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Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which
of IRV and FTP<br>
produces the best outcome. Using enough election data, one could even
measure how often IRV may<br>
elect the candidate not favored by most voters.
My humble estimation is rarely (1/50 times).<br>
In comparison I estimate FPTP outcomes to be deficient (1/5 times) and
condorcet methods (1/200 times).<br>
I qualify a method to be deficient when another outcome would produce a
better global satisfaction.<br>
<br>
Stéphane<br>
<br>
Kathy Dopp a écrit :
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cite="mid391f105b0712261541j351cc9e0pae465ca4acbd9312@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
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<pre wrap="">Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2007 19:33:27 +0100 (CET)
From: Kevin Venzke <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr"><stepjak@yahoo.fr></a>
Subject: [Election-Methods] RE : Re: IRV ballot is at least as fair as
FPTP ballot
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<pre wrap=""> Yes some voters have second-choice considered but they are all still
treated equally.
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<pre wrap=""><!---->
So, you "define" equal as your ballot's first and second choices
count, but someone else's first and second choices do not.
I and many others may disagree with your definition of "equal"
treatment and I hope that the courts do too since IRV may often elect
the candidate not favored by most voters.
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<pre wrap="">But it does this according to what it believes each voter wants. If your
</pre>
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Well I don't want some voters' second choices given consideration but
not all voters' second choices given consideration. Will it take what
I believe into consideration? No.
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<pre wrap="">first preference wins the election, then you don't want your second
preference to be counted. If your first preference is a very weak
candidate, then you want him to be eliminated so that your second
preference can be counted.
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One problem is that my second choice candidate may be eliminated in
the first round and my first choice candidate not have success either
- despite the fact that my second choice candidate is the most popular
among all voters.
For instance, this example, which is one of countably infinite
examples where IRV elects the candidate not supported by most voters:
Republican Libertarian Progressive Democrat
1st choice 4 3 3 2
2nd choice 1 2 1 7
3rd choice 1 1 6 1
I.e. in this example with 12 voters, the Democrat loses in the first
round, even though the most number of persons supported the Democrat
overall - letting the Republican win, even though the Republican (in
this example) is not as widely supported as to other candidates.
I created a list of the 12 voters and their choices in a spreadsheet.
I suggest you do a little experimenting on your own because I do not
have time to do the analysis for you because I am too busy to spend
my time disabusing you of a fiction you hold. I am working on other
more critical matters. Please do the analyses yourself with a
spreadsheet so you can see how trivially easy it is to make IRV put
the wrong candidate, not supported by most voters into office.
For example in Florida, what if the true first choice of most
Democratic voters had been Nader in 2000, then IRV would have
immediately knocked the Democrat out of the race, enabling the
Republican to win. (BTW, Nader had virtually nothing to do with Gore
losing Florida in 2000 - there was 1. electronic fraud in one county
that robbed thousands of votes from Gore temporarily, 2. tons of
illegal undated military ballots sent into election offices during the
election contest and when the Dems tried to challenge the illegal
ballots, they were intimidated by being told they were not patriotic,
and 3. Katherine Harris removed thousands of legal voters off the
rolls primarily in Black Democratic districts. IRV would have made
sure that Gore didn't win, even without all those other election
frauds or voter disenfranchisements.
IRV is factually just not capable of doing what it claims to be able to do.
Kathy
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<pre wrap="">For this reason it's not obvious which voters are put at a disadvantage.
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">IRV not only treats voters'
ballots very differently, it ensures that there are numerous ways that
a candidate is declared a winner who is supported by fewer voters
overall than a candidate who loses in the first round.
This fact is irrefutable, obvious and simple. Just try some scenarios
out in any spreadsheet.
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<pre wrap="">It is a valid criticism that IRV can elect a candidate with less "support"
than some other candidate.
This makes me wonder what election methods you do like, since
first-preference plurality voting already has the same issue. Just because
the plurality ballot doesn't ask for "support" doesn't mean the concept
doesn't exist.
In any case, people on this list who dislike IRV still would not want to
argue that it should be illegal, since this could set a precedent that
prevents other, arguably better methods from being adopted.
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">IRV would only be fair and treat all voters equally if all first AND
second choices of all voters were tabulated, with the second choices
being given some weight less than the first - ONLY then would IRV not
routinely allow numerous ways to declare a candidate a winner who is
supported by fewer voters than the candidate who loses in the first
round.
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<pre wrap="">That sounds like Borda, not IRV. Borda would be terrible in public
elections. Maybe you would like Bucklin, in which all voters' subsequent
choices are added in until somebody has a majority.
It's worth noting, about these, that an IRV advocate can argue that it is
unfair for a vote for a second preference to cause one's first preference
to fail to win.
What do you think of top-two runoff, as in Louisiana? In the
three-candidate case IRV is the same method as this, except that the second
round is performed automatically according to the rankings.
If my candidate is eliminated in the first round of a top-two runoff, so
that I am forced to vote for a different candidate in the second round, do
you feel I have been treated unequally?
Alternatively, if my first choice makes it to the second round but loses,
have I been treated unequally because I never had a chance to vote for my
second preference?
I guess one could hold such opinions, but top-two runoff is not such a rare
method in the world.
Kevin Venzke
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<pre wrap=""><!---->----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
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