On 11/30/05, <b class="gmail_sendername">Jan Kok</b> <<a href="mailto:jan.kok.5y@gmail.com">jan.kok.5y@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<div><span class="gmail_quote"></span><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
> Not sure that's really what I meant, because it all depends on the<br>> definition of "democratic" and don't think I want to go there. :) I suppose<br>> its unfair, but even that is debatable. More importantly it's not
<br>> practical, because any rational person with an IQ over 50 would vote<br>> insincerely, so the system would quickly break down.<br><br>Well, I have voted with less than maximum strength in some situations.<br> (And I think my IQ is >50 :-). For example:
</blockquote><div><br>Well, if not dumb, then I would claim that that is not rational, at least not in the strict game theory/econmics definition. Maybe I should have said "rational, self interested". See <a href="http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/prin/txt/Neoch/Eco111t.html">
http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/prin/txt/Neoch/Eco111t.html</a><br></div><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">- When discussing where to go for lunch (a very informal sort of
<br>election) I sometimes refrain from influencing the decision, if the<br>nominated alternatives are all acceptable, instead of voting or<br>attempting to sway the decistion in favor of whatever place I would<br>most prefer at the moment.
</blockquote><div><br>Very different situation. The most analogous voting situation would allow you to "save" your voting power for something you do care about, since you can more or less do that in