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Howard Swerdfeger wrote:<br>
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<pre wrap="">Tim Hull wrote:
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""> Condorcet, on the other hand, does not suffer
from the center squeeze. However, it suffers from the opposite problem -
the so-called "Pro Wrestler" or "Loony" syndrome in an election with a
couple polarized candidates and a weak centrist or joke candidate. In my
student government elections, I picture this being a candidate walking
around campus in a clown suit and winning based on becoming everybody's #2.
Also, Condorcet's later-no-harm failure may mean people give a less sincere
ranking than in IRV, though this failure is far less so than in range.
</pre>
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<pre wrap=""><!---->
This is a potential problem with all pure Condorcet methods.
It might be able to be overcome with some restrictions
Candidate must have >5% first preference votes or be one of the top 5
candidates in number of first preference votes.
Or some other restriction might help.
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I can see why this is a marketing/propaganda problem, but not why it is
a *real* problem. <br>
One reason why not is that Condorcet gives serious candidates incentive
to contest the centre so if the<br>
election is serious then at least one serious centrist will run and one
will win. If the election isn't serious then <br>
why is "polarised candidate" necessarily a better winner than a weak
centrist or even a "joke candidate"?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">While I agree party lists are "rotten".
there are lots of other multi winner PR systems, that don't require a
party list
MMP where the "top-up" comes from the best of the losers.</pre>
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How exactly does this version of MMP work? <br>
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<br>
Chris Benham<br>
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