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<DIV>><I> Very bad is the Supplementary Vote used to elect some<BR></I>><I> mayors in the </I><I>UK. It is like the Contingent Vote (one trip to </I></DIV>
<DIV><I>>the </I><I>polls TTR) except </I><I>voters are only allowed to rank 2 candidates.<BR></I><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Kevin Venzke wrote:<BR></DIV>
<DIV>I don't see how this is "very bad." I could see how you might think it<BR>is easily improved. But is this method better or worse than Approval? Is <BR>it better or worse than FPP?<BR></DIV>
<DIV>Kevin,</DIV>
<DIV>The question of the precise ranking of the worst single-winner methods</DIV>
<DIV>doesn't interest me very much. I just mentioned it as a method in use with</DIV>
<DIV>absurd arbitrary features/restrictions that is dominated (in terms of useful criterion <BR>compliances) by IRV.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>To reluctantly answer your question I suppose it isn't worse than FPP and</DIV>
<DIV>is probably worse than Approval.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I'd be much more interested in your reaction to my recent "Range-Approval<BR>hybrid" suggested methods, which after all use the concept of "Approval</DIV>
<DIV>Opposition" which you invented.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Chris Benham</DIV></div><br>Send instant messages to your online friends http://au.messenger.yahoo.com </body></html>