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Miss Dopp,<br>
<br>
I definitively cannot accept this analysis.<br>
What you just wrote SEEMS OBVIOUSLY TRUE WITH IRV to me.<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, every voter has
their first place choice tabulated and no one has any second-choice
considered and all voters' ballots are treated equally.
This is obviously not true with IRV.
Kathy</pre>
</blockquote>
In IRV, every voter has a current preference tabulated and all voters'
ballots are treated equally.<br>
The fact that it is a first, second or fifth preference is definitively
unrelevant when having to consider<br>
the voting method fair or not. The treatment is the same for every
voter, and you cannot say in advance<br>
which voter will be unfairly treated, or less than with FPTP.<br>
<pre wrap="">And this previous statement is simply unbelievable!!!
<blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">my opinion is that it does
not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
equally.
(...)
Kathy</pre></blockquote></pre>
Obviously to me, IRV ballots are at least as fair than FPTP ballots,<br>
and definitively more precise.<br>
<br>
Stéphane Rouillon, ing., M.Sc.A., Ph.D.<br>
<br>
Kathy Dopp a écrit :
<blockquote
cite="mid391f105b0712251111x2f23b358h9893b07566ab5b7f@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">-
Allen,
Your statement is flatly false.
in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, every voter has
their first place choice tabulated and no one has any second-choice
considered and all voters' ballots are treated equally.
This is obviously not true with IRV.
Kathy
Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 12:51:10 -0500
From: Allen Smith <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:easmith@beatrice.rutgers.edu"><easmith@beatrice.rutgers.edu></a>
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to
Lawsuit Against IRV
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>
Umm... in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, anyone voting
for a candidate who doesn't win has their votes not considered,
essentially. While IRV has its definite problems, I'd not say this is one of
them (indeed, given that it counts the choices (for the two top candidates)
of voters who vote for a third/whatever candidate when FPTP doesn't, this is
an argument for _FPTP_ being illegal under such a law...). However, it's
perfectly possible that courts may disagree; as can be seen with such things
as rulings that Congress is competent to determine medical necessary (as
with marijuana), courts frequently make mistakes when dealing with matters
outside of their rather limited area of expertise (said area being the law,
as opposed to reality...).
-Allen
On Dec 25, 2007 11:15 AM,
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV
(Kathy Dopp)
2. Re: Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV
(Allen Smith)
3. Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election
(Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 10:11:47 -0700
From: "Kathy Dopp" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kathy.dopp@gmail.com"><kathy.dopp@gmail.com></a>
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to
Lawsuit Against IRV
To: "Abd ul-Rahman Lomax" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:abd@lomaxdesign.com"><abd@lomaxdesign.com></a>
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>
Message-ID:
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:391f105b0712250911k70e31d26x24bb8f7ae0f6ccc9@mail.gmail.com"><391f105b0712250911k70e31d26x24bb8f7ae0f6ccc9@mail.gmail.com></a>
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-
Thanks for your comments Abd ul-Rahman Lomax (what name should I call you?)
I do find that ballots (2nd choices) of some, but not all
voters is considered with IRV, and hence my opinion is that it does
not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
equally.
I find there to be many scenarios where IRV voting makes a candidate a
winner who is not supported by the most number of voters and I do not
support it and in fact I oppose IRV.
There must be better methods.
Kathy
On Dec 24, 2007 11:25 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:abd@lomaxdesign.com"><abd@lomaxdesign.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">At 12:12 AM 12/23/2007, Kathy Dopp wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">-
What do you think of this lawsuit?
Kathy
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">I've done a fair amount of study on Brown v.
Smallwood, and it's worth reading. Google it;
there is a copy of the decision on rangevoting.org.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">FairVote Minnesota Responds to Lawsuit Against Instant Runoff Voting
Minneapolis, MN (December 20, 2007)?FairVote Minnesota, a nonprofit,
nonpartisan organization leading the effort to institute instant runoff
voting in Minnesota, is issuing a response to news of a lawsuit brought
against the City of Minneapolis and various elected officials by an Eden
Prairie-based organization that is opposed to the pending use of instant
runoff voting (a.k.a. single transferable vote or ranked choice voting) in
the City of Minneapolis.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">The lawsuit was inevitable. It might be premature, however.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The lawsuit alleges that instant runoff voting (IRV) is unconstitutional
and violates the principle of ???one person, one vote.?? Additionally, the
plaintiffs contend that voters won???t understand how to vote using instant
runoff voting.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">They probably also allege that it will cause
dandruff. That's all fluff. There is a real legal
question in Minnesota, and all the hand-waving by
FairVote is not going to make it go away.
