<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV><BR>><I> "Low social utility (SU)" Condorcet winners with<BR></I>><I> little solid support and </I><I>depend for their status as the CW on weakly-held </I></DIV>
<DIV><I>>lower</I><I> preferences can </I><I>begin to look quite chimera-like and not necessarily the<BR></I>><I> only legitimate </I><I>winner.<BR></I>><I> <BR></I><BR>This seems to be a typical complaint that Condorcet will elect a<BR>compromise rather than a candidate that anyone is excited about. But if a<BR>candidate people are excited about assumes office over the CW, then by<BR>definition the majority is ruled against its will by an enthusiastic<BR>minority. Even supposing that this majority is itself composed of<BR>incompatible minorities does not mean that a polity whose electorate is<BR>broken into several minority factions should just let one of those<BR>factions govern. Wouldn't the acceptable compromise be fairer and more<BR>stable?</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>CB: Not necessarily, no. I have in mind something like (with sincere ratings):</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>49: A(99) > C(2) > B(1)</DIV>
<DIV>48: B(99) > C(2) > A(1)</DIV>
<DIV>03: C(99) > A(98) > B(1)<BR></DIV>
<DIV>C is the CW, but A is a much more stable, much higher SU, arguably as</DIV>
<DIV>fair or fairer winner.<BR></DIV>
<DIV>Perhaps you (Aaron) could answer my direct question about what you<BR>mean by "Smith/IRV".</DIV>
<DIV><BR>Chris Benham<BR><BR>><I> One ok Condorcet method is Smith,IRV: voters strictly rank<BR></I>><I> from the </I><I>top however many candidates they wish, before each normal<BR></I>><I> IRV </I><I>elimination check for a candidate X that pairwise beats all<BR></I>><I> the other </I><I>remaining candidates, elect the first such X to appear.<BR></I>><I> <BR></I>><I> Is this what you mean by "Smith/IRV"? <BR></I><I><BR></I>><I> I'm not sure if you suggested otherwise, but all<BR></I>><I> methods that meet the </I><I>Condorcet criterion are vulnerable to Burial </I></DIV>
<DIV><I>>strategy.<BR></I><I> <BR></I>><I> Chris Benham<BR></DIV></I></div><br>
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