<div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> Reasons why Range is better and always will be.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> I would like to end the truce.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">That won't work I guess. Using the term "better" alone is a major flaw of many discussions here. Obviously, it all depends on what goals a method is expected to achieve.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Ok, using the term "better" is biased, you got me. I will proceed to defend my position. I merely mean that it satisfies criteria I think are important and will proceed to attempt to convince why they are important. I do admit the flaws of Range Voting and would be happy to explore them, but I think that including my judgment of which is better is not evil. I too love property based discussions. The definition of the "better"-ness criterion is as follows:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">"Better"-ness Criterion:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Arbitrary pronounced by the writer to be more suitable than some other method for elections.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">:-) </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I'm not trying to impose my will on anyone; I would just like to see the matter discussed. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> something reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">As you might guess, I appreciate this, of course :-)</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> Property Related:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> Implications:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> 1) It is always good to vote and it is always good to rate your</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> favorite candidate 100. The only Condorcet method to satisfy favorite</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> betrayal is an obscure variant of Minmax which I'll ignore because of</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> its glaring flaws (clone dependence *cough*)</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> 2) How does it make sense to be able to divide a region into two</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> constituencies each electing A if B is the actual winner? Condorcet</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> methods are not additive, this calls into question the actual meaning</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> of being elected by a Condorcet method.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">No, it calls into question the actual meaning of being elected in a region. The misunderstanding arises only when you interpret the election of A in a region as meaning that A is "best" in some sense. But Condorcet methods are based on a different logic than measuring "goodness" of candidates. They have more to do with stability, for example: Electing a candidate other than the Condorcet Winner always faces immediate opposition by some majority who prefers the Condorcet Winner. So, if you consider majorities significant (which you seem to judging from your reasoning further down), you should consequently not accept different winner when a Condorcet Winner is available.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I see your point. Try thinking about it from a different perspective:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">The regions are the "status quo", not the conglomerate super-region.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I cite this example: </font><a href="http://www.rangevoting.org/CondNonAdd.html"><font face="Calibri" size="3">http://www.rangevoting.org/CondNonAdd.html</font></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Picture it this way, the region has chosen their representative, but suddenly the introduction of a region that chose exactly the same way has altered the result. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">This example should justify my original point. The opinions of these two groups are not in conflict with each other per se, yet their aggregate decision is. If you claim that a region is a fictional entity with no real meaning, I say look at the problem from the regions' perspective and consider the super-region a fictional entity. (This might make it seem odd why they are participating in the exact same election, but it seems less so if they are voting on say, the region's favorite color.)</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> answers to potentital majority rule counterarguments:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> 1) Range voting isn't a majority method.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> answer: any majority can impose their will if they choose to exercise</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> it.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I greatly appreciate your making this clear! Warren has often argued that Range is *not* really majoritarian when I pointed this out. The main point is of course the question of whether one assumes intelligent voters who vote strategically or dumb voters who vote "honestly" against their own interest (whatever "honestly" means with a ratings-based method - more on this below). When we assume intelligent voters, Range is clearly a majoritarian method.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I was attempting to make a distinction between an active and a passive majority. Any active majority (one unwilling to make any compromises whatsoever, voting every non-them candidate the lowest possible score) will win. A passive majority (clear majority opinion, but makes compromises) will not necessarily win. I argue this isn't a fault because if a majority is passive then they can arguably be considered to support another candidate the percentage that they voted for him. E.g. their partial vote could be used to form a majority per se.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">That leads me to the main problem with Range (as with any other majoritarian method): It is simply not democratic. It cannot be because every majoritarian method gives 100% of the power to less than 100% of the people (the "demos" in greek). Often, about 60% of the people can consistently impose their will on the other 40% without the latter being given any means at all by the majoritarian method to influence the decision. Of course, this is a problem of most popular election methods, but that does not mean the problem cannot be solved. Democratic decisions are possible but not with majoritarian methods.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Interesting point. I would argue that a compromise candidate is better than a polarizing but barely passing candidate (like FPTP with primaries tends to produce). I'd say this isn't a voting-issues question, but a civil rights question. A nice constitution will help protect you from tyranny of the majority.</font></p>