FairVote wrote a legal opinion before, similar to
what's in this release. It may have been what was
used to convince Minneapolis authorities to go
ahead in spite of legal opinions given to the contrary.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">FairVote Minnesota presents the following facts as guidance in the
discussion of this lawsuit.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Ah, I must say that I'm tempted to use the term
"lies," when opinions, perhaps even weak
opinions, are presented as fact. Some of what is
said will be arguments, and some facts will be stated as well.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">1. IRV has been upheld on the principle of "one person, one vote" in legal
challenges following its adoption in Cambridge, Mass. (Moore v. Election
Commissioners of Cambridge (1941) and in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Stephenson v.
Ann Arbor Board of Canvassers (1975).
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Yes. Different states. Further, the court in
Brown v. Smallwood was aware that it was
contradicting precedent in other states.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Sources:
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.rwinters.com/docs/moore.htm"><http://www.rwinters.com/docs/moore.htm></a><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.rwinters.com/docs/moore.htm">http://www.rwinters.com/docs/moore.htm</a>;
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.fairvote.org/library/statutes/legal/irv.htm">http://www.fairvote.org/library/statutes/legal/irv.htm</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Lesson One: don't rely on legal advice from people with a conflict of interest.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">2. No legal challenges are threatening instant runoff voting anywhere it's
in use?San Francisco, Calif.; Cambridge, Mass.; Burlington, Vermont; Takoma
Park, Maryland and Cary and Hendersonville, North Carolina.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">I'll be a little surprised if a challenge doesn't
arise in San Francisco, though a lot depends on
details. IRV is sold as a replacement for top-two
runoffs, and top-two runoffs are only employed
where it is considered desirable to have a
majority result. In San Francisco, there are
elections being won with, I think, less than 40%
of the vote. As any parliamentarian would know,
you can't create a majority by discarding ballots
with legal votes on them, merely because they did
not vote for the top two. This *might* be the
basis of a challenge to IRV, though, more likely,
the IRV implementation superceded the majority
requirement, which may not have been absolute.
When IRV has been proposed for the election of
governor in Vermont, it has been quite clear that
exhausted ballots still counted, and that the
election would still go to the legislature if the
winner did not get a majority, as required by the
Vermont constitution: the legislature is to
choose from among the top three candidates.
Now, this makes a lie out of the ballot
instruction that has been proposed in that
Vermont legislation: that adding a lower ranked
preference cannot hurt your first preference. It
can. Odd, don't you think, that such a thing would escape notice?
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">3. Election exit polls in cities using IRV all show voters in overwhelming
numbers not only understand IRV, but prefer it to the old way of voting.
The share of voters indicating they understood IRV well or very well the
first time using IRV: San Francisco ? 87%, Burlington ? 89%; Takoma Park ?
88%; 8%; Cary ? 95%; Hendersonville ? 86%.
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.fairvotemn.org//sites/fairvotemn.org/files/Exit%2520Survey%2520Summary_2007_FINAL.doc"><http://www.fairvotemn.org//sites/fairvotemn.org/files/Exit%2520Survey%2520Summary_2007_FINAL.doc></a><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.fairvotemn.org/sites/fairvotemn.org/files/Exit%20Survey%20Summary_2007_FINAL.doc">http://www.fairvotemn.org/sites/fairvotemn.org/files/Exit%20Survey%20Summary_2007_FINAL.doc</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">The claim that voters would not understand IRV is
of no legal significance. By the way, FairVote
takes two polls, with mixed results, and presents
them as if the results are "overwhelming." Is it
important if 10% of voters say they don't
understand the system? I'd think so. But it is not legally relevant.
Takoma Park always amuses me. That's where
FairVote staff live. Small town, mostly unopposed
elections. Not a place where IRV was needed.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">4. As discussed in an opinion piece in the September 30, 2007 Star Tribune
by attorney and professor David Schultz, the 1915 legal case cited in the
lawsuit, Brown v. Smallwood, was not about instant runoff voting.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Impressive. True. Misleading.
David Schultz is on the Board of FairVote Minnesota.
