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<div> > From: thully@umich.edu<br>
><br>
> Anyway, I have been investigating alternate systems for single-winner<br>
> elections and (especially) multi-winner elections. Party list is out<br>
> - the less rigidly-defined party structure makes it even less fair<br>
> that it would be in a national election.<br>
<br>
There is a system called open party list. Basically, the voter votes<br>
for 1 candidate. The party that that candidate represents gets the vote<br>
and the seats are split on that <span class="correction" id="">basist</span> between the parties. However,<br>
the party member that actually fills each seat is determined by how many<br>
votes the candidate obtained for the party, e.g. the party's highest<br>
vote getter gets the first party seat and so on down until all the party<br>
seats are filled.<br>
<br>
This allows the voters to choose the parties but also choose which<br>
party member gets elected.<br>
<br>
<br>
> I have also investigated <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> (and <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span> for single-winner) However, the<br>
> lack of <span class="correction" id="">monotonicity</span> is quite troubling - the fact that you can help<br>
> elect a candidate by ranking them LOWER seems almost undemocratic.<br>
<br>
In the multi seat case, I don't think PR-<span class="correction" id="">STV</span> is that bad.<br>
<br>
> This, coupled with the fact that the current system *replaced* <span class="correction" id="">STV</span><br>
> some 20-odd years ago, dampens my enthusiasm for that method a bit.<br>
<br>
That doesn't mean that <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> is bad, it just means that it is bad for<br>
the majority. Any PR system is bad for the majority.<br>
<br>
Look at what the new system actually does ... it give most of the<br>
seats to the majority party/faction. Who decided the current system?<br>
Presumably, it was the majority party/faction.<br>
<br>
> I have also seen plenty of other election methods that look interesting<br>
> - <span class="correction" id="">Concordet</span> methods especially. However, these methods are quite complex<br>
> and don't have any good multi-winner variant (there is CPO-<span class="correction" id="">STV</span>, but it is<br>
> extremely complex and is still non-monotonic).<br>
<br>
I would suggest asset voting as a really simple way to get PR.<br>
<br>
In its most simple form, each voter votes for 1 candidate. Any candidate<br>
who gets the quota is elected and can transfer his excess to any other candidate.<br>
All the other candidates can also transfer votes in order to bring one of<br>
them to the quota.<br>
<br>
> Right now, I'm kind of at a loss as to what the best voting system would be.<br>
<br>
It depends on your objectives. There is no 'best' system.<br>
<br>
> It's obvious that the current system isn't it<br>
<br>
Yeah, it does seem pretty bad.<br>
<br>
> I also don't like the idea of using a system that is so complex that<br>
> it can't be reasonably explained to non-technical types.<br>
<br>
> I also don't like the idea of using a system that is so complex that<br>
> it can't be reasonably explained to non-technical types.<br>
<br>
There is also the problem that if it is that complex, <span class="correction" id="">explaining</span> it to<br>
the vote counters could even be a problem. Also, some of them require a<br>
computer to count the votes. <span class="correction" id="">IMO</span>, that is to complex for a student<br>
government.<br>
<br>
> regular <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> is about at the maximum complexity I would want<br>
<br>
This is one way to give the rules for asset. It is not the full<br>
transfer method though, but it gives clear rules for the transfers.<br>
<br>
You could maybe describe it as PR-<span class="correction" id="">STV</span>, but that the candidates decide<br>
the transfers. However, maybe that would be a bad idea if PR-<span class="correction" id="">STV</span> has<br>
bad press.<br>
<br>
(Anyway, here's my suggestion for the rules)<br>
<br>
The candidates, equal in number to the number of seats to be filled,<br>
holding the most votes, shall be given the option of transferring<br>
