<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
In a single district it would elect A (the straightforward approval
winner).<br>
To feed a multiple winner method, it would tell us:<br>
in this district the support for the candidates are A (49), B (48), C
(3).<br>
These supports can be used both to produce a proportional result and to
order<br>
each political party list from the ballots instead of using an order
designated by each party chief.<br>
<br>
Suppose 9 other districts with results:<br>
2: A(55) B(23) C(22)<br>
3: A(97) B(2) C(1)<br>
4: ...<br>
5: ...<br>
6: ...<br>
7:<br>
8:<br>
9:<br>
10: ...<br>
<br>
The average for each party indicates party support that can be
interpeted as seats. Let's suppose<br>
averages give: A(60) B(30) C(10). For 10 seats these numbers represent
the perfect proportional share:<br>
A(6) B(3) C(1). And for what is known, candidate for party A in the
first district as less chances of being elected<br>
than candidate B in the first district because his support is under his
party average while B's support is above party B average. This method
suppose equivalent electorate per district, thus many or no candidates
can be elected for each district.<br>
<br>
SPPA is like an improved STV while maximizing both proportionality and
ballot simplicity (only one name per political party on each ballot).<br>
<br>
Supports have to be legitimate, highest support candidates are not
necessarily winners.<br>
<br>
S. Rouillon<br>
<br>
Kevin Venzke a écrit :
<blockquote cite="mid632193.58560.qm@web23302.mail.ird.yahoo.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Stephane,
I have some difficulty understanding your method. It looks like you
repeatedly find the RP(wv) ranking and assign the last-ranked candidate a
score based on approval (in a way that I didn't totally understand). Then
you disregard this candidate when redetermining the ranking. So that
somehow, which candidates are still being considered in the ranking affects
your approval-based score. If this is basically right then I'd guess the
method is at least not monotonic.
What is your answer to Chris' question about the resolution of this
scenario? :
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">49: A | > C
48: B | > C
03: C | > B
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
He thinks your method elects A. While I can understand why this kind of
method could elect A, it seems alarming to me that it collects the
"disapproved" rankings, which not only seem unused, but also draw attention
to the method's failure of criteria. I imagine it would undermine the
perceived legitimacy of the winner.
Kevin Venzke
_____________________________________________________________________________
Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://mail.yahoo.fr">http://mail.yahoo.fr</a>
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>