For an independent opinion, see
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/charter-commission/docs/06_January_3_2006_Legal_Analysis_to_Ch_Commission.pdf">http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/charter-commission/docs/06_January_3_2006_Legal_Analysis_to_Ch_Commission.pdf</a>
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> It was
about a voting method that effectively gave Duluth citizens two votes in
some situations, a clear violation of both the Minnesota and United States
constitutions.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">That's a ... lie. Under no situation in Duluth
did voters have two effective votes. The method
was Bucklin. Simple summary: three-rank ballot.
It's a form of instant runoff, but not using
sequential elimination. In the first rank, you
could vote only for one candidate. Same for the
second rank. Third rank, you could vote for as
many as you like. This was essentially instant
runoff Approval. That is the votes were added, no
candidates were eliminated. Now, the majority
legal opinion at the time, and a dissenting
justice on the Brown v. Smallwood court, clearly
thought that Bucklin was constitutional.
(At first glance, to some, it appears that
Approval -- and Bucklin -- give voters more than
one vote. But, just as with IRV, only one vote is
actually effective; the difference between
Approval and IRV is that alternative votes are
simultaneously considered in Approval and
sequentially in IRV. The sequential dropping of
candidates, and thus of the votes for them, is
what makes IRV such a poorly-behaved system,
quite capable of electing a candidate even though
a majority of voters preferred someone else. See
Robert's Rules on preferential voting. In the
end, only a vote for a winner is effective; all
other votes could be erased from the ballots
without changing the result. Cumulative voting is
a system which actually allows more than one
vote, but cumulative voting is itself not
unconstitutional for some elections, particularly multiwinner elections.)
FairVote analysts have taken a piece of the
Smallwood decision and have treated it as if it
were the entire opinion. In fact, however, if the
entire record is read and, in particular, the
response to a request for reconsideration, the
court was objecting to any kind of alternative vote.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> The concern of that decision was based on what the courts
now call the "one person, one vote" standard. IRV does not violate this
standard because it does not give anyone two votes. It simply allows voters
to rank their preferred candidates.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Smallwood talks about marks on the ballot. With
IRV, a voter may make more than one mark on the
ballot. Sorry, the Smallwood reasoning *does*
apply to IRV. Only one small part of that
reasoning seems to be about the simultaneous
consideration of votes for more than one
candidate, the thing that IRV avoids by
sequential elimination. However, there is no
serious expert opinion that Approval violates one-person, one-vote.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">5. Schultz further explained that since 1915 American democracy has
matured. The political process now seeks to provide more choices for voters
than it once did, as evidenced by numerous ballot access court decisions
that have made it possible for third party candidates such as Jesse Ventura
to run for office. The courts, mindful of voters??? demands for more
options when voting, have properly responded to the demand of citizens in
interpreting election laws to empower and not limit options on election day.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Eh? Is this supposed to be relevant? The problem
in Minnesota is that the Supreme Court of the
State decided that alternative votes were
*unconstitutional*. That court specifically and
explicitly avoided considering whether or not
Bucklin was an improvement, they noted that those
who wanted this improvement should act to amend the constitution.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">6. The lawsuit???s plaintiffs advocate to keep low-turnout municipal
primaries and to make them partisan to ensure all parties are represented
on the ballot. However, IRV shares the goal of ensuring choice on the
ballot. In fact, it makes sure that all candidates appear on the general
election ballot, regardless of party. With IRV, no candidate can be
eliminated in a low-turnout election whose chances might be different in a
general election.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Again, this is not relevant.
Brown v. Smallwood is the current law of
Minnesota, it is a standing precedent. I would
argue that it was a totally defective decision,
not on the self-serving basis served up by
FairVote, but because the arguments in it were
clearly corrupt. Bucklin was working, all you
have to do is look at the election of Smallwood
that was overturned. IRV would also have chosen Smallwood.
I wrote an analysis of the decision which is on
the rangevoting.org web site. You can find it by
googling "Brown v. Smallwood." FairVote has
extensively misrepresented what is in that decision.
As to what will happen to the challenge, this
case is not likely to be resolved without a state
supreme court decision. Good chance that the
lower courts will toss out the Minneapolis law
based on Brown v. Smallwood, but, regardless,
expect it to end up at the top. There, I see three possibilities:
1. Brown v. Smallwood is upheld and applies to IRV. That would be unfortunate.
2. Brown v. Smallwood is upheld but applies only
to Approval-type alternative vote. That would
*also* be unfortunate, and would be the first
time that such a decision is explicitly made.
Approval supporters should, in particular,
attempt to avoid this outcome by filing friend-of-the-court briefs.
