that methods that fail it are </DIV>
<DIV>vulnerable to Pushover strategy and those that meet it aren't. <BR></DIV>
<DIV>
<P><A name=push-over></A><B>push-over</B> <BR>The strategy of ranking a weak alternative higher than one's preferred alternative, which may be useful in a method that violates <A href="http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml#monotonicity"><FONT color=#0000ff>monotonicity</FONT></A>.<BR><A href="http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml">http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml</A></P>
<P><BR>But now you are proposing an interpretation of mono-raise (aka monotonicity) that can </P>
<P>be met by a method that is clearly vulnerable to Pushover strategy.</P>
<P> </P>
<P>25: A>B<BR>26: B>C</P>
<P>23: C>A</P>
<P>26: C<BR></P>
<P>What is the value/use of a criterion that does that and moreover can be met by a method</P>
<P>that fails to elect C in the above election? </P>
<P> </P>
<P>The method under discussion that you say meets mono-raise, Definite Majority Choice</P>
<P>(Whole), elects B.</P>
<P> </P>
<P> </P>
<P>All candidates are in the top cycle, but by our 3-slot ratings ballot interpretation C has</P>
<P>the highest TR score, the highest approval score, and the lowest approval-opposition</P>
<P>score.</P>
<P> </P>
<P>Would you agree then that there is a need for an "Invulnerability to Pushover strategy"</P>
<P>criterion, that is more important than mono-raise?</P>
<P> </P>
<P>Chris Benham</P>
<P> </P></DIV>
<DIV><BR> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Hi Chris,<BR><BR>--- En date de : Jeu 23.10.08, Chris Benham <<A href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com"><FONT color=#810081>cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au</FONT></A>> a écrit :<BR>><I> Kevin,<BR></I>><I> I think the version of DMC that allows voters to rank
</I><I>among unapproved<BR></I>><I> candidates fails mono-raise, and both versions are </I><I>vulnerable to Pushover<BR></I>><I> strategy. <BR></I>><I><BR></I>><I> Would you say that that the plain "all ranked are<BR></I>><I> approved" version </I><I>doesn't properly fail mono-raise but instead fails<BR></I>><I> mono-raise-delete?<BR></I><BR>I think it definitely fails the latter. I think it only fails the former<BR>if you can't rank all the candidates (for approval purposes).<BR><BR>><I> <A href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-March/019824.html"><FONT color=#0000ff>http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-March/019824.html</FONT></A><BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> I wrote in March 2007:<BR></I>><I> With the approval cutoffs, DMC (and AWP) come close to<BR></I>><I> failing mono-raise.<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> 31: A>>B<BR></I>><I>
04: A>>C<BR></I>><I> 32: B>>C<BR></I>><I> 33: C>>A<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> A>B>C>A Approvals: A35, B32, C33. <BR></I>><I> A eliminates (doubly defeats) B, and C wins. (AWP measures <BR></I>><I> defeat-strengths by the number of ballots on the winning<BR></I>><I> side that approve the <BR></I>><I> winner and not the loser, and so says C's defeat is the<BR></I>><I> weakest and so also<BR></I>><I> elects C.)<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> Now change the 4 A>>C ballots to C>>A<BR></I><BR>To my mind you aren't allowed to move C over both A and the cutoff at<BR>the same time, unless the method for some reason doesn't allow it any<BR>other way (such as if this is the bottom of the ballot and you can't<BR>approve all candidates).<BR><BR>Kevin Venzke<BR><BR>I misstated something:<BR><BR>--- En date de : Dim 26.10.08, Kevin Venzke <<A
href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com"><FONT color=#810081>stepjak at yahoo.fr</FONT></A>> a écrit :<BR>><I> > Now change the 4 A>>C ballots to C>>A<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> To my mind you aren't allowed to move C over both A and<BR></I>><I> the cutoff at<BR></I>><I> the same time, unless the method for some reason<BR></I>><I> doesn't allow it any<BR></I>><I> other way (such as if this is the bottom of the ballot and<BR></I>><I> you can't<BR></I>><I> approve all candidates).<BR></I><BR>You can move C over both at the same time, but you can't, at this same<BR>time, move A and the cutoff relative to each other, according to my<BR>opinion.<BR><BR>Kevin Venzke<BR><BR></DIV></div><br>
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