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<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2>Again, I'm just a po' li'l ol' voter here. But there was a
resonation with the "need to have accurate polling data".</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2>Neither I nor any other voter in my precinct gives a hoot
or assigns any credibility to the "have to have something to publish so we'll
publish the results of a badly-conducted poll" garbage that we're currently
getting.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2>Any analysis that depends upon "accurate polling data" is
probably doomed. I was the happy recipient of a random poll call not long ago,
and even the nice-sounding part-time intern who was asking the questions agreed
with me that the questions were pretty stupid. There was no way they could get
my opinion from my answers to those questions. </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2>Let's pretend for the purposes of Election Methods that the
only "polls" in the debate are those that said "Dewey beats
Truman!"</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=318541100-25122005></SPAN> </DIV><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader lang=en-us dir=ltr align=left>
<HR tabIndex=-1>
<FONT face=Tahoma size=2><B>From:</B> election-methods-bounces@electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces@electorama.com] <B>On Behalf Of </B>rob
brown<BR><B>Sent:</B> Saturday, December 24, 2005 6:02 PM<BR><B>To:</B> Jan
Kok<BR><B>Cc:</B> election-methods@electorama.com<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: [EM]
Updated article<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Thanks for your feedback Jan, comments below....<BR><BR>On
12/23/05, <B class=gmail_sendername>Jan Kok</B> <<A
href="mailto:jan.kok.5y@gmail.com">jan.kok.5y@gmail.com</A>> wrote:
<DIV><SPAN class=gmail_quote></SPAN>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=gmail_quote
style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: rgb(204,204,204) 1px solid">Rob,<BR><BR>Overall,
I like the previous, short version and the current version<BR>about
equally. The short version spent a larger fraction of the text
<BR>talking about the problems with Plurality voting. The
problems with<BR>Plurality are the common ground that pretty much all voting
reformers<BR>(IRVists, Approvalists, Condorcetists...) agree
on. Those problems<BR>are also the most likely "hook" to get
ordinary citizens and political <BR>activists interested in voting
reform. So, I like to put a lot of<BR>emphasis on the problems
with Plurality when I promote voting reform.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR>I tend to agree. I think people very quickly lose interest in
voting reform when they see that those who advocate reform are so
factionalized themselves. <BR><BR>At least I pointed out that (in my opinion)
DSV-approval and the various Condorcet methods are pretty much equal. I
see no reason to dwell on their various imperfections in documents intended
for the masses. I continue to have the opinion that the "cycle
resolution" imperfections of Condorcet and DSV methods are academic and would
have few real world consequences if we just agreed on one method or
another. In other words, here is my vote: <BR><BR>[X] DSV- Approval
Strategy A<BR>[X] Condorcet- Shultz<BR>[X] Condorcet - Ranked Pairs<BR>[X]
Condorcet - Minmax<BR>[X] Condorcet - R Brown scoring algorithm<BR>[ ]
IRV<BR>[ ] Approval<BR>[ ] Range<BR>[ ] Plurality<BR>[ ]
Dictatorship<BR></DIV><BR>(and yes I am aware of the irony of unapproving
Approval....) :)<BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=gmail_quote
style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: rgb(204,204,204) 1px solid">It's
a pity that Approval isn't your favorite method. If it was,
you<BR>could keep the article pretty short. :-)<BR><BR>You say "If the voter
guesses wrong, there is a good chance that<BR>voting may actually do more
harm than good to his own cause." I am <BR>afraid the casual
reader won't understand what you are talking about,<BR>unless you reword
this to be more descriptive, or show an example. </BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR>Good suggestion. See my update. <A
href="http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html">http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html</A><BR>The
permanent url of this revision is <A
href="http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite-r3.html">http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite-r3.html</A>
(with r1 and r2 being the older ones). New stuff is in green, ommitted
stuff in red. </DIV><BR>I think this explains the problem pretty
clearly. <BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=gmail_quote
style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: rgb(204,204,204) 1px solid">I
don't see any way to avoid explaining the problem clearly, because <BR>that
problem is the justification for allowing voters to cahnge their<BR>votes,
and for introducing ranked ballot methods. I assume you
are<BR>talking about the problem that if a voter underestimates the
strength<BR>of his Favorite candidate (relative to a Disliked candidate who
seems<BR>to have a chance of winning) and votes for a Compromise candidate
in<BR>addition to his Favorite (in order to keep Disliked from
winning),<BR>Compromise may win, whereas Favorite might have won if there
were not <BR>so many votes for Compromise.<BR><BR>By the way, allowing
people to change their votes in Approval voting<BR>serves the same function
as pre-election polls. If we had Approval<BR>Voting as our public
election method, I expect that candidates, <BR>parties, special interest
groups and the media would all want to have<BR>polls that would accurately
estimate the results of the election. </BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR>Here is the problem with that as I see it: it works ok for,
say, presidential elections. Last time I voted, though, there were a ton
different seperate elections on the ballot, mayor, district supervisor,
sherrif, etc. I had no idea of who was likely to win....its hard enough
to just learn about all the candidates, much more so if I have to keep track
of who is ahead in the polls. <BR><BR>Furthermore, this doesn't work in other
types of elections like the movie example I used. From a practical point
of view, this means that we can't get people used to our "better" election
method through things like web polls, or in voting for the officers of small
organizations, etc. By having the expectation that people will have
accurate polling info served to them, you have limited the usefulness of the
method. I find that extremely unfortunate, and unnecessary as
well. The DSV method I proposed seems to have all the advantages of
Approval, without the "need to know polling info and strategy" downside. (of
course, I think Condorcet methods do as well, but with DSV Approval, it is
easier to demonstrate that it is so because of the way it is derived from
Approval) <BR></DIV><BR></DIV>-rob </BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>