<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV>Kevin,</DIV>
<DIV>I think the version of DMC that allows voters to rank among unapproved</DIV>
<DIV>candidates fails mono-raise, and both versions are vulnerable to Pushover</DIV>
<DIV>strategy. </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Would you say that that the plain "all ranked are approved" version<BR>doesn't properly fail mono-raise but instead fails mono-raise-delete?<BR><BR><A href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-March/019824.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-March/019824.html</A></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I wrote in March 2007:</DIV>
<DIV>With the approval cutoffs, DMC (and AWP) come close to failing mono-raise.<BR><BR>31: A>>B<BR>04: A>>C<BR>32: B>>C<BR>33: C>>A<BR><BR>A>B>C>A Approvals: A35, B32, C33. <BR>A eliminates (doubly defeats) B, and C wins. (AWP measures <BR>defeat-strengths by the number of ballots on the winning side that approve the <BR>winner and not the loser, and so says C's defeat is the weakest and so also<BR>elects C.)<BR><BR>Now change the 4 A>>C ballots to C>>A<BR><BR>31: A>>B<BR>32: B>>C<BR>37: C>>A (4 were A>>C)<BR><BR>A>B>C>A Approvals: C37, B32, A31<BR>Now C doubly defeats A, and B wins. (AWP also elects B)</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><A href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-October/023017.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-October/023017.html</A><BR><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Chris Benham<BR></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><BR><BR>Kevin Venzke wrote (Mon.Oct.20):<BR>Hi Kristofer,<BR><BR>--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<A href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com"><FONT color=#810081>km-elmet at broadpark.no</FONT></A>> a écrit :<BR>><I> You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call<BR></I>><I> it <BR></I>><I> Condorcet,Approval. I think it's Smith (so it would be<BR></I>><I> Smith,Approval), <BR></I>><I> but I'm not sure. The method is this: Drop candidates,<BR></I>><I> starting with the <BR></I>><I> Approval loser and moving upwards, until there's a CW.<BR></I>><I> Then that one is <BR></I>><I> the winner.<BR></I><BR>This method has been invented from scratch a few times; most recently<BR>it was called "Definite Majority Choice."<BR><BR>I don't think it can be described using double-slash or comma notation...<BR><BR>For instance Smith//FPP would mean
that you eliminate all non-Smith<BR>candidates and elect the FPP winner pretending that the eliminated<BR>candidates never existed. Whereas Smith,FPP would mean that you elect<BR>that Smith candidate who had the most first preferences to start with.<BR><BR>When "Condorcet" is the first or "Approval" is the second component, it's<BR>not likely to make a difference which punctuation is used.<BR><BR>><I> Is Condorcet,Approval (Smith,Approval?) nonmonotonic? If<BR></I>><I> not, and it is <BR></I>><I> Smith, then you have a simple Smith-compliant<BR></I>><I> Condorcet/approval method.<BR></I><BR>It satisfies Smith and monotonicity.<BR><BR>Kevin Venzke<BR></DIV></div><br>Send instant messages to your online friends http://au.messenger.yahoo.com </body></html>