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Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">At 06:09 AM 10/30/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
The strongest preference is expressed in range by rating the
undesired outcome at the minimum rating and the desired outcome at
the maximum rating. If the majority does this, and if they are in
agreement about these two things, they will prevail.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">"Strong preference" means strong preference for a desired outcome.
If they only have a weak preference, and express such a preference,
they might not get it.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: This requires them to be coordinated regarding their "desired
outcome". What if they agree that X should lose but are split about
which individual candidate should get max. rating,
or they agree that Y should win but are split about which candidate
should get minimum rating? Why shouldn't they also "prevail" in those cases?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
</pre>
</blockquote>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Abd:Continually, it is assumed that the majority should "prevail," i.e, a
small preference by a majority should prevail over a large preference
of a minority, no matter how great the gap in preference, and no
matter how close the minority is to the majority. His argument here
applies equally well to Approval Voting, it is just that the matter
is starker there, and does require strategic considerations on the
part of the voter. I.e., under Approval, a voter must, to vote with
full power, determine an approval cutoff which involves knowing who
the top candidates are likely to be, and then the voter must
effectively state that both of them are equally preferred.
</pre>
</blockquote>
Now voters are interested in "voting with full power" are they? In that
case of course Range also<br>
"requires strategic considerations on the part of the voter".<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Approval is a Range method with binary input.
The majority should prevail when it is voting on a single question.
</pre>
</blockquote>
Why is that? There you go again, always assuming that the majority
should prevail!<br>
If a choice between Yes and No, is a "single question" then why isn't
a choice between candidates<br>
A and B? And if "the majority should prevail" in a choice between two
candidates, why not <br>
between two factions of candidates? <br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The Majority Criterion is sensible when it is a two-candidate
election, and both sides are informed about the preference strengths
of the other.
</pre>
</blockquote>
Assuming that the voters consider the "preference strengths" of other
voters to be an important<br>
issue.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Venzke pointed out that this is what happens with
pizza, which is why pizza choosers don't actually use Range. They do
the Range work informally and then use a Supermajority criterion,
Approval Style, unless nobody has a strong preference, in which case
they will simply choose the favorite of the majority.
But that informal process breaks down on a large scale. </pre>
</blockquote>
Kevin argues that it doesn't. There is enough public discussion and
reporting of pre-polls that if<br>
voters like the pizza choosers still think that the consensus candidate
should win, then can pretty<br>
easily guess who s/he is and simply voter for her/him.<br>
<br>
What "breaks down" from the pizza choosing scenario is that the voters
either don't care about <br>
the preference-strengths of other voters or they think there are more
important issues.<br>
<br>
A big difference in the pizza choosing scenario is that no-one thinks
that anyone else's pizza<br>
preference is stupid or mistaken. Often in elections a group of voters
Y want to over-ride the <br>
preferences of a rival group of voters X not because they are hostile
to X's real interests and welfare, <br>
but (at least in part) because they consider the X voters to be wrong
about which candidate <br>
would best promote that if elected.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The Majority Criterion is weak when considering elections with more
than two candidates.
To repeat, Chris, in his argument, continues to rely on the Majority
Criterion. He is using the Majority criterion to justify the Majority
Criterion. He is not deriving the Majority Criterion from generally
accepted principles that do *not* include the Majority Criterion.
</pre>
</blockquote>
No, I have shown that the absence of majority-related guarantees
(including the "Majority criterion")<br>
encourage dishonest voting by giving such voters more power to
determine the result. Maybe *not rewarding<br>
dishonesty* is one of your "generally accepted principles". <br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I'll quote again and answer directly:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">What if they agree that X should lose but are split about which
individual candidate should get max. rating,
or they agree that Y should win but are split about which candidate
should get minimum rating? Why shouldn't they also "prevail" in those cases?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
They are split about the second-best. The question should be
reversed.