3. Brown v. Smallwood is reversed. This is the ideal outcome, in my view.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
--
Kathy Dopp
The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author
Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a
Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in
exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at
P.O. Box 680192
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://utahcountvotes.org">http://utahcountvotes.org</a>
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History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of
Election Auditing Fundamentals
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf">http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf</a>
Vote Yes on HR811 and S2295
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Voters Have Reason to Worry
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and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote
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------------------------------
Message: 2
Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 12:51:10 -0500
From: Allen Smith <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:easmith@beatrice.rutgers.edu"><easmith@beatrice.rutgers.edu></a>
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to
Lawsuit Against IRV
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>
Message-ID: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mid+200712251751.lBPHpAe65724377@dogberry.rutgers.edu"><mid+200712251751.lBPHpAe65724377@dogberry.rutgers.edu></a>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
In message <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:391f105b0712250911k70e31d26x24bb8f7ae0f6ccc9@mail.gmail.com"><391f105b0712250911k70e31d26x24bb8f7ae0f6ccc9@mail.gmail.com></a> (on
25 December 2007 10:11:47 -0700), <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:kathy.dopp@gmail.com">kathy.dopp@gmail.com</a> (Kathy Dopp) wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I do find that ballots (2nd choices) of some, but not all
voters is considered with IRV, and hence my opinion is that it does
not treat all voters' ballots equally and should be considered illegal
under any law that requires the ballots of all voters to be treated
equally.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Umm... in a non-runoff FPTP single-person-position system, anyone voting
for a candidate who doesn't win has their votes not considered,
essentially. While IRV has its definite problems, I'd not say this is one of
them (indeed, given that it counts the choices (for the two top candidates)
of voters who vote for a third/whatever candidate when FPTP doesn't, this is
an argument for _FPTP_ being illegal under such a law...). However, it's
perfectly possible that courts may disagree; as can be seen with such things
as rulings that Congress is competent to determine medical necessary (as
with marijuana), courts frequently make mistakes when dealing with matters
outside of their rather limited area of expertise (said area being the law,
as opposed to reality...).
-Allen
--
Allen Smith <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://cesario.rutgers.edu/easmith/">http://cesario.rutgers.edu/easmith/</a>
There is only one sound argument for democracy, and that is the argument
that it is a crime for any man to hold himself out as better than other men,
and, above all, a most heinous offense for him to prove it. - H. L. Mencken
------------------------------
Message: 3
Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 13:14:39 -0500
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:abd@lomaxdesign.com"><abd@lomaxdesign.com></a>
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two
candidate election
To: Kevin Venzke <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr"><stepjak@yahoo.fr></a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>
Message-ID:
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At 09:47 AM 12/25/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">[...] Range, voted with full strategic
effect, reduces to Approval Voting, which may reduce to bullet
voting. It *still* is not Plurality, because it only takes a few
percent of voters adding multiple votes to eliminate the spoiler effect.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">So you say that if Range is not quite as bad as Plurality, then that's "as
well as hoped" for Range? I think most Range advocates have higher hopes.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">No. But I can understand why Mr. Venzke would think that's my
position. When a writer writes something that, without careful
reading, can be interpreted to confirm some stereotype, it's very
easy to overlook contradictory details. Further, an extension of the
Wikipedia principle of Assume Good Faith, which is to assume that a
writer is actually saying something of interest, would require not
being satisfied with a shallow and meaningless interpretation.
Read what I wrote. I described what happens under certain conditions,
the *worst* case. And then I noted that a few voters voting other
than Plurality style are enough to solve the number one problem with
Plurality. That's not shabby, particularly for Approval, which
accomplishes this at no cost, merely starting to do what should have
been a no-brainer from the beginning. It's the elephant in the living
room, we never noticed, thought he was part of the furniture.
I did a study of strategic voting in Range 3, using some simple
assumptions: three candidates, many voters, utilities for the voter
of 1.0, 0.5, 0, and zero knowledge. Turns out that the sincere vote
utility is equal to the "strategic vote" utility in that case, which
is the same whether the voter votes (1,0,0), or (1,1,0). The claim
that bullet voting is higher utility is not correct, it depends.
*Accurate* sincere voting is on a par, at least, with "strategic
voting," but there were different implications. The exaggerated vote
resulted, as one might predict, in more wins for the favorite. But it
also resulted in more wins for the least-favored. The sincere vote
was less variable in result.