<p style="BACKGROUND: #f8fcff"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">"<span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN">Advocates of majoritarianism argue that <a title="Majority" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority"><font color="#0000ff">majority</font></a> decision making is intrinsically democratic and that any restriction on majority decision making is intrinsically undemocratic. If democracy is restricted by a <a title="Constitution" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution"><font color="#0000ff">constitution</font></a> which cannot be changed by a <a title="Simple majority" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_majority"><font color="#0000ff">simple majority</font></a> decision then yesterday's majority is being given more weight than today's; if it is restricted by some small group, such as <a title="Aristocrat" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristocrat"><font color="#0000ff">aristocrats</font></a>, <a title="Judge" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judge"><font color="#0000ff">judges</font></a>, <a title="Priest" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Priest"><font color="#0000ff">priests</font></a>, <a title="Soldier" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soldier"><font color="#0000ff">soldiers</font></a> or <a title="Philosopher" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosopher"><font color="#0000ff">philosophers</font></a>, then society becomes an <a title="Oligarchy" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oligarchy"><font color="#0000ff">oligarchy</font></a>. The only restriction acceptable in a majoritarian system is that a current majority has no right to prevent a different majority emerging in the future (this could happen, for example, if a minority persuades enough of the majority to change its position). In particular, a majority cannot exclude a minority from future participation in the democratic process. It should be noted, as it's often a subject of misunderstanding, that majoritarianism does not prohibit a decision being made by representatives as long as this decision is made via majority rule, as it can be altered at any time by any different majority emerging in the future."</span></font></font></p>
<p style="BACKGROUND: #f8fcff"><span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">From </font><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarianism"><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarianism</font></a></span></p>
<p style="BACKGROUND: #f8fcff"><span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">The above excerpt embodies the spirit of majoritarianism fairly well. It basically says, if not the majority, then who decides? If you delegate the responsibility to some group (even yourself) to judge what is best for society, then you are imposing your will on people.</font></font></span></p>
<p style="BACKGROUND: #f8fcff"><span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">Arguments both for and against majoritarianism both tend to boil down to rights. Do you have the right to non-interference from the majority? Does the majority have the right to non-interference from you? </font></font></span></p>
<p style="BACKGROUND: #f8fcff"><span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN"><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">I'd argue that the opinion of a passive majority shouldn't be given the same weight as that of an active majority. Nevermind the fact that the two are indistinguishable under Condorcet methods (how do you give people MINIMUM scores?), if a majority attempts to make compromises, can their opinion really be considered to be absolute and inviolable?</font></font></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><span lang="EN" style="mso-ansi-language: EN"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> Voter Experience:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">> </font></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> Range Voting (based on the existence of Amazon product ratings,</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> youtube video ratings, <a href="http://hotornot.com">hotornot.com</a>, the number of movies rated out</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> of stars.) I cannot find a single instance of Condorcet methods</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> besides elections in various open source communities. It doesn't</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> qualify as mainstream.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">That may be right but is irrelevant for the question of what is a good method and what is not.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">If you are attempting to get it used in any situation with non-experts, you better believe it's relevant.