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<div> Warren Smith <span class="correction" id="">wds</span> at math.temple.<span class="correction" id="">edu</span> wrote:<br>
> [The specified pattern] attack appears to be quite devastating to me.<br>
> I personally regard <span class="correction" id="">Rivest</span>'s scheme as therefore dead or anyway on the critical list,<br>
> for purpose of applying it to plurality voting. <span class="correction" id="">Rivest</span> has a few lame attempts<br>
> to <span class="correction" id="">rescusitate</span> it, but they do not impress me much. However, for approval & range voting,<br>
> this attack (in the de-bundled world of course) is not an attack at all. It<br>
> is nothing. So <span class="correction" id="">Rivest</span>'s idea is strong and healthy for range & approval voting.<br>
<br>
One solution would be to cut the ballot after/during casting.<br>
<br>
The 35 person ballot would be kept together until after it has been validated for<br>
correct marking. After that it can be split into say 7 5-person ballots or something.<br>
<br>
There would need to be an ID on each ballot for each set of 5 candidates. The voter<br>
would effectively get 7 receipts in the above example.<br>
<br>
What is still needed is a way to prevent the voter from knowing the ID of votes that<br>
are cast that he doesn't get a receipt for. Otherwise, the "buyer" can demand the<br>
list of ID numbers.<br>
<br>
Also, if the ballot is split into 35 parts, then this is equivalent in complexity<br>
(and number of receipts) to using approval or range.<br>
<br>
> >A u-R <span class="correction" id="">Lomax</span>:<br>
> Vote-buying may shift close elections; but,<br>
> frankly, I think it is rare. very rare.<br>
><br>
> --Well, that is not clear. May be rare here & now, but historically it has at the right<br>
> times and places been not rare, but "the norm." Read <span class="correction" id="">LBJ</span> biography & <span class="correction" id="">Gumbel</span> book if you<br>
> want to learn about that. Also in the right kind of country, it (or coercion) may be common or<br>
> an easy way to slide into non-democracy.<br>
<br>
I guess the issue is that it might be rare because the voting system (tries<br>
to) guard against it.<br>
<br>
The benefit for secret ballots is that if voters have a better than 50% chance of<br>
being correct on a question, then asking lots of them will likely give the right<br>
answer. If people can sell their votes, this law of large number effect is<br>
reduced. This is in addition to the issue of coercion.<br>
<br>
> STENCILS:<br>
> --One more thing. <span class="correction" id="">Raphfrk</span> on this forum suggested some<br>
> ideas about sliding widgets and 3ballot.<br>
> I thought his stuff (assuming <span class="correction" id="">raphfrk</span> is a "him") was rather <span class="correction" id="">kludgy</span> and confused<br>
> and I wasn't even sure it would work<br>
<br>
It would :). The main issue is getting ID numbers to work, without showing the<br>
voter the ID for ballots that are not in the copy slot.<br>
<br>
<span class="correction" id="">Btw</span>, a mechanical system that people can see operating is a hell of <span class="correction" id="">alot</span> easier for<br>
people to understand than a list of instructions. Using the suggested system,<br>
it would be impossible to cast an illegal vote.<br>
<br>
> , BUT, it had the germ of a very good idea.<br>
> Which I call "STENCILS."<br>
<br>
I think that the two systems can be combined. You put the ballot in a slot. There<br>
is one hole over each candidate's name. You use the handle to move a slider to<br>
cover one hold for each candidate. There is also a "voting" handle which you use<br>
to cover an empty hole for the candidate that you want to vote for.<br>
<br>
><br>
> I have some optimism <span class="correction" id="">Rivest</span> will see the light and realize he"s come up with<br>
> a great reason to prefer range & approval voting, and he ought to at least<br>
> mention <span class="correction" id="">AV</span> in his paper, for heaven's sake.<br>
><br>
<br>
I don't think ease of securing the vote should be that high on the list of<br>
priorities, when evaluating an election method. <br>
<br>
<span class="correction" id="">OTOH,</span> implementation details are for example, the main reason to support<br>
approval over range. (as range allows people to cast approval votes if they <br>
wish), as approval is simplier.<br>
<br>
Also, implementation details are why asset voting is potentially superior<br>
to <span class="correction" id="">PR-STV</span> as the counting can be decoupled from the distribution.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div style="clear: both;"><span class="correction" id="">Raphfrk</span><br>
--------------------<br>
Interesting site<br>
"what if anyone could modify the laws"<br>
<br>
<span class="correction" id="">www</span>.<span class="correction" id="">wikocracy</span>.<span class="correction" id="">com</span></div>
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