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Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061028223318.0207ae00@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">At 11:34 PM 10/27/2006, Chris Benham wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">That is, healthy group decision process follows certain general
principles. The Majority Criterion neglects an important part of this.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">That is because it is about *elections*, which of course isn't
necessarily the beginning and end of "healthy group decision process".
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
For some reason, Chris continues to insist upon the specious
distinction between elections and general decision-making process.
The term "election" covers any kind of choice being made; however
usage focuses on the selection of one candidate out of a number, for
single-winner, or of multiple candidates out of a larger number, for
mutiple-winner. And we also assume, generally, for the purposes of
this list, that elections are of candidates, and the candidates are
people who will hold an office.
But for a group to select candidates or to select a pizza involves,
properly, the same considerations. Pizza is almost certain to be less
important a choice, but the importance of the choice only should mean
that greater care would be taken. Not that a different process is involved.
</pre>
</blockquote>
CB: No.I see "group decision making process" as spread out along a
continuum with "informal consensus"<br>
at one end and civil war or violent "mob rule" at the other. Abd sees
elections as (in his view undesirably)<br>
substituting for consensus and wants to change them into mechanisms for
reaching a formal consensus,<br>
whereas I think they should more properly be seen as tough competitions
that substitute for civil war.<br>
<br>
A group of people ordering pizza are presumably a freely associating
group of friends, so all are <br>
considerate of the other's strong preferences (and "needs") and no-one
wants to oppress anyone or<br>
listen to anyone whingeing while they are trying to enjoy their pizza.
(And of course if anyone is really unhappy<br>
they can presumably just leave the group and not starve.)So in that
case of course the group would<br>
probably quickly come to an informal consensus, and if there *was* any
formal "voting" then I suppose<br>
some variation of Range or Approval would do and may be best.<br>
<br>
But suppose in an experiment to please Abd, the pizza orderers aren't
friends and maybe even dislike <br>
each other, they are very hungry and there won't be enough pizza to
satisfy everyone's hunger and the <br>
people are locked in the room with nothing to eat but this pizza they
are ordering. Then "informal consensus"<br>
will tend to break down and we will have a scenario more appropriate
for a tough election. Voters might<br>
have incentive to vote for a variety others dislike in the hope they
will then get a bigger share.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061028223318.0207ae00@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
The only substantial argument I see against Range is that the method
is allegedly vulnerable to strategic voting. *But what we have now is
what Range would look like if everyone votes strategically.*
So Range would not make things worth, unless... unless honest people
vote intermediate values, and dishonest people vote the extremes, and
there are enough of these dishonest people that election results are
warped as a result.
However, I have argued that this can only happen when the honest
people do not have a strong preference. When they have, and express,
a strong preference, and they are in the majority, the dishonest
people can try what they may, they can only nudge the results among
candidates strongly preferred by the majority.
</pre>
</blockquote>
A "strong preference" for *what* exactly?.. that a single candidate be
elected, that a single candidate<br>
not be elected, that the winner come from a certain set, what?<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061028223318.0207ae00@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
Essentially, some writers treat the vulnerability of Range to
strategic voting as if it were a proven thing. They simply assume it.
It has *not* been proven, far from it. And it seems to me that this
is a false charge against Range.
</pre>
</blockquote>
It would. It is obvious to anyone with a clue that it is.<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061028223318.0207ae00@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
E
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">That is, if the majority does not want to please the minority, it
does not care if they are devastated by the outcome of the
election, if their attitude is "they should get over it," then they
can easily get what they want. Just vote it as a strong preference.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">The problem with Range is that if "the majority" are not self-aware
and coordinated, they cannot
"easily get what they want".
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
On the contrary, the condition being described was that the majority
had a strong preference. Under Range, all they need to do is vote
that preference as a strong one. What coordination does this take?
</pre>
</blockquote>
Again "strong preference" for what exactly? And how strong is "strong"?<br>
<blockquote cite="mid7.0.0.16.0.20061028223318.0207ae00@lomaxdesign.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
This has been stated so many times by Warren, but obviously it bears
repeating. The best vote in Range is a sincere one. Sure, partisans
may distort their votes, turning them into black and white. But by so
doing they are essentially eliminating their own true preference
strengths from the election. They are harming themselves, not the
society, except to the extent that the society is harmed when
individuals are not satisfied. They are risking their own
dissatisfaction, if it turns out that, by voting black and white,
they effectively abstained from voting in the top two pair-off.