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> Understandability:</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">> </font></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">> Range Voting (I dare anyone to challenge me on this)</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">Then let me challenge you right away: I don't understand at all what those numbers a range-ballot asks me for are supposed to mean. They are not explained but instead it is simply assumed naively that each voter will be able to assign meaningful numbers to options. Some even suggest that voters should apply their "gut feelings" to derive the numbers - as if voting were about diffuse emotions and not hard facts. In real world situations it is difficult enough to decide whether I *prefer* A to B or B to A or neither to the other. Often enough it turns out that A is preferable in some aspects and B is preferable in other aspects. Suggesting to weigh the aspects first is of no help since it lifts the problem of coming up with meaningful numbers only to a higher, more abstract level. Also, Range advocates tell us that the numbers are not simply supposed to be monetary values but rather such things as degrees of "utility" or perhaps "happiness". Simple question: Can you enumerate y</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>our happiness with, say, having saved a species from extinction? And even if some people can, it is obviously not justified to simply assume that every voter should be able to do such magic without at least providing some serious scientific evidence for such a bold claim.</font></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I now realize the mistake of labeling how easy it is to teach someone to emulate the method 'Understandability' and for that I apologize. : - )</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">What I meant is that if you attempt to teach anyone how to turn Range Voting ballots into a winner, it will take a lot less time than the same feat in Schulze.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I do not want your well thought out arguments to go to waste though : -) </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">I'll respond.</font></p>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">The arguments you are referring to about "I *prefer* A to B or B to A or neither to the other" was covered in the apathy section. In short, I agree with this claim that you can only be 100% certain of the directionality of a comparison A > B, A< B, A ~ B (~ is the apathy comparison, a notation I made up but seems to work so far). I mentioned this. Now, I would argue that utility and money are intuitive concepts. The comparison of $45 to $1 to $.99 is really, really simple. I understand that this is a far-fetched example (by which I mean far removed from the realm of voting), but I suggest that this is how voters actually see the world. Asking them to quantify how much they like a candidate is not an impossible feat. Now, range voting only deals with a single dimension of comparison, not the aggregate impact of O(n^2) individual comparisons. I'd argue this is easier for most voters to deal with and closer to how they actually see the world. Also, your response comes dangerously close to refuting the concept of decision entirely, in which case all voting is useless. "Often enough it turns out that A is preferable in some aspects and B is preferable in other aspects." You're walking on glass if you attempt to use this argument to refute Range Voting but not binary Condorcet-level decisions.</font></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"></font> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"></font> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3">=========================================================================</font></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri" size="3"></font> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font face="Calibri">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Greg,</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"><font size="3"> </font></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">If one limits criteria to the few you selected, Range "looks" good. I will set aside for the moment the fundamental issue of whether mixing different individuals' different scoring standards can convey any real meaning ( the difference in candidate "quality" between candidates you score 8 and 10 may be ten times greater than the difference your neighbor assigns to candidates scored 2 and 10), and just speak about other criteria.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"> </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">I am not attempting to limit the debate to a few criteria. I welcome all criteria anyone deems important. I only mentioned a few to begin with, and they didn't all support Range Voting e.g. the apathetic voter's dilemma argument. Go ahead and accuse my coverage of being biased; it probably is, I am human after all. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">If you wish to continue setting the issue of combining different scales together aside, just say so, but I will respond to your argument nonetheless.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">The reason they can be treated equally is their impact on the mean. Each voter's decision might be using different scales but there is certain behavior that all rational voters' votes will follow (such as transitivity and no wasted space). In addition to this, the votes' impact on the mean is identical and it is fundamentally the IMPACT OF A VOTE THAT SHAPES ITS USE, given enough time and a ration population. Still, a very good argument, thanks. : - )</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"><font size="3"> </font></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Personally, I agree that the Condorcet-winner criterion is not as significant as it sounds (we may not be looking at a single solid majority, but rather antagonistic divergent majorities). I think the mutual-majority criterion is more significant (and Range violates it).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>However, I think the Condorcet-loser criterion is a show stopper. If a candidate would lose in every single one-on-one match up, then that candidate should not win. But such a Condorcet loser can indeed win under Range voting.