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Stephane Rouillon wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I would suggest a Condorcet method usind residual approbation weights
with an approval cut-off (noted "|" ).
It's a mix of Condorcet, IRV and approval.
The idea is:
1) to rank candidates using a Condorcet (ranked pairs, winning votes
for example) method;
2) eliminate last candidate like in IRV and give him the weight
according to the number of voters
having that candidate as last approved;
3) repeat 1) and 2) until winner selection.</pre>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Stephane,
Am I right in gathering that the approval cutoffs don't actually have
any effect on who wins??!
Chris Benham</pre>
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<pre wrap="">33: A > B | C
31: B > C | A
33: C | A > B
3: B | A > C
C is eliminated with 33 votes as support.
B is eliminated with 34 votes as support.
A is last eliminated but receives no rallying voters and finishes with 33
votes as support.
B wins.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Stephane,<br>
<br>
I think I now get it, but to say that an "eliminated" candidate wins
is very strange because in the election<br>
method context "eliminate" normally means "disqualify from winning,
drop from the ballots and henceforth ignore".<br>
>From your original description it seemed that the approvals served only
to give all the candidates each a final "approbation"<br>
score (just for decoration).<br>
<br>
As I now understand it, this method just looks like a very complicated
way of nearly always electing the Approval winner.<br>
<br>
49: A | > C<br>
48: B | > C<br>
03: C | > B<br>
<br>
C>B 52-48, C>A 52-48, B>A 51-49. RP(wv) order C>B>A.
<br>
<br>
By my calculation your method elects the Approval winner A, violating
Majority Loser, Majority for Solid Coalitions and<br>
the Condorcet criterion.<br>
<br>
Is that right?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid46CCF989.6113D983@sympatico.ca" type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Yes. Sorry my wife's name comes up when I remote login...
I think your statement is wrong. Let's try a counter-example:
3 candidates A, B, C and 100 voters.
Ballots:
35: A > B > C
33: B > C > A
32: C > A > B
Repetitive Condorcet (Ranked Pairs(winning votes) ) elimination would produce
at round 1:
68: B > C
67: A > B
Thus ranking A > B > C
C is eliminated.
at round 2:
67: A > B is the ranking
B is eliminated
at round 3:
A wins.
Now in which kind of ballot could an approval cut-off remove some support from
A
and give it to another candidate? Any ballot with A not in first position nor
in last.
Thus concentrating on the C > A > B voters to vote C | A > B instead of C > A
| B
removes final support from A and gives it to C. Not enough A still wins.
Can we obtain an equivalent pairwise succession while raising the number of
adjustable ballots (the ones with A in second position)?
Let's add some B > A > C and try to adapt the others:
33: A > B > C
31: B > C > A
33: C > A > B
3: B > A > C
Pairwise comparison would produce the same 3 round process (values are
different).
66: A > B
67: B > C
64: C > A
Let's put the cut-offs to disadvantage A:
33: A > B | C
31: B > C | A
33: C | A > B
3: B | A > C
C is eliminated with 33 votes as support.
B is eliminated with 34 votes as support.
A is last eliminated but receives no rallying voters and finishes with 33
votes as support.
B wins.
This method is proposed within SPPA.
Stéphane Rouillon
Chris Benham a écrit :
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">Elisabeth Varin wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I read several ways to mix Condorcet and Approval on recent mails.
This is my favourite, using the latest proposed ballot example.
I would suggest a Condorcet method usind residual approbation weights
with an approval cut-off (noted "|" ).
It's a mix of Condorcet, IRV and approval.
The idea is:
1) to rank candidates using a Condorcet (ranked pairs, winning votes
for example) method;
2) eliminate last candidate like in IRV and give him the weight
according to the number of voters
having that candidate as last approved;
3) repeat 1) and 2) until winner selection.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Stephane (?),
Am I right in gathering that the approval cutoffs don't actually have
any effect on who wins??!
Chris Benham
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<pre wrap=""><!---->
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