</pre>
</blockquote>
So if you can't answer my question, just change it to one you prefer.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Now, question is, why not just choose the candidate with the most
first-preference votes? I agree that the Schulze method is superior,
but just making the Plurality choice satisfies the Plurality
Criterion, which is broadly accepted, though, I think we would agree,
it is accepted ignorantly.
</pre>
</blockquote>
It is obvious that you don't know what the "Plurality criterion" is. <br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Plurality_criterion">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Plurality_criterion</a><br>
<br>
It is met by almost every sensible method including Schulze and IRV,
and also some others <br>
like Range and Approval.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> </pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">He expects that people would engage in a conspiracy to vote
insincerely in order to impose their weak preference on the society.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: What "conspiracy"?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
An agreement to vote insincerely. "Strategically."
</pre>
</blockquote>
What "agreement"? If a group of people all do the same thing, like get
out of the rain, does that mean<br>
that there was an "agreement"? "Agreement" and "conspiracy" implies
that they conferred beforehand.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite"><br>
<pre wrap="">And it *is* a control system we are engineering. The winner-take-all
nature of preference election systems is quite dangerous, from an
engineering perspective. Condorcet could make it worse, because the
Condorcet winner in one election might be from fanatic party A, with
35% of the vote, and the next one from party B, with 35% of the
vote.... The society swings. (And this is indeed what I think we are
seeing in U.S. politics. We'll see. The percentages may be about
right, if Condorcet were being used.)
</pre>
</blockquote>
So according to Abd, "Condorcet could make it worse". What is "it"
exactly?..the present system?<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> </pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Right off I'll note that these votes are preposterous. People will
not vote, in such numbers, anything like this.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: Completely irrelevant for my demonstration.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
But what Chris is demonstrating is that Range does not satisfy the
Majority Criterion.
</pre>
</blockquote>
No, I was demonstrating vulnerability to the Compromise strategy. And
my example wasn't "preposterous".<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite"><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Well, I would have to assume that the serious closeness of this
election would be known. A shift from 98 to 99 is hardly a major shift.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: Sufficient to force those voters to stop expressing their B>A preference.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Note how we have a situation where the "sincere preference" is 99 to
98 in Range.
</pre>
</blockquote>
No you don't. You obviously didn't even read my not-very-long message
that you are replying to, or at least<br>
you reply to bits of it before you've read all of it.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> Chris expresses this situation as "forcing" voters to
vote insincerely. But if they vote sincerely, with the initial
conditions, they get a candidate who is almost perfect to them,
relatively speaking. The difference is insignificant. So why are they
"forced" to vote the extremes, to lie about their rating of their
second choice? Where does this pressure come from?
</pre>
</blockquote>
One of Abd's annoying habits is to falsely put words in my mouth. In
none of my messages in this<br>
thread did I use the words "forcing", "forced" or even plain "force".<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">What Chris is going to have to show, if he can, and he wants to use
examples, is an example where social damage is done by selecting the
Range winner over the Majority winner, in a pure Range system.
</pre>
</blockquote>
What constitutes "social damage" is a big somewhat subjective and
controversial topic (and arguably<br>
off-topic). I have in the past shown that Approval (and the
demonstration would also apply to Range)<br>
is very vulnerable to disinformation campaigns. (But I'm sure that
Abd would find my scenario "preposterous"<br>
and/or not a case of "social damage").<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> </pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I've recommended that Range elections include a facility for
expressing Favorite *without* giving a higher rating. I've also
recommended that Range be coarser, not 0 to 99, I'd rather see 0 to 10.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: The fact that the range was so large (99-0) is what forced me to
make the difference in size between the two factions so small.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Yes. However, with a larger step size (i.e, 0.1 rather than 0.01,
comparing Range 11 with Range 101), it is more likely that candidates
would rate equally. The Favorite expression option makes this less
painful to partisans. A 10% difference in preference strength is
probably still down in the noise in terms of what it means to human
beings. It is still a slight preference.
