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Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Chris,
Chris writes [regarding NWL]:
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">For a two-round method that is certainly something simple and "intuitive"
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->that improves on standard
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">plurality TTR. I assume the details are "in first round vote for oneas
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""><!---->favourite and approve as many
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">as you like. FPW wins with FP score of 50% or more. Otherwisequalifiers
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""><!---->are FPW and most approved
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">alternative candidate. (Of course "favourite" also counts as"approved").
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""><!---->
Actually, if I remember correctly I considered this to be a fully ranked
method. You could specify more than one first preference.
</pre>
</blockquote>
I was referring to the 2-round version (with relatively simple
ballots). With these rules in a 2-round version<br>
there would be no point in ballots that allow voters to do more than
indicate first preference and approval.<br>
<br>
In your single- round version with ballots that allow full ranking, are
equal-first preferences split or whole?<br>
<br>
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<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">For method that uses ranked ballots either in one round or in the firstof
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->two rounds, I prefer "elect the winner
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">of the pairwise comparison between the IRV (Strict) winner and the Approval
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""><!---->winner". That wouldn't have a
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">clone problem, supporters of weak candidates would have no
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""><!---->"favourite betrayal" incentive, and it would meet
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">Majority for Solid Coalitions and Dominant Mutual Third.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
I wonder if this method doesn't have a similar problem as NWL.
</pre>
</blockquote>
It probably does. In the 49A, 24B, 27C>B scenario the A supporters
can shift the win from B to A by voting A>C<br>
making C the AW. <br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid633535.32746.qm@web23305.mail.ird.yahoo.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Chris,
Chris writes [regarding NWL]:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">For a two-round method that is certainly something simple and "intuitive"
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->that improves on standard
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">plurality TTR. I assume the details are "in first round vote for one as
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->favourite and approve as many
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">as you like. FPW wins with FP score of 50% or more. Otherwise qualifiers
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->are FPW and most approved
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">alternative candidate. (Of course "favourite" also counts as"approved").
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Actually, if I remember correctly I considered this to be a fully ranked
method. You could specify more than one first preference.
And if the same candidate was the FPW and the AW then this candidate would
win. Otherwise there seems to be a needless monotonicity problem.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Of course in this method voters who are confidant that their favouritewill
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->be the FPW have a big incentive
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">to approve all the turkeys and conversely voters who are confidant
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->thattheir favourite will be the AW might
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">have incentive to vote a turkey as their favourite.But I doubt that
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->the risk of both qualifiers being turkeys is as
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">great in approval top-2, and all this attempted "turkey raising" mighthelp
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->minor parties survive. :)
That's something I wasn't thinking about back then, I guess. The ability
of FPW supporters to approve turkeys seems too great. I'm not worried
about AW supporters ranking turkeys as their favorite, though; this would
run a substantial risk of giving the race to them.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">For method that uses ranked ballots either in one round or in the firstof
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->two rounds, I prefer "elect the winner
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">of the pairwise comparison between the IRV (Strict) winner and theApproval
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->winner". That wouldn't have a
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">clone problem, supporters of weak candidates would have no
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->"favourite betrayal" incentive, and it would meet
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Majority for Solid Coalitions and Dominant Mutual Third.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
I wonder if this method doesn't have a similar problem as NWL.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">... a potentially useful set:"the set of candidates whose approval score
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->is higher than their maximum approval opposition score".
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I think it's pretty interesting... I'm having trouble thinking through
these particular methods, but as a criterion it seems pretty good. Inote
that in the 7 5 8 plurality failure example, again B is required.It
reminds me of "pairwise plurality" (at least, my conception of it),where
a candidate can't win if their worst loss is stronger than theirbest win.
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Notice that in your NWL example
7 A>B5 B6 C2 D>C
the set is {B}, the winner by many of our preferred methods. I invite you
to suggest a name for this set.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Well, in my mind this concept has more to do with "acknowledgment" than
"approval." So I'd be more inclined to phrase it in terms of "voting for"
a candidate than "approving" one.
MD can be:
"If >50% vote for X and don't vote for Y, then Y can't win."
Plurality can be:
"If there are more first preferences for X than votes for Y, then Y can't
win."
This would be:
"If more people vote for X and don't vote for Y, than vote for Y, then
Y can't win."
I'm not sure what to call it... It's nice that it doesn't make reference
either to a majority or to first preferences, though.
Kevin Venzke
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</pre>
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