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Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">As for IIB, well, Top-Two Runoff already fails
that. </pre>
</blockquote>
Technically, based on "intended rankings", I don't think it does.
Certainly the ranked-ballot one-voting-round<br>
automated top-two plurality runoff meets Irrelevant Ballots (IIB).
BTW, I gather that in the same circles where<br>
IRV is called the Alternative Vote, that method is called the
"Contingent Vote" (and the ghastly version of that<br>
that allows the voter to rank a maximum of two candidates is called the
"Supplementary Vote".)<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">This method is intended to be simple yet still give good results in
likely scenarios. It's a niche method.
The basic idea is to handle at least the case that there are three viable
candidates, with an underlying political spectrum (so that the candidates
can be called left/right/center).
So yes, the ballot is restrictive, and yes, if a fourth major candidate
attracts votes then you will see problems. (But note that the incentives
of the method should make a fourth viable candidate unlikely, just as
FPP makes three unlikely.) As for IIB, well, Top-Two Runoff already fails
that. This is just an improvement of that method.</pre>
</blockquote>
In a scenario like the 2002 French Presidential election (where there
were 12 candidates and the top 3 had<br>
a total of under 53% (19.83, 16.91, 16.14) and second highest
scoring candidate wasn't expected to be<br>
among the top few) I don't think the improvement would be very great. <br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I am sure that something that uses approval ballots in the first round
could be much better. A while ago I suggested
that the two qualifiers should be the Approval winner and the
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">candidate
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">with the most approval opposition to the
AW. How do you see your suggested method as being better than that?
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
I don't think your suggestion is too bad. However, I think the strategy
is harder for the voter to understand.
Also, I think there is a strategy problem that I tried to avoid in the
case that your favorite candidate is left and you think he may be able
to defeat center head-to-head.
In my method you most likely vote for left and vote against right. (Though
if you are confident left can at least beat right, you might not do this.)
In your method, if you approve both left and center, you not only can
make center the AW, you are also unable to provide any opposition for
left against center. You could cause the second round to be center vs.
right. If you bullet vote for left, there is a greater chance that
center will be shut out of the second round (which is something I, at
least, want to try to avoid).</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
In my suggested method the voter's strategy problem is more or less the
same as it is in plain Approval,<br>
unless the voter is tempted by a risky Pushover strategy of trying to
make a "turkey" the first-round AW.<br>
<br>
I think a better method that would achieve everything you are trying to
do with your method (technically<br>
if not "psychologically") would be this:<br>
<br>
"1) Voters indicate one Favourite and also Approve as many candidates
as they like.<br>
<br>
2) Any candidate voted as favourite on 50% or more of the ballots wins.
<br>
<br>
3) Eliminate any candidate whose max. approval opposition score is
greater than 50%, unless that is all<br>
the candidates. (I'm not sure if that's possible).<br>
<br>
4) Of the remaining candidates, the two voted as favourite on the most
ballots go to the second round."<br>
<br>
This uses a more expressive ballot and mainly confines the split-vote
problem to the "top" of the ballot.<br>
So the normal recommended strategy in the 3 viable candidates scenario
would be vote the most preferred<br>
of the 3 as favourite, and approve all the candidates you prefer to the
least preferred of the 3.<br>
<br>
What do you think of that? <br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid802295.55908.qm@web23302.mail.ird.yahoo.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Chris,
--- Forest W Simmons <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:fsimmons@pcc.edu"><fsimmons@pcc.edu></a> a écrit :
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Kevin Venzke wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I suggest this two-round method. It's not Condorcet-efficient or even
rank ballot but I think it would be an improvement, and it's quite
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">simple:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">In the first round you vote FOR one candidate. You also vote AGAINST
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">one
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">candidate. If someone has more than half of the FOR votes, they are
elected. If someone has more than half of the AGAINST votes, they are
disqualified. Then the second round is between the two candidates with
the most FOR votes who have not been disqualified.
I think this is much better as a two-round method than a one-round rank
method.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">I think this uses an overly restrictive ballot and would have horrible
clone problems and fails Independence
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">>from Irrelevant Ballots without very good justification.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
This method is intended to be simple yet still give good results in
likely scenarios. It's a niche method.
The basic idea is to handle at least the case that there are three viable
candidates, with an underlying political spectrum (so that the candidates
can be called left/right/center).
So yes, the ballot is restrictive, and yes, if a fourth major candidate
attracts votes then you will see problems. (But note that the incentives
of the method should make a fourth viable candidate unlikely, just as
FPP makes three unlikely.) As for IIB, well, Top-Two Runoff already fails
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid802295.55908.qm@web23302.mail.ird.yahoo.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">that. This is just an improvement of that method.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I am sure that something that uses approval ballots in the first round
could be much better. A while ago I suggested
that the two qualifiers should be the Approval winner and the
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">candidate
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">with the most approval opposition to the
AW. How do you see your suggested method as being better than that?
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
I don't think your suggestion is too bad. However, I think the strategy
is harder for the voter to understand.
Also, I think there is a strategy problem that I tried to avoid in the
case that your favorite candidate is left and you think he may be able
to defeat center head-to-head.
In my method you most likely vote for left and vote against right. (Though
if you are confident left can at least beat right, you might not do this.)
In your method, if you approve both left and center, you not only can
make center the AW, you are also unable to provide any opposition for
left against center. You could cause the second round to be center vs.
right. If you bullet vote for left, there is a greater chance that
center will be shut out of the second round (which is something I, at
least, want to try to avoid).
I have a hunch that people will be more eager to "vote against" a
candidate they perceive to be an opponent, than to give a lower
preference to a candidate they may need as a compromise.
Kevin Venzke
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</pre>
</blockquote>
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