There was another interesting result from that study: if we take the
Range election, with equal expected outcome for both the sincere vote
and the strategic vote, and make it an Approval election, i.e.,
restrict the set of legal votes to the Approval style votes, the
expected outcome *declines.* The existence of even one voter who
votes intermediate causes the entire vote distribution to dither,
increasing accuracy, at least that's my theory of why this occurred.
(More study is needed to confirm this; Warren Smith did co-author a
page on it at rangevoting.org, so I think the math is sound; but the
implications of converting to pure Approval have not been confirmed.)
However, first things first. While Range may be theoretically
superior, Approval does improve results quite a bit in the
simulations, and it is blatantly obvious why. Approval is free, just
Count All the Votes. In the ranked form, Bucklin, it was used fairly
widely in the U.S. at one time, though before the living memory of
nearly everyone.
Consider this an election, and electability is important. The
candidates are Plurality, IRV, Approval, Range, Condorcet. How would
we vote in this election, held right now, assuming some level of
public education in the campaign? How should the election be held?
What method should be used?
The Range Voting people are *all*, to my knowledge, supporting
Approval at this time. While CRV is doing a level of educational
effort regarding Range, it's Approval which is seeing real advocacy.
It has a solid history of academic study. It's significant enough
that FairVote is putting some considerable effort into finding ways
to attack it. Simple, cheap, easy to understand, strategy very
simple, no surprises, solves the spoiler problem, but has no center
squeeze effect. Center squeeze is not important in a two-party
system, but what if election reform lives up to the sometimes-implied
promise that it helps third parties gain a toehold?
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Your claim that strategic Range voters are actually sincere is not
different from choosing to believe that the Plurality winner is always the
favorite candidate of the most voters.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">I'm disappointed. Mr. Venzke, I've seen much better analysis from
you. Look again.
In Range, there is no strategic advantage, ever, to reverse expressed
preference from real preference. The so-called "insincere" vote in
Range is simply a non-linear squeeze of the internal utilities, or
another way to put it, the internal absolute utilities are
normalized, first -- nearly everyone will do that, since an election
is a choice, and choices are almost automatically normalized -- then
the scale is expanded depending on two factors: expectations of how
the electorate as a whole is likely to vote, and the effort the voter
is willing to put into determining how to vote. Approval-style voting
is relatively easy, and a lot of voters are going to do just that.
In Plurality, by contrast, strategic voting requires preference
reversal, as with all ranked methods where equal ranking is not allowed.
It's simpler to see with Approval. I claim that a sincere vote in
Approval is a vote which divides candidates into two sets: Approved
and Not Approved. There is no reason for a voter to insincerely vote
(other than through misunderstanding the implications, and they are
pretty simple); an insincere vote would be voting for a candidate
when another candidate preferred over him or her does not get a vote.
What most voters will do with Approval is to vote for their favorite,
first. They will also vote, most of them, for their preferred
frontrunner, since all other votes are likely to be moot. And then,
if they understand the system, they will likewise vote for any other
candidates they also prefer to the frontrunner they voted for. But
those third votes will be rare, and, practically by definition, in a
two-party system, most voters would vote for only one.
Range is obviously more complex to vote, but the basic principles are
the same. I'd expect nearly all voters, once Range is understood, to
vote the extremes for at least one candidate each. It's been argued
that votes should be normalized, to correct for weak votes, on the
theory that these were due to voter ignorance. Indeed, that was a
proposal of mine. I later came to think it was a bad idea. Voters
voting weak opinions *when they really do not have a strong
preference and choose to partially abstain* actually improves outcome.
It's easy to see why. Under Plurality, voters who don't care which of
the frontrunners wins current may choose not to vote, or just don't
go to the trouble. There is lots of handwringing over this, but, in
fact it improves outcome over introducing noise. In face-to-face
meetings, people who don't care about the outcome of a vote, they
could accept either result, often abstain. As they should.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> Essentially Range comes with a
suggestion on how to rate candidates, that isn't motivated by the method's
incentives. And then no matter how people vote, you choose to interpret
that they followed the suggestion.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">What suggestion does Range "come with"? First of all, Center for
Range Voting, mostly put together by a mathematician, is not an
authority on ballot instructions.
Range voting is exactly equivalent to allowing fractional votes in an
Approval election. Current ballot instructions say *nothing* about
how to choose who to vote for. They do not say, "Vote for your
Favorite," they certainly do not say, "Vote for your favored
frontrunner." Approval ballots will not say, "Vote for all candidates
you approve." If the ballots are as I would argue, they should merely
describe what votes are legal and how the outcome will be determined,
which is very, very simple with Range. Again, it is Just Count All
the Votes. Candidate with the most votes wins.
