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Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Your definition of your criteria system sounds
conversational and inexact. Could you demonstrate why Approval and 0-10
CR fail Condorcet’s Criterion, in your system?
<br>
<br>
Aside from that, why is it ok to speak of intent, but not preference?
<br>
</blockquote>
Speaking of preference is an ok alternative, but we don't necessarily
want to worry about what might be 'sincere preferences'<br>
that are voluntarily not voted.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Chris continues:
<br>
<br>
[after naming a long list of criteria met by Approval]
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">But it fails Majority Favourite and Majority
Loser
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Do you mean those criteria with your fictitious rankings?
</blockquote>
Yes.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I’ve never denied that rank methods can add
advantages not available in Approval. I’ve even said that I myself
would prefer a good rank method for our public elections, though I
myself, as a voter, would be content with Approval. It would be a nice
luxury to rank the best candidates, but I don’t really care which one
of the best candidates wins.
<br>
</blockquote>
That is your individual inclination, one which is very convenient for
an Approval advocate.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I'd said:
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">Obviously majority rule is violated by an
outcome that is contrary to what a majority have voted that they want.
For instance, if a majority vote B over A, then we can assume that, if
A or B wins, they vote that it be B.
<br>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
Chris says:
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">That is reasonable, and granted for the sake
of argument. That implies that you agree with Kevin Venzke that Minimal
Defense(MD) must be met
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
It does?? I don't agree with Keviln Venzke that Minimal Defense (MD)
must be met.
</blockquote>
>From Levin's page:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><a name="critmd"></a>
<h3><a name="critmd"><b>Minimal Defense</b>. <i>(Due to Steve
Eppley.)</i></a></h3>
<p><a name="critmd"><i>If more than half of the voters rank candidate
A above candidate B, and don't rank candidate B above anyone, then
candidate B must be elected with 0% probability.</i></a></p>
<p><a name="critmd">Steve Eppley has defined and discussed Minimal
Defense </a><a href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/%7Eseppley/">here</a>
and <a
href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/%7Eseppley/Strategic%20Indifference.htm">here</a>.
Satisfaction of this criterion implies compliance with Mike Ossipoff's <i>strong
defensive strategy criterion</i>, although the reverse is not
necessarily true. That criterion can be found <a
href="http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/stfree.html">here</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/">http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite">It does?? I don't agree with Keviln Venzke that
Minimal Defense (MD) must be met.
</blockquote>
<br>
I'd be interested in seeing an example of MD failure that you agree
(or are content) with.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Chris continues:
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">[Approval] is very vulnerable to
disinformation campaigns
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
That’s a vague statement that could be said of many methods, including
some that Chris likes.
</blockquote>
My statement lacked details, but that doesn't make it "vague". I've
elaborated this criticism of Approval<br>
a few times before.<br>
<br>
Say in the lead-up to the election two candidates have announced that
they will run, and accurate polling<br>
of voters' voting intentions shows A52%, B48%. Say the media hate A, so
others that hate A nominate<br>
a third candidate C who is anathema to A's supporters (or at least some
of them). Then those that hate A<br>
set about giving C a high profile and publishing some fake polls that
suggest that C has some chance to<br>
win. This frightens some of the A supporters into approving B, causing
A to win.<br>
<br>
47: A<br>
05: AB (disinformed timid A>B preferrers)<br>
46: B<br>
02: CB<br>
<br>
Approval: B53, A52, C2.<br>
<br>
What "methods that I like" do you have in mind as being comparably
vulnerable to disinformation campaigns?<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Sincere preferences:
<br>
<br>
40: A
<br>
29: BC
<br>
31: CB
<br>
<br>
The C voters vote C & B. The B voters vote only B. B wins by
defection.
<br>
<br>
Chris, can you find a majority who is being robbed of victory here?
<br>
</blockquote>
No, but if 21 or more of the C voters also defect the sincere BC
majority solid coalition is robbed of victory and<br>
the sincere majority loser wins.<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I’ve repeatedly asked you to show that Approval
and CR pass or fail Condorcet’s Critrerion, by your fictitious-ranking
approach. You never did. I asked Chris. He couldn’t either.
</blockquote>
In your example say the 'intended rankings' are<br>
40: A<br>
29: B>C<br>
31: C>B<br>
<br>
On these intended rankings, C is the CW. On arriving at the polling
place we pretend that those who<br>
were intending to rank B>C or C>B are surprised to find that they
have to use 2-slot ballots, so they each<br>
make an arbitrary choice whether to approve (consistent with their
intended rankings) one candidate or two.<br>
This could result in these actual cast approval ballots:<br>
<br>
40: A<br>
29: B<br>
10: CB<br>
21: C<br>
Approvals: A40, B39, C31.<br>
<br>
A wins, failing Condorcet. (This is the same set of cast ballots as in
the "defection backfires because of too<br>
many defectors" example).<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="midBAY107-F170DCAD166826F5119D40FA5760@phx.gbl"
type="cite"><br>
I<br>
</blockquote>
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