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Juho,<br>
<br>
Juho wrote:
<blockquote cite="midAC5B350C-18BE-41AF-A2DE-F2C46ACAFD78@yahoo.co.uk"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">On Nov 2, 2006, at 1:29 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Juho,
--- Juho <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:juho4880@yahoo.co.uk"><juho4880@yahoo.co.uk></a> a écrit :
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Example 1. Large party voters consider C better than the other large
party candidate, but not much.
45: L>>C>R
40: R>>C>L
15: C>L=R
Ranked Preferences elects L. (first round: L=-10, C=-70, R=-20;
second round: L=-10, R=-20)
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">In my opinion, if C is able to convince *every voter* to acknowledge
that he is better than the major party alternative, then C is surely
not a bad result.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
There is no need to convince every voter. This example is simplified
(for readability) but not extreme since there could well be a mixture
of different kind of votes. (See e.g. example 4.)
The utility of C could be really low to the voters even though it was
ranked higher than the worst candidate (in Range terms e.g. R=99,
C=1, L=0). One of the key points of Ranked Preferences is that also
weak preferences can be expressed and they may have impact.
</pre>
</blockquote>
CB: So in your example is electing C a "bad result" or not?!<br>
<blockquote cite="midAC5B350C-18BE-41AF-A2DE-F2C46ACAFD78@yahoo.co.uk"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">As long as truncation is allowed, and voters have the opportunity to
learn how the method works, I don't think "weak" CWs would be a real
problem.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
I take this to mean support to basic (flat preference) Condorcet
methods with active use of truncation.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">If they're not "good enough" to win at all, people should not
be giving them votes.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
I'd prefer methods where voters can simply vote sincerely without
considering when it is beneficial to truncate and when not.
</pre>
</blockquote>
Yes, don't we all. You like methods that meet Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help, so how<br>
then is your method supposed to be better than IRV?<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="midAC5B350C-18BE-41AF-A2DE-F2C46ACAFD78@yahoo.co.uk"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Condorcet
voters need not leave non-approved candidates unlisted. I think
Ranked Preferences provides some improvements. I'll try to explain.
If A and B voters would all truncate we would end up in bullet voting
and falling to a plurality style election. Not a good end result.
45: L>C=R
40: R>C=L
15: C>L=R
</pre>
</blockquote>
Since it gives the same winner as your suggested method, why not?<br>
<blockquote cite="midAC5B350C-18BE-41AF-A2DE-F2C46ACAFD78@yahoo.co.uk"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
I think it is a problem of basic Condorcet methods that they easily
elect the centrist candidate.
</pre>
</blockquote>
No, that is their theoretical strength. One big (over-looked by you)
reason why the "weak, <br>
low-SU, centrist CW" is mostly a non-issue is that Condorcet methods
create strong incentive <br>
for "strong" high-SU centrists to be nominated. This idea is well
explained in James Green-Armytage's<br>
July 2003 essay/post "the responsiveness of Condorcet".<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-July/010083.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-July/010083.html</a><br>
<blockquote cite="midAC5B350C-18BE-41AF-A2DE-F2C46ACAFD78@yahoo.co.uk"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">If preference strengths are not known
electing the Condorcet winner is a good choice (and basic Condorcet
methods are good methods). If preference strengths are known, then
the choice is not that obvious. Ranked Preferences takes into account
the relative strength of preferences (but not the "absolute
strengths" in the Range style). The end result is more expressive
than basic Condorcet but still quite immune to strategies (?).
</pre>
</blockquote>
The "end result" is a horribly complicated, very awkward- to-operate
monstrosity that we know<br>
fails both Condorcet and *Majority Loser* ( but you hope is "quite
immune to strategies".)<br>
<br>
I am a great fan of "Definite Majority Choice" (DMC).<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/DMC">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/DMC</a><br>
<br>
But suppose I was on the "same page" as you and thought that if the CW
is a "weak low-SU<br>
centrist" then it is desirable to elect a "higher-SU" candidate, and
also that the "ranked preference"<br>
style of ballot you suggest should be used. In that (hypothetical)
case I suggest:<br>
<br>
"Interpreting ballots as approving all candidates above the strongest
indicated preference gap ("ties"<br>
resolved by approving as many as possible without approving any ranked
bottom or equal-bottom)<br>
calculate the Definite Majority set (i.e candidates not pairwise beaten
by a more approved candidate).<br>
If that set contains one candidate X only, elect X.<br>
<br>
If not eliminate (drop from the ballots and henceforth ignore) the
candidate with the fewest top (among<br>
remaining candidates) preferences.<br>
(I prefer above bottom equal-ranking to be not allowed, but if it is,
then "fractional").<br>
<br>
Recalculate (among remaining candidates) the DM set and repeat the
whole process until an X is elected."<br>
<br>
That at least meets Majority Loser and is relatively easy to operate.
Also in common with IRV it meets <br>
Dominant Mutual Third, Majority for Solid Coalitions and Condorcet
Loser.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">45: L>C>R
20: C>>R>L
35: R>>C>L</pre>
</blockquote>
In this example you give your method electing L, failing Majority
Loser. <br>
<br>
My suggested alternative (first) interprets the 45 L>C>R as
L>C>>R and so calculates the initial DM set <br>
as {C} and so elects C. If instead the votes were<br>
<br>
<pre wrap="">45: L>>C>R
20: C>>R>L
35: R>>C>L
then all the candidates are in the initial DM set, so C is eliminated and then
the "new DM set" is {R} so R wins.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Example 4. Some of the large party voters think C is good but
majority of them think C is no good.
15: L>C>>R
30: L>>C>R
14: R>C>>L
26: R>>C>L
15: C>L=R</pre>
</blockquote>
Initial approvals: L45, C44, R40<br>
C>R, C>L, L>R, so initial DM set is {L,C}.<br>
Initial top preferences: L45, R40, C15.<br>
<br>
C is eliminated and L wins (agreeing with your method).<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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