<div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I'll attempt to organize the Range Voting vs Condorcet debate somewhat.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">From what I can see, the following methods have been proposed/have some argument defending them/are reasonably good representatives of the groups being considered:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Range Voting:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">There are two types of arguments against this system:</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">1)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Ratings themselves are useless/unreasonable/illogical/not indicative of reality</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">2)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Nothing survives post-strategy, so any benefit of Range Voting is lost anyway as it reverts to approval. The zero-info strategy is approval.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">3)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Range Voting isn't a majority method.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">My response typically is:</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo2"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">1)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">The meaning of the vote is substantiated by the system. People vote to achieve a particular outcome. With Range Voting, the different scores have an at-least partway predictable impact on the election (same as any other system). People can tell what is good for the candidates and by how much. Every reasonable voting system preserves this important feature. As a consequence of the votes influence result effect, the different scores now have meaning.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l5 level2 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">a.</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">The concept of comparing candidates along a single dimension is more intuitive and hence more meaningful to voters than making O(n^2) binary decisions</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo2"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">2)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">In order for this to be true, the utility gain from having one's favorite candidate in office must exceed the relative benefit of choosing between the competitors. To the extent which this is true in reality, the results will resemble approval. The real question here is: if each voter strongly prefers their favorite candidate set to the set of everyone else, would a non-approval style election really help?</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l5 level2 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">a.</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Does zero-info in this case mean a) lack of info about of the behavior of other voters or b) (a) and lack of info about other candidates as well? Either way, if the problem can be ameliorated by adding info, then add info.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l5 level1 lfo2"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">3)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Any majority can impose its will.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 1in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l5 level2 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">a.</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">It is a majority method if you reject the ranked ballot conception of what a majority is. If you regard someone who voted Alice 60% and Bob 100% as belonging 60% to the Alice camp and 100% to the Bob camp, then Range Voting is a majority method. If you interpret the same data as meaning I support Bob, failing Bob, I support Alice… then it isn't.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 1in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l5 level2 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">b.</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Is this behavior even a good thing? If the majority isn't exercising its influence and a compromise candidate is elected instead, do you really want a polarizing candidate or a compromise one?</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">RP:</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l6 level1 lfo3"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">1)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">This is a system I initially cited as an example of a reasonable Condorcet method, it hasn't really been argued about.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Schulze:</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l2 level1 lfo4"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">1)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Same comment</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">River:</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">1)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Same comment</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">MMPO:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1"> </span>Seeing as Electorama is down and I can't find an actual description of how this system works, I am stuck making generic arguments against it. If someone could explain it to me, that would be great. From what I can tell, it is a variant of Minmax that satisfies FBC, but neither Clone nor Condorcet. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>My best guess is that it takes the biggest loss for each candidate, and picks the candidate with the smallest biggest loss. That is what I have gathered from its name, MinMaxPairwiseOpposition.</font></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">If that is the case, then my responses to this are that the myopic view of what is your biggest loss has profound impacts on strategic nomination. Cloning becomes extremely powerful.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>By nominating an additional candidate, my biggest loss won't go down if my party is even slightly organized, but my opponent's can. I'm not quite sure how this teaming incentive compares to, say, Borda, but I imagine it to be fairly substantial nonetheless.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Condorcet-Approval:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1"> </span>Ok, so I inadvertently described this one. I assumed it was more complicated than a simple two-step process. </font></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1"> </span>My arguments against this system:</font></font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo6"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">1)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">The Bayesian Regret Data </font><a href="http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html"><font face="Calibri" size="3">http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html</font></a><font face="Calibri" size="3"> suggests the Condorcet winner is usually good for society and that Range selects the Condorcet winner more often than Condorcet efficient methods do. If one compares Condorcet-Approval to just Approval, Approval chose the utility-based Condorcet winner 655 more times. In fact, all of the Condorcet-efficient methods selected the true CW winner 10342 times. This suggests that obeying the nominal property can cause the system to elect fewer actual CWs.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l7 level1 lfo6"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">2)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Let's pretend there are two ballots here, one ranked and one rated. Does the ranked ballot have any influence on the rated ballot or vice versa or are they separate? E.g. would it be possible for me to disapprove of the person I voted best in the Condorcet section or approve of the first and third best but not the second best?</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">ICA:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Hmm so this is ICA:</font></p>
