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Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Chris said that people arrive at the polls intending to vote a certain way
in a rank method, and then find out that it's (say) Plurality or Approval.
Say it's Plurality. Their ranking that they arrive with would reasonably
have their favorite in 1st place (Yes, I know it's a no-no to speak of
preference).
Now, upon finding out that it's Plurality, they have strategic reason to
give their one vote to a lower choice compromise. But FARCS has them voting
consistent with their rankings, so that their 1st ranked candidate must be
the one they vote for in Plurality.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Yes. All the strategising (if any) is supposed to only happen between
their sincere preferences and their<br>
'intended ranking'.<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Or, if it's known to be a Plurality election, do they come to the polls
"intending" to vote a ranking that has their Plurality compromise at the top
of the ranking? </pre>
</blockquote>
Yes.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">What about FBC? One must not get a better result by burying one's favorite.
But FARCS and votes-only doesn't allow speaking of favorites. So, what is it
then, does top-ranked replace favorite?
But then, if the actual ballot has to be consistent with the ranking, the
top ranked candidate can't be buried. So how could there be an FBC test?</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Kevin's "Sincere Favourite" criterion seems fine to me. If the voter's
intended ranking is A=B>C and<br>
this results in neither of A or B winning, but some other intended
ranking with one or both of A and B not<br>
given top preference results in one of them winning, then SF is failed.<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><a name="critsf">
<h3><b>Sincere Favorite</b>.</h3>
<p><i>Suppose a subset of the ballots, all identical, rank every
candidate in S (where S contains at least two candidates) equal to each
other, and above every other candidate. Then, arbitrarily lowering some
candidate X from S on these ballots must not increase the probability
that the winner comes from S.</i></p>
<p>A simpler way to word this would be: <i>You should never be able
to help your favorites by lowering one of them.</i></p>
</a></blockquote>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/">http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/</a><br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
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