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>I see! Here is my question though, how is the mutual majority criterion relevant when the members of this "majority" specifically chose to compromise with other candidates? My point is essentially this. Range voting rejects the ranking mentality. I support A, failing A, I support B, failing B, I support C etc. With Range it's a bit more abstract and less procedural. Because nothing resembling an iteration (one could view comparing pairwise contests sequentially as a type of iteration) ever occurs under Range Voting, none of the candidates ever conceptually fail such that one's full support is deemed to fall with a different candidate. I know this is a bit complicated and I might be explaining things badly, but the bottom line is this: Range Voting treats a vote of 100% for Bob and 60% for Alice as exactly that. This voter is not determined to support Bob 100% over Alice for the purposes of forming a majority. Thus a majority in the sense of the mutual majority criterion doesn't really carry any weight. Thus it does obey the mutual majority criterion if you define "belonging" to a particular majority as 100% of this voter is going to the Bob camp and 60% to the Alice camp.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">If that answer is unsatisfactory, this is the simplified version "You are ignoring the magnitude of preferences, which ARE knowable in Range Voting hence the criticism doesn't apply."</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">I also believe the later-no-harm criterion is of crucial importance, which Range fails. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">IRV, FPTP, and some obscure variant of Minmax are the only methods to satisfy later-no-harm.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">FPTP is just pathetic.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">IRV is non-monotone and leads to perpetual two-party domination.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">I do not know enough about the obscure variant of Minmax to criticize it specifically.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Range is more prone to strategic voting manipulation than either IRV or Condorcet (see analysis by James Green-Armytage in his doctoral paper<span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>linked on this list a couple of months ago).</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Once I find the paper I will have some better arguments, but in the meantime, here is this.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Range Voting manipulation is straightforward, exaggeration. Manipulation in Condorcet and IRV involve intricate support of other candidates to lead to favorable match-ups. Strategic Range is just equivalent to Approval, which fares better than Condorcet and IRV in Bayesian Regret simulations. In Range Voting, the exaggerations are at least partway honest, reducing the chance of a vastly inferior dark horse from winning.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Essentially, even if Range Voting is more prone to this, that doesn't prove the result of strategy in fact makes Range Voting an inferior method to Condorcet and IRV. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes"> </span>It also doesn't address the damage when strategic voting is attempted. I argue that Range will at least lead to semi-plausible winners under this system.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Range is also more prone to spoiler scenarios than IRV or Condorcet-compliant methods, because the score a voter assigns is dependent on what other candidates are, or are not in the race to compare with. </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">First, um, independence of irrelevant alternatives…</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Next, IRV spoiler scenario: </font><a href="http://rangevoting.org/IRV1519.html"><font size="3">http://rangevoting.org/IRV1519.html</font></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Third, Condorcet methods fail IIA</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Now to defend the behavior that has been called the spoiler effect. First of all, the rough magnitudes of voter comparisons are stable, thus an additional candidate should not alter the placement of current candidates unless they are the new best or new worst. You exaggerate the additional impact of new relative comparisons of old ones.</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes"><font size="3"> </font></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Beyond the realm of standard criteria, I am also concerned about the effect different voting methods have on candidate campaign behavior, and resulting voter information. Some voting methods discourage candidates from revealing their true positions on controversial issues, if avoiding voter alienation is more crucial than earning first-preference support (this can be true of both Range and Condorcet).</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Let's look to Australia and Ireland for evidence of the impact of IRV, particularly Ireland. You might have seen pictures of campaign posters advocating a certain person for spot #1 and others for #2 or #3. Or one could observe the preference-swapping agreements in Australia. This is a direct consequence of later no harm. The parties THEMSELVES share power with each other. (In spite of this, both countries have two party systems).</font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">My best guess regarding Condorcet/Range's impact is this: the parties will be campaigning in the same areas more and more, trying to improve their own position in the same demographic. Campaigns will be less negative because you have more than one opponent. Attacking that opponent will help your rivals as well, so it's a waste of your effort. Explicit preference swapping agreements will be rarer under Condorcet and nonexistent under Range, but they will be campaigning in other parties' turf when they think they can improve that group's opinion of them just a little.</font></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Thanks, </font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><font size="3">Greg Nisbet</font></p></font></div>
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