<HTML><BODY style="word-wrap: break-word; -khtml-nbsp-mode: space; -khtml-line-break: after-white-space; "><DIV><DIV>On Mar 14, 2007, at 12:15 , <A href="mailto:raphfrk@netscape.net">raphfrk@netscape.net</A> wrote:</DIV><BR class="Apple-interchange-newline"><BLOCKQUOTE type="cite"> <DIV> Doubtless this won't thread correctly.<BR> <BR> <SPAN class="correction" id="">Juho</SPAN> said<BR> > Some observations.<BR> ><BR> > The description talks only about the "yes" votes. Is the assumption<BR> > that the "no" votes mean "no action will be taken"?<BR> ><BR> > If we are talking about approving a new law then this is quite<BR> > typical, but if we vote for example about whether we should send our<BR> > rocket to Mars or Venus, then both sides should be treated in the<BR> > same way.<BR> ><BR> > In the described method repeated 45% yes, 55% no results do not lead<BR> > to final "no" (assuming super majority and new referendum levels 60%/<BR> > 40%). If we have only one rocket to send, voting first on sending the<BR> > rocket to Mars, then on sending it to Venus, then to Mars etc. is not<BR> > fair either. But maybe the method is not intended for this kind of<BR> > elections with two similar alternatives to choose from.<BR> ><BR> <BR> I get the impression the vote would go something like:<BR> <BR> Initial scores = 0<BR> <BR> Round 1<BR> <BR> Mars: 45% +0 = 45 (-50 = -5)<BR> Venus: 55% +0 = 55 (-50 = +5)<BR> <BR> Round 2<BR> Mars: 45% -5 = 40 (-50 = -10)<BR> Venus: 55% +5 = 60 (-50 = +10)<BR> <BR> Round 3<BR> Mars: 45% -10= 35 (-50 = -15)<BR> Venus: 55% +10= 65 (-50 = +15)<BR> <BR> Round 4<BR> Mars: 45% -15= 30 (-50 = -15)<BR> Venus: 55% +15= 70 (-50 = +15)<BR> <BR> Venus wins as >2/3<BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><DIV>Yes. You seem to assume that the Mars and Venus votes would take place more or less simultaneously.</DIV><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><DIV>Howard Swerdfeger's xls sheet btw doesn't behave exactly the same way as the written description of the method says. It doesn't let the Mars results drop below 45%. Thanks to Howard Swerdfeger for providing the sheet. Tthat is a good method to give clear (operational) definitions to the methods.</DIV><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><DIV>Note that it is possible that the sum of Mars and Venus votes need not be 100%. It is possible for example to have a faction that is eager to send a rocket to any planet. As a result both planets may get !50% results. In this case I don't know what happens if both planets reach the super majority limit at the same round.</DIV><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><DIV>One could also make the rules such that there is only one Mars vs. Venus vote at each round and the decision will be made when the balance will go from 50% to some threshold % to either direction. This way the election would be a symmetric election between two similar options (not a status quo vs. change type of election as in the original version).</DIV><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><BLOCKQUOTE type="cite"><DIV>This means that a majority can get anything past if they stick to their<BR> guns, however, it will take lots of votes (spaced say 1 day apart).<BR> <BR> It also naturally scales the time spent debating based on how<BR> controversial the decision is.<BR> <BR> Handling multiple choices could be handled with approval voting. Using<BR> multiple rounds means that the tactics for approval are easier to use.<BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV>Yes. Even Condorcet could be used - just keep increasing/decreasing the elements of the comparison matrix.</DIV><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><DIV>I think there could be also electronic election methods where results are calculated in real-time and voters may change their vote when they see what the current results are. The behaviour of a method in this situation could be also used as one criterion to evaluate the stability of the method. This kind of situations could make also the Nash equilibrium of strategic voting states more meaningful (I have earlier criticized them as not being a good measure for typical ("non real-time feedback") elections).</DIV><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><DIV>Juho</DIV><DIV><BR class="khtml-block-placeholder"></DIV><DIV> <BLOCKQUOTE type="cite"><DIV> For example, if you could use the following formula<BR> <BR> New Approval = 2/3 * ( Old Approval*3/4 + approval from vote )<BR> <BR> if 50% approve of an option, it will get<BR> <BR> Round 1:<BR> 2/3*( 0 + 50) = 33%<BR> <BR> Round 2:<BR> 2/3*(25+50) = 50%<BR> <BR> Round 3:<BR> 2/3*(38+50) = 59%<BR> <BR> Round 4:<BR> <BR> 2/3*(44+50) = 63<BR> <BR> At round N (with N -> <SPAN class="correction" id="">inf</SPAN>)<BR> <BR> Round N<BR> <BR> 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3<BR> <BR> Round N+1<BR> <BR> 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3<BR> <BR> I would suggest rounding upwards to the nearest percent. Ignoring rounding<BR> an option cannot get the <SPAN class="correction" id="">supermajority</SPAN> unless it has 50%+ approval.<BR> <BR> <BR> Alternatively, rounding down could be used and the <SPAN class="correction" id="">supermajority</SPAN> could be <BR> set to say 65% required.<BR> <BR> <BR> </DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV style="clear: both;"><SPAN class="correction" id="">Raphfrk</SPAN><BR> --------------------<BR> Interesting site<BR> "what if anyone could modify the laws"<BR> <BR> <SPAN class="correction" id="">www</SPAN>.<SPAN class="correction" id="">wikocracy</SPAN>.<SPAN class="correction" id="">com</SPAN></DIV> <DIV class="AOLPromoFooter"> <HR style="margin-top:10px;"> <A href="http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100122638x1081283466x1074645346/aol?redir=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eaim%2Ecom%2Ffun%2Fmail%2F" target="_blank"><B>Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail</B></A> -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.<BR> </DIV><DIV style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; ">----</DIV><DIV style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; ">election-methods mailing list - see <A href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</A> for list info</DIV> </BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR></BODY></HTML>