<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
<br>
<br>
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">At 12:48 PM 3/15/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Asset Voting is not "merely proxy voting". The voters are compelled
to choose candidates as their
proxys, who then become privileged super-voters. And in any case I
don't support proxy voting
for public political elections.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Chris has made some assumptions about the identity of candidates. In
particular, I've assumed that write-in votes are allowed. So what is
to prevent a voter from voting for himself or herself?</pre>
</blockquote>
As I understand the Asset Voting procedure, if a significant proportion
of voters did that the meeting<br>
room where the final negotiating and voting takes place could become
over-crowded.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I'd be interested to know why Chris is opposed to "proxy voting for
public political elections." What is it about political elections
that is different from, say, corporate elections? Sure, there are
differences, but why do these differences imply that proxy voting is
to be rejected?</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
I don't see any need for it, and its obviously open to abuse. Plus it
is good for democracy if everyone<br>
directly participates. I don't see that people who are too lazy or
incompetent to vote, or not allowed<br>
out by their domineering associates should be allowed to sign over
extra voting power to Uncle Abd.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">What would Chris think about Asset used for multiwinner elections?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Bad, but less so.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Again, why?
</pre>
</blockquote>
Less bad because (as with Party List PR) with a very simple ballot and
voting, some sort of proportionality<br>
is achieved.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Note that Asset Voting can be, effectively, STV. Consider this: the
ballot could be an STV ranked ballot, which may be truncated. I would
assume, generally, that a voter would most trust their first choice,
so if a truncated ballot is exhausted, the vote would revert to the
control of the first-ranked candidate. It would be possible that the
voter could separately specify the proxy to control votes in the
event of ballot exhaustion, but I really don't see significant benefit in that.
With this procedure, if a voter votes for only one, it is, for that
voter, pure Asset Voting. If a voter ranks all candidates, it is STV,
effectively.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
I get it and don't like it. It just gives parties and candidates extra
'sheep manipulating' power by making it easier<br>
for the sheep to assign their lower preferences blindly. <br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>