</pre>
</blockquote>
I agree from the perspective of the individual voter, a "Favourite
expression option" makes for<br>
an improvement, but with this having no force to influence the result
it could make the winner<br>
look illegitimate.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> </pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Now, note that I proposed, in these and concurrent threads, a
safety feature, a runoff if the preference winner were different
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">>from the Range winner.
CB: Yes *you* did, but that isn't the CRV proposal.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
That's right. CRV has *not* in my opinion developed, yet, a consensus
definition of Range, as far as the details are concerned.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> I have been addressing the pure Range method, not some as yet not
even fully defined "Range with Runoff" or "Range with Ratification"
scheme of yours.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Yes. Note that these "schemes" would be normal in standard
deliberative process. "Shall so-and-so take office" is a not uncommon
motion. I'd insist on it, where I have the choice!
In other words, the context of a method matters. A method which is
vulnerable to some possible malfunction can actually be the optimal
method if the context deals with that and prevents it from actually
causing damage.
</pre>
</blockquote>
Since all methods are arguably "vulnerable to some possible
malfunction", philosophically I <br>
agree. <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> </pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Remember, the "sincere" vote here was A99>B98.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: The ranking was sincere but as I explained, the ratings maybe not.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
We can't understand what the rankings actually mean if we do not know
what the sincere ranking would actually be.
</pre>
</blockquote>
We know the "sincere rankings" just not the "sincere ratings". There is
nothing ambiguous about<br>
rankings.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> What Chris was allegedly
examining was the vulnerability of Range to strategic voting. But we
can't examine strategic voting unless we understand what sincere
voting was. The first results, 99 to 98, were presumably in the
absence of strategic considerations.</pre>
</blockquote>
No.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> We can do nothing other than
assume that these are sincere.
If the preference were stronger than that, why would the Range voters
not want to express it? </pre>
</blockquote>
Because they can only do so by reducing the voted strength of their
stronger B>C preference and<br>
thus increase the danger that C will win.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> </pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The 18 B voters have "defected" from the AB coalition by insincerely
changing from B99>A98
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">to B99>B0=C0, and Range rewards their dishonesty (and disloyalty)
by electing B.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Now, why would they do this? Only if they strongly prefer B to A.
But this contradicts the initial conditions.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: Range only allows voters to express one "strong" (by your
definition) preference (between two candidates or two sets of
equally-ranked candidates).
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
</pre>
<pre wrap=""> </pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">. And yet we imagine that the B voters are going to lie about their
preference, in cahoots with each other, in order to elect B?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">CB: Who (besides you) mentioned anything about them being "in
cahoots with each other"?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
You did. You mentioned an agreement to vote in a certain way, as I recall.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> No coordination is needed. As long as the other factions vote the
same way, individual members of the B faction can try the strategy
without any risk of it back-firing (and it can work if only some of
them do it.)
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
Once again, the suggested behavior makes no sense. It has been
constructed artificially just in order to show a characteristic of
Range Voting that we all agree is true. It does not satisfy the
Majority Criterion, and, further, a group of voters voting in highly
coherent patterns can push an outcome the way they want.
Yes, they can. However, the point I've been making is that this is
essentially stupid behavior.
</pre>
</blockquote>
CB:Like me reading and replying to Abd's posts.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">And there is no reason to suppose that,
if Range Voting is implemented, such behavior will be common enough
to significant affect outcomes, *plus* if it *does* affect outcomes,
it seems that it does so in a way that is not offensive to the majority.
The examples given all show election outcomes that are satisfactory
to the majority.</pre>
</blockquote>
No they don't, for reasons I've explained.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061030100424.0404dce0@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> *Quite* satisfactory. So where is the beef?
</pre>
</blockquote>
It is also at least possible that a majority believe in "majority
rule", so the "beef" could be post-election<br>
intense.<br>
<br>
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Chris Benham<br>
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<blockquote cite="mid4545DD7D.8030707@optusnet.com.au" type="cite"><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><br>
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