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Satisfaction analysis should help answer your question....<br>
<br>
Diego Santos a écrit :
<blockquote
cite="midab7e60980712120350l120ae884m85db15da1abf6e6@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">I was not enough clear when i wrote my previous email. The
'>>' is not a real approval mark on the ballot, it was only a
"satisfaction limit" from each voter. I am arguing that not always the
Condorcet winner is the one that maximizes happiness of the people, as
Jonathan pointed.
<br>
<br>
A "approval quorum" rule will avoid low utility CW to win. And, opposit
to Jonanthan argument, an approval cuttoff does not add too much
complexity: it is like a hypothetical candidate NOTB (none of the
below).
<br>
<br>
<div><span class="gmail_quote">2007/12/11, Dave Ketchum <<a
href="mailto:davek@clarityconnect.com">davek@clarityconnect.com</a>>:</span>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">On
Tue, 11 Dec 2007 12:20:49 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote:<br>
> On Dec 11, 2007, at 6:05 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
><br>
><br>
>>Jonathan,<br>
>><br>
>>--- Jonathan Lundell <<a href="mailto:jlundell@pobox.com">
jlundell@pobox.com</a>> a écrit :<br>
>><br>
>>>...should choose B as a good compromise, with the A voters
saying A<br>
>>>is<br>
>>>good, B OK, C very bad. But Diego's profile suggests to me
that the A
<br>
>>>voters are saying something like A is good, B is bad, C is
very bad.<br>
>>>Not that they can express it in a normal linear ballot,
just that<br>
>>>we're being told a little more about their opinions.
<br>
>><br>
>>In my opinion, to the extent that the effect of a
">>bad>verybad"<br>
>>vote is<br>
>>disregarded, the point of letting voters indicate such
preferences is<br>
>>undermined anyway.
<br>
><br>
><br>
> I'm not advocating it as a ballot option, only as a meta-notation<br>
> shorthand to give us kibitzers a little more information about the<br>
> voters' utility functions.<br>
><br>
>
<br>
>><br>
>>>In my example, the effect of a later-no-harm voting rule is
evident.<br>
>>>In Diego's, a rule (such as STV) that elects A doesn't seem<br>
>>>unreasonable to me.<br>
>>>
<br>
>>>The problem is that with an ordinary linear ballot (no
'>>'), we<br>
>>>can't<br>
>>>distinguish between the cases. Not that I'm arguing that we
should<br>
>>>employ '>>'; offhand, that strikes me as a
complication to be
<br>
>>>avoided.<br>
>><br>
>>In one sense I don't agree. If >> is allowed then
apparently it's<br>
>>safe to<br>
>>vote ">>bad>verybad." If >> isn't allowed then
voters will probably
<br>
>>be more<br>
>>cautious, since the method could very well take them as serious
if<br>
>>they say<br>
>>that bad is better than verybad.<br>
>><br>
>>I tend to think that if B doesn't win in Diego's scenario, the
<br>
>>method is<br>
>>second-guessing the voters. It either disbelieves the C voters'<br>
>>preference<br>
>>for B over A, or finds that there's something more important
than<br>
>>majority
<br>
>>rule.<br>
><br>
><br>
> There's a reasonable argument to be made (hardly originally by me)
on<br>
> either side of the question of whether a compromise candidate is<br>
> sometimes (or always) better to the candidate of one faction in a
<br>
> close election.<br>
><br>
> If the vote were:<br>
><br>
> 53 A<br>
> 47 C<br>
><br>
> ...we'd shrug and call it a fairly close election, or at least no<br>
> landslide, and forget about it, even if all 100 voters strongly
<br>
> disapproved of the opposing candidate. If we introduce a third<br>
> candidate whom the A and C voters despise only slightly less than C<br>
> and A respectively, and end up with something like Diego's
profile, we
<br>
> have 100 (or 90 in that profile) unhappy voters instead of 47.<br>
<br>
A and C agree that B is better than their standard enemy.<br>
<br>
C voters will be happy to help install B, since this is better than<br>
installing A. A voters may be a bit unhappy, but they at least avoided
<br>
installing C.</blockquote>
<div><br>
Probably A supporters will be too unhappy, because their favorite
candidate would win if B was not nominated.<br>
</div>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">><br>
> I'm not saying that it's unarguable, nor that the voting system
should<br>
> somehow anticipate the situation (through the use of '>>',
for<br>
> example). I think it's a fuzzy case with no perfect answer, and
that
<br>
> we don't really want to make the ballot more complex, or add to the<br>
> possibilities for manipulation that such a rule would entail. I'm
just<br>
> saying that it's not obvious that, in all cases, the best rule is
the
<br>
> one that lets B win.<br>
<br>
Choices can be hard. Get far enough from a tie and A or C will win. If<br>
we manage a cycle we can debate the results of that.<br>
--<br>
<a href="mailto:davek@clarityconnect.com">davek@clarityconnect.com
</a> <a href="http://people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek">people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek</a><br>
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026<br>
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
<br>
If you want peace, work for justice.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a>
for list info<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<br clear="all">
<br>
-- <br>
________________________________<br>
Diego Santos
<pre wrap="">
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</pre>
</blockquote>
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