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Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I think a better method that would achieve everything you are
trying to do with your method (technically
if not "psychologically") would be this:
"1) Voters indicate one Favourite and also Approve as many
candidates as they like.
2) Any candidate voted as favourite on 50% or more of the ballots
wins.
3) Eliminate any candidate whose max. approval opposition score is
greater than 50%, unless that is all
the candidates. </pre>
</blockquote>
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<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">4) Of the remaining candidates, the two voted as favourite on the
most ballots go to the second round."
This uses a more expressive ballot and mainly confines the split-
vote problem to the "top" of the ballot.
So the normal recommended strategy in the 3 viable candidates
scenario would be vote the most preferred
of the 3 as favourite, and approve all the candidates you prefer to
the least preferred of the 3.
What do you think of that?
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
I've had this exact thought... I agree that on paper this should be
similar in effect and better.
I'm a little concerned about approving candidates strategically. If you
have three factions, A B C, with A and B being the frontrunners and C
being an oddball, if both the A and B supporters approve C in attempt
to disqualify their opponent, and C supporters don't approve anyone else,
then C automatically wins.
40 A>C
40 B>C
20 C
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Kevin,<br>
<br>
There are a lot of good methods that can't help the voters if they are
so reckless as to vote an "oddball"<br>
the 60-40, 60-40 CW! But I see that your version (VFA) is "safer"
because only one candidate can be<br>
disqualified.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Maybe three years ago I suggested a rank-ballot, single-round, ranking-
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->implies-approval method in which the pairwise winner of FPW (first-
preference winner) vs. AW (approval winner) contest was elected, except
that the AW would be elected despite losing to the FPW if the FPW had
a loss to a third candidate that was stronger than the FPW's win over
the AW (measured according to WV). I called this method "NWL" for "...and
has No Worse Losses."
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The point of the NWL rule was to avoid inappropriate FPW wins in a
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->scenario like this:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">7 A>B
5 B
6 C
2 D>C
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The FPW is A and the AW is B; A defeats B pairwise, but an A win is
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->deemed inappropriate due to A's loss to C (strength 8 vs. strength 7).
So NWL elects B.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Anyway, it occurs to me that instead of the NWL rule you could have a
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->second round between these two candidates. The ballots say that A will
beat B, but there was plenty of reason for other voters not to vote
for B, even if they had a small preference. If they hold a second round
between A and B, and the C and D>C voters truly do not care to express
a preference between them, then I'm fine with allowing A to be elected.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
For a two-round method that is certainly something simple and
"intuitive" that improves on standard<br>
plurality TTR. I assume the details are "in first round vote for one
as favourite and approve as many <br>
as you like. FPW wins with FP score of 50% or more. Otherwise
qualifiers are FPW and most approved<br>
alternative candidate. (Of course "favourite" also counts as
"approved").<br>
<br>
Of course in this method voters who are confidant that their favourite
will be the FPW have a big incentive<br>
to approve all the turkeys and conversely voters who are confidant that
their favourite will be the AW might<br>
have incentive to vote a turkey as their favourite.But I doubt that the
risk of both qualifiers being turkeys is as<br>
great in approval top-2, and all this attempted "turkey raising" might
help minor parties survive. :)<br>
<br>
For method that uses ranked ballots either in one round or in the first
of two rounds, I prefer "elect the winner<br>
of the pairwise comparison between the IRV (Strict) winner and the
Approval winner". That wouldn't have a<br>
clone problem, supporters of weak candidates would have no "favourite
betrayal" incentive, and it would meet<br>
Majority for Solid Coalitions and Dominant Mutual Third.<br>
<br>
(An alternative ballot-style would be to allow voters to give an
approval cutoff, so they can rank among <br>
unapproved candidates.)<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">... a potentially useful set:
"the set of candidates whose approval score is higher than their
maximum approval opposition score".
</pre>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I think it's pretty interesting... I'm having trouble thinking through
these particular methods, but as a criterion it seems pretty good. I
note that in the 7 5 8 plurality failure example, again B is required.
It reminds me of "pairwise plurality" (at least, my conception of it),
where a candidate can't win if their worst loss is stronger than their
best win.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Notice that in your NWL example<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">7 A>B
5 B
6 C
2 D>C</pre>
</blockquote>
the set is {B}, the winner by many of our preferred methods. I invite
you to suggest a name for this set.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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