<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
Kevin,<br>
<br>
Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I also don't find the FBC-satisfying version of MCA to be a
significant improvement over Approval.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
I like it better than 3-slot CR. I agree that in scenarios where it
is known to be very likely<br>
no majority first-round winner then it is just "Approval with extra
voter expression" and when<br>
it is considered possible that there will be a first-round winner then
that prophesy will quickly tend<br>
to become self-fulfilling and the method tends to become "Approval with
a silly ballot option<br>
(the middle slot) for strategic mugs".<br>
<br>
In principle I don't like restricted ranking ballots or hybrid
ballot-types with a restricted ranking<br>
component.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">As far as my strategy simulation is concerned, this rule change raises the
question of how voters should evaluate the possibility that they elevate a
candidate to the top spot on first preferences only to see him lose due to
pairwise opposition.</pre>
</blockquote>
I don't fully understand this point. Any candidate who would win in
the first round of regular MCA would <br>
also win in the first round of my suggested version, and in both the
FPW can win in the second round.<br>
The only difference is that my version is more likely to have a
first-round winner, which I suppose in the<br>
FBC-complying 3-slot ballot version might be a bit self-defeating. In
your FPP-approval ballot version<br>
I don't see how it greatly complicates the strategy.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Well, if you're considering using MCA then you probably care about
complexity. </pre>
</blockquote>
I used to think that for a 3-slot method it had a "maximal set of
properties" (though not necessarily<br>
the most attractive set) and that the great simplicity was a bonus.<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid615796.59086.qm@web23305.mail.ird.yahoo.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Chris,
--- Chris Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"><cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au></a> a écrit :
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Kevin,
In your latest post you alluded to MCA's failure of Independence from
Irrelevant Ballots (IIB):
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">A nice thing about the majority requirement is that if it's assumed that
you are going to vote, there's no way that your vote can move the
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">majority
>from one candidate to another.
</pre>
<pre wrap="">But but the bad thing about the "majority requirement" is that choosing
between not voting and voting
for nobody (ignoring the competitive/viable candidates) can change the
winner by changing the majority
threshold.
I suggest that MCA instead of electing the top-ratings winner only if
that candidate's top-ratings score
is greater than half the total number of valid ballots, it elects the
top-ratings winner (TRW) if the TRW's
top-ratings score is not smaller than his/her maximum pairwise
opposition.
(Here I'm referring to the FBC complying version of MCA that uses
3-slot ratings ballots, but this
mechanism could equally be used for the version you were discussing that
uses hybrid FPP-approval
ballots, and also to Bucklin.)
Doesn't this fix MCA's IIB problem at no cost (except a bit more
complexity)?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Well, if you're considering using MCA then you probably care about
complexity. I also don't find the FBC-satisfying version of MCA to be a
significant improvement over Approval.
In terms of criteria, at first glance it seems like this has a good chance
of preserving FBC since pairwise opposition is friendly to it. I'm not
totally sure.
As far as my strategy simulation is concerned, this rule change raises the
question of how voters should evaluate the possibility that they elevate a
candidate to the top spot on first preferences only to see him lose due to
pairwise opposition.
Kevin Venzke
_____________________________________________________________________________
Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://mail.yahoo.fr">http://mail.yahoo.fr</a>
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>