I must say, though, that I don't understand Venzke's last comment, it
refers to more than one unspecified abstraction: the "suggestion on
how to rate candidates," the "method's incentives," and, further,
some "choice to interpret." We add up the votes, we don't "interpret"
them. (In my opinion, that's best; the 'official' CRV recommendation
is still average vote, which introduces a whole can of wormy
complications for no real benefit, and the simulations utterly
neglect this as far as I know, it's just an opinion that got stuck in there.)
Approval instruction: Vote for all candidates you choose to support;
the winner will be the candidate with the most votes.
Range instruction (Range 3, +/-): For each candidate, mark Yes or No
or leave the boxes blank. The candidate with the highest result,
after No votes are subtracted from Yes votes, will win. A blank vote
will not affect the total. (This is Range 3, the three possible votes
are -1, 0, +1; the default vote pulls the average toward the center.
However, it is also possible that there would be an explicit zero,
and that average result would be used. I don't care to debate this,
at this time, there is plenty of time. If we can't get Approval,
Range is really pie in the sky.)
Other possible instructions can be written for higher Range
implementations and different treatment of abstentions; my own
opinion probably that candidate abstentions should be treated as
minimum rating, not mid rating, but this all really needs further study.
Range Voting, at least under that name, was invented by a
mathematician, not a political scientist. The description of Range in
terms of the *meaning* of the vote, aside from the real political
meaning, is a red herring. Votes are actions, not sentiments.
Sentiment is something that the voter uses and integrates with the
voter's opinion of what is possible, sometimes, to decide how to act,
but behind a single action may be quite different intentions.
To cover one more matter again: the application of the Majority
Criterion to Approval depends on a quite problematic definition of
"sincere vote," and James Armytage-Green struggles mightily with the
problem on his page on this criterion. What he really ends up with,
though he doesn't say it explicitly, is a definition of sincere vote
in Approval as being not not sincere. Yes, double negative.
Is it insincere to say that the set of candidates A, B is preferred
to the set of candidates, C, D, if the voter has a preference between
A and B? Of course not. It is not full disclosure of preference, that
is all. To make Approval fail the Majority Criterion -- there seems
to be a strong intuition that it fails, and so a lot of effort into
manipulating the definition so that it, indeed, fails, which makes
mincemeat of the use of election criteria for objective judgement --
one must posit an internal preference that is not expressed, and,
then, of course, if a preference is not expressed, it cannot be
considered by the method and so the majority preference may fail to
win. However, *any preference not expressed* can cause MC failure,
and Plurality, as an example, is generally considered to pass MC.
With Plurality, then, the criterion requires a "sincere vote." Which
with plurality requires preference reversal, i.e., the voter prefers
a candidate that the voter did not rank first.
However, with Approval, the voter may rank the favorite first, there
is no motive not to do so. The question is about additional
approvals. If the majority chooses not to express its preference
*exclusively*, then, of course, it can fail to elect its favorite.
How do we describe this vote? Is it sincere?
In the ordinary meaning, of course it is, there is no reason to
presume otherwise. However, "sincere vote" is used technically in the
Criterion. What does it mean?
The original Majority Criterion that I could find simply referred to
the voter's "preference list." It did not address unexpressed
preferences, it was written for ranked methods, and seems to have
assumed that full ranking was allowed. If a majority strictly prefers
one candidate over all others, that candidate must prevail. But
unwritten was that the majority must express the preference. If a
majority strictly prefers one candidate over all others, and
expresses that preference, that candidate must prevail. Approval
passes this criterion. Some have argued that defining the criterion
this way makes it useless, but that's not true. Range does not pass
the criterion, because "prefer" has no strength; a majority may have
a weak preference which is overcome by a strong preference of a minority.
However, real world: It is certainly true that, with Approval, it
could occur that the preference of a majority fails to be elected, if
the majority adds votes which essentially cancel out the expression
of this preference. But what has long been overlooked is that the
situation in which this would happen would be extraordinarily rare
under present conditions. We should be so luck as to see multiple
majorities, which is what it takes! How often would voters vote for
both frontrunners?
I'd say, let's work for Approval and see how it plays out. Then some
experimentation with fractional votes. The cost of both of these is
well under the cost of implementing ranked methods; Approval is
essentially free. Did I mention that it as simple as:
Just Count All the Votes.
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