<p><b><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">3e. </font><a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Improved_Condorcet_Approval"><span style="BACKGROUND: yellow; COLOR: black"><span id="google-navclient-hilite"><font size="3">ICA</font></span></span></a></span></b><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">: </font></span></p>
<ol type="A">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; tab-stops: list .5in"><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">(Same as for MDDA.) </font></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; tab-stops: list .5in"><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">Again as in MDDA, a voter implicitly <i>approves</i> every candidate whom he explicitly ranks. </font></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; tab-stops: list .5in"><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">Let v[a,b] signify the number of voters ranking candidate <i>a</i> above candidate <i>b</i>, and let t[a,b] signify the number of voters ranking <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> equally at the top of the ranking (possibly tied with other candidates). </font></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; tab-stops: list .5in"><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">Define a set <i>S</i> of candidates, which contains every candidate <i>x</i> for whom there is no other candidate <i>y</i> such that v[x,y]+t[x,y]<v[y,x]. </font></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; tab-stops: list .5in"><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">If <i>S</i> is empty, then let <i>S</i> contain all the candidates. </font></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo7; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; tab-stops: list .5in"><span style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial','sans-serif'"><font size="3">Elect the candidate in <i>S</i> with the greatest approval</font></span></li>
</ol>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">This description appears to suggest that the candidates that are not ranked are automatically disapproved of. I'll follow the link to variant forms of ICA, but just as a quick question: If you can't decide among candidates you disapprove of, how do you know if the optimal strategy is to approve of the candidate at the bottom or to disapprove of the candidate entirely.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Let me explain this dilemma:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">A 1</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">B 2</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">C 3</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">D X</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">E X</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">F X</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">That is my ballot so far. How do I know whether it is in my best interest to bottom-approve D (making it 4) or disapprove of it entirely. In my opinion this is worse than Range Voting's rate as zero or give intermediate score dilemma because you are comparing apples and oranges. If my understanding of this method is correct, then if you want to have any impact at all on the D vs E or D vs F subelection, you must rank it 4.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">The variant forms cannot be accessed to a SQL error. Great.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">At last some good news, apparently the Google caches still work so Electorama can still be accessed yay!</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Majority-Range:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">This is one hybrid I suggested.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">My description was vague; there are at least four possible ways to do this.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo8"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">1)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Include a super-99 option. It counts the same as 99 for the range portion but is capable of being used to construct a majority. One Super-99 is allowed</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo8"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">2)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Same as (1) but multiple super-99s are allowed</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo8"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">3)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">You are given one supplementary vote; it is counted for the majority thing before anything.</font></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 0.5in; TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo8"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin"><span style="mso-list: Ignore"><font face="Calibri" size="3">4)</font><span style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'"> </span></span></span><font face="Calibri" size="3">Multiple supplementary votes.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">The argument over this is whether it satisfies FBC or not. 2 and 4 clearly satisfy FBC, but not majority, in fact they turn the method into essentially approval. 1 and 3 satisfy majority, but not FBC. Here is why, it is conceivably in my best interest to give my supervote to a front runner compromise candidate rather than my true favorite. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Cardinal Condorcet </font><a href="http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.htm"><font face="Calibri" size="3">http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.htm</font></a><font face="Calibri" size="3">:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">This method is another hybrid.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">The advantages of this method are similar to both Range and Condorcet.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">First of all it is a Condorcet efficient method, meaning the CW as reflected by the voters will be chosen. This specific tiebreaker uses the magnitude of comparisons in order to decide which to drop. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">This method has the advantages of both worlds. The CW comparisons means that voters are never forced to abandon preferences regarding particular candidates for fear of diluting the power of the vote. It also means that voters get some sort of direction as to which comparisons they feel more strongly about. This method was never really attacked. Mentioning it was, but whatever.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Framing the debate:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Debating the specific merits of Range Voting or Condorcet Method X is meaningless unless we can agree on some kind of metric.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Debates about which properties are important don't really lead anywhere. There are a few we can probably agree upon. Let's see how often it satisfies those properties. I advocate moving away from a binary framework and focusing on how often certain properties are satisfied.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I like the Bayesian Regret metric because it's nice and quantifiable. Apparently there are some issues with previous simulations. I proposed a method for simulating strategy for any method about forty minutes ago. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I think Bayesian Regret is the way to settle this, once the simulation's lumps have been smoothed out.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">There is one exception to this. Clone independence must be evaluated separately because the simulation would not be especially good at determining the impacts of strategic nomination.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p></div>