<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV><STRONG>Kristofer Munsterhjelm</STRONG> wrote (Sat.Oct.18):</DIV>
<DIV>><I> Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current favorite election <BR></I>><I> method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need complex algorithms to find </DIV>
<P>
</I>><I> a winner.<BR></I><BR>You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call it <BR>Condorcet,Approval. I think it's Smith (so it would be Smith,Approval), <BR>but I'm not sure. The method is this: Drop candidates, starting with the <BR>Approval loser and moving upwards, until there's a CW. Then that one is <BR>the winner.</P>
<P><BR> </P>
<P>Kristofer,</P>
<P>The method you describe isn't Smith,Approval (which is the same thing as</P>
<P>Smith//Approval). Smith,Approval elects the member of the Smith set</P>
<P>highest-ordered by Approval on the original ballots, Smith//Approval first</P>
<P>eliminates (drops from the ballots) all non-members of the Smith set and</P>
<P>applies Approval to the remaining candidates. </P>
<P><BR>Since approval is treated as 'absolute' it doesn't make a difference like it does </P>
<P>between Smith,IRV and Smith//IRV.</P>
<P> </P>
<P>The method you describe has IRV-like mono-raise failure and Pushover </P>
<P>strategy vulnerability.</P>
<P> </P>
<P>31: A>B</P>
<P>32: B>C</P>
<P>31: C>A<BR>06: C</P>
<P> </P>
<P>All ranked candidates are approved, and all candidates are in the Smith set.</P>
<P>A>B 62-32, B>C 63-31, C>A 69-31. </P>
<P>Approval scores: A62, B63, C69.<BR></P>
<P>A is eliminated and B wins, but if 2 of the 6 C votes change to A then C wins. </P>
<P> </P>
<P>31: A>B</P>
<P>32: B>C</P>
<P>31: C>A<BR>04: C</P>
<P>02: A</P>
<P> </P>
<P>The Approval winner C is the clearly strongest candidate (the most first preferences </P>
<P>and the most second preferences) in both cases.</P>
<P> </P>
<P>"These methods would obviously need approval cutoff ballots (unless you <BR>go with the MDDA assumption, that the approval cutoff is where the voter <BR>truncates, but I don't think that would be a good idea here)."<BR></P>
<P>Here I agree with Kevin Venzke. Allowing voters to rank among candidates they</P>
<P>don't approve just makes the method more vulnerable to Burial strategy and makes</P>
<P>the proposal much more complex.</P>
<P> </P>
<P> </P>
<P>Chris Benham<BR></P><!--endarticle--><!--htdig_noindex-->
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