</pre>
</blockquote>
I suppose it would be too much to expect any examples or evidence in
support of this<br>
fantastic nonsense?<br>
<br>
Range has no real "majority-rule" related guarantees, except a very
unimpressive weakened<br>
version of Minimal Defense that means that for a majority to block the
election of X they <br>
must both give X a minimum rating and some other candidate a maximum
rating.<br>
<br>
But since Range is a deterministic method, the lack of guarantees for
the majority necessarily<br>
make it vulnerable to strategy.<br>
<br>
25001: A99>B98>C0<br>
25000: B99>A98>C0<br>
49999: C99>A0=B0<br>
<br>
Here a majority express the strongest possible preference that C not
win without falsifying their<br>
sincere rankings, and yet C wins. This demonstrates (proves) that
Range fails Majority Loser,<br>
Condorcet, Majority for Solid Coalitions and (regular) Minimal Defense.<br>
<br>
These failures make Range in this case vulnerable to Compromise
strategy. If the 2500 B99><br>
A98 voters change to B99=A99, the winner changes from C to A (who they
vastly prefer).<br>
<br>
25001: A99>B98>C0<br>
25000: B99=A99>C0 (sincere is B>A>>C)<br>
49999: C99>A0=B0<br>
<br>
This Abd, is *proof* that Range is vulnerable to the
Compromise(compression) strategy.<br>
"Compression" refers to the fact that they only have to "compress"
their B>A preference to B=A.<br>
Because Range/Approval meet the Favourite Betrayal Criterion and
Sincere Favourite (FBC/SF)<br>
they don't have to actually reverse from B>A to A>B.<br>
<br>
36: A99>B98>C0<br>
18: B99>B98>C0 <br>
46: C99>A0=B0<br>
<br>
This time the AB have a comfortable enough majority to win without
insincere equal-ranking, and<br>
A (the Condorcet and IRV winner) wins. But Range (like Approval) is
vulnerable to a form of <br>
Burial with a nasty defection incentive.<br>
<br>
36: A99>B98>C0<br>
18: B99>B0=C0 (sincere is B>A>>C)<br>
46: C99>A0=B0<br>
<br>
The 18 B voters have "defected" from the AB coalition by insincerely
changing from B99>A98<br>
to B99>B0=C0, and Range rewards their dishonesty (and disloyalty) by
electing B.<br>
<br>
(Note to Abd: this *proves* that Range is vulnerable to the Burial
strategy)<br>
<br>
Of course if the A supporters also defected then C would win, and that
would be an example<br>
of a "majority" (a sincere majority solid coalition) not being
"coordinated".<br>
<br>
The type of election scenario illustrated by these examples, polarised
with one united faction<br>
confronting two sub-factions, is much better handled by IRV than by
Range or Approval.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Majority Rule. What a concept!</pre>
</blockquote>
Yes. Please make up your mind whether you are in favour of it or not. <br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">And thus, respecting the majority principle, I've suggested that
the election of a Range winner over a Preference winner should be
ratified by the electorate, either by a pure ratification vote or by a runoff.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">So what exact method do you propose be used to determine "the
preference winner"?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
The simplest would be a Majority winner. It might be the Plurality
winner. Or the Condorcet winner. However, a Condorcet winner who has
only a small percentage of the first-preference vote is probably not
worth electing, if there is a clear Range winner; likewise a
Plurality winner. I'm not sure exactly what winner would best be
chosen, it would be worth considering. The Range ballots would be
analyzed by converting them to ranked ballots, which is trivial
(equal ranking allowed).
I'm inclined that it be a Majority winner. Remember, the objection
was that somehow choosing the Range winner would be a violation of
majority rule. Well, this would guarantee that majority rule would
not be violated.</pre>
</blockquote>
"Majority winner" (presumably referring to a single candidate who is
the favourite of more than<br>
half the voters) and "Plurality winner" both have a split-vote problem
(failing Clone-Winner) and <br>
of course there isn't always a Condorcet of "Majority" winner. <br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">(I oppose public campaign financing, it is the wrong approach, but it
*does* exist and is going to be a problem in election reform.)
</pre>
</blockquote>
It works quite ok in Australia. What do you suggest to address the
unfair advantage of Big Money<br>
in election campaigns?<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
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