some of their votes to other <span class="correction" id="">uneliminated</span> candidates. Each of the<br>
candidates shall decide how many of their votes and to whom to<br>
transfer them to. After, the transfer has been completed, a candidate<br>
shall be eliminated. If no candidate volunteers, the candidate with<br>
the fewest votes shall be eliminated. The eliminated candidate shall<br>
be given the option to transfer any votes held to other candidates.<br>
This two step process shall be repeated until the number of <span class="correction" id="">uneliminated</span><br>
candidates is less than or equal to the number of seats to be filled.<br>
The remaining <span class="correction" id="">uneliminated</span> candidates shall be deemed elected.<br>
<br>
<br>
It also allows a candidate to volunteer to stand down. This helps <br>
with monotonicity issues.<br>
<br>
> Even standard <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> is almost too complex - part of the reason it was<br>
> originally eliminated is due to its complexity! Due to these reasons,<br>
> ease of use, understanding, and transparency is paramount.<br>
<br>
Maybe I am being cynical, but I would say that was the excuse rather<br>
than the reason (or at least only part of the reason).<br>
<br>
> So far, all I have came up with which seems to potentially be a good<br>
> method is a variant of sequential proportional approval voting. Under<br>
> the system, single winner elections would be simple approval voting.<br>
> However, for multi-winner elections each student would begin with a<br>
> set number of "points" equal to the number of seats to be elected.<br>
> Votes would be counted as in normal <span class="correction" id="">SPAV</span>, and each weighted according<br>
> to the number of points each student has remaining. Every time a voter<br>
> elects one of their choices, they would "use up" one of their points.<br>
> This seems a little more understandable than standard <span class="correction" id="">SPAV</span>, and it<br>
> hurts groups that share some preferences with the majority less.<br>
><br>
> Is there something that would potentially be better while not becoming too complex?<br>
<br>
You are basically weighting each ballot as<br>
<br>
E = number of elected candidates on ballot.<br>
N = number of seats<br>
<br>
Your way:<br>
<br>
(N-E)/N<br>
<br>
(the divide by N is to just <span class="correction" id="">rescale</span> it, so the 2 match for E=0)<br>
<br>
instead of<br>
<br>
Normal method:<br>
<br>
1/(1+E)<br>
<br>
Assuming, 5 seats,<br>
<br>
E (normal) (your way)
<br>
0: 1 1<br>
1: 0.5 0.8<br>
2: 0.33 0.6<br>
3: 0.25 0.4<br>
4: 0.20 0.20<br>
<br>
Your system greatly decreases the penalty for electing a candidate.<br>
This will be a benefit to larger parties. The normal way has the advantage<br>
that a faction of a Droop quota always gets a seat, while under your<br>
system it doesn't.<br>
<br>
I think in a small number of seats case, it may not be quite as big a problem.<br>
<br>
However, if there were 5 seats and 3 parties with<br>
<br>
A: 77%<br>
B: 22%<br>
C: 21%<br>
<br>
A got 3.85 seats<br>
B got 1.1 seats<br>
C got 1.05 seats<br>
<br>
A will get the first 3 directly.<br>
<br>
Round 4:<br>
A: 78 * ( 5-3) = 154<br>
B: 22 * ( 5-0 ) = 110<br>
C: 21 * (5-0) = 105<br>
<br>
A wins again<br>
<br>
Round 5:<br>
A: 78 * ( 5-4) = 78<br>
B: 22 * ( 5-0 ) = 110<br>
C: 21 * (5-1) = 105<br>
<br>
B wins<br>
<br>
A wins 4 seats and B wins 1 seat. However, C had more than 1/5 of the votes<br>
so should have won at least 1 seat in a 5 <span class="correction" id="">seater</span> election.<br>
<br>
> ... and not to complex<br>
<br>
Asset has the advantage that the voting stage is very easy for<br>
the voters .... just pick your <span class="correction" id="">favourite</span> candidate.<br>
<br>
The candidates then move around the votes after the election in order to<br>
give PR.<br>
<br>
You can't get much less complex than that.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div style="clear: both;"><span class="correction" id="">Raphfrk</span><br>
--------------------<br>
Interesting site<br>
"what if anyone could modify the laws"<br>
<br>
<span class="correction" id="">www</span>.<span class="correction" id="">wikocracy</span>.<span class="correction" id="">com</span></div>
<div> </div>
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