<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><DIV>I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly<BR>better than the version of "Range Voting" (aka Average Rating or<BR>Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV.<BR><BR> <A href="http://rangevoting.org/">http://rangevoting.org/</A></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that have the bottom</DIV>
<DIV>slots (at least 2 and not more than half) clearly labelled as expressing<BR>"disapproval" and all others as expressing "Approval". The default</DIV>
<DIV>rating is the bottom-most.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Compute each candidate X's Approval score and also "Approval</DIV>
<DIV>Opposition" score (the approval score of the most approved candidate</DIV>
<DIV>on ballots that don't approve X). </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>All candidates whose approval score is exceeded by their approval<BR>opposition (AO) score are disqualified. Elect the undisqualified</DIV>
<DIV>candidate that is highest ordered by Average Rating.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I suggest many fewer slots than 99 and no "no opinion" option, so I</DIV>
<DIV>think the resulting method is not more complex for voters.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>This method would work much better than normal RV in avoiding a</DIV>
<DIV>split-vote problem in a '2 sub-factions confront a big faction' scenario</DIV>
<DIV>(such as Obama and Clinton versus McCain). In this method if Obama</DIV>
<DIV>and Clinton supporters all approve both candidates and not McCain,</DIV>
<DIV>then if there are more of them voting than McCain supporters McCain</DIV>
<DIV>must be disqualified, so Obama and Clinton can compete with each</DIV>
<DIV>other more meaningfully and with much less risk of a McCain win.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Minor party supporters can make approval distinction between the </DIV>
<DIV>front-runners and then rate their sincere favourites exclusive-top with</DIV>
<DIV>very little added risk (compared with rating their preferred front-runner<BR>equal-top) of allowing their "greater evil" candidate to win.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>It meets a sort of "Approval Strong Minimal Defense" that says that</DIV>
<DIV>if more voters approve X and not Y than approve Y, Y can't win.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>And a sort of "Approval Majority for Solid Coalitions" that says that</DIV>
<DIV>if more than half the voters rank/rate a subset S of candidates above</DIV>
<DIV>all others, and approve all the members of S and none of the non-members,</DIV>
<DIV>then the winner must come from S. </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>(This of course is only worth mentioning because the voters supporting</DIV>
<DIV>the S candidates can still make meaningful preference distinctions among<BR>them, unlike in plain Approval.) </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Like normal Range it clearly meets Favourite Betrayal, because if X wins</DIV>
<DIV>with some voters insincerely down-rating Y, then if Y is raised to the top</DIV>
<DIV>slot alongside X; X will still be qualified (because X's approval score will</DIV>
<DIV>not be reduced and X's AO score can only be reduced), no non-XY candidate</DIV>
<DIV>can have a reduced PO score so no previously disqualified non-XY candidate</DIV>
<DIV>will become undisqualified; and of course only Y's Average Ratings score</DIV>
<DIV>will be changed so if there is a new winner it can only be Y.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Like normal Range and unlike methods such as Bucklin, it meets Independence<BR>from Irrelevant Ballots (IIB). This wouldn't be the case if the rule regarding the</DIV>
<DIV>approvals specified for example that candidates need to be disapproved by "a</DIV>
<DIV>majority" to be disqualified.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I can't see that this method fails any desirable criterion that normal Range meets.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Comments?</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Chris Benham</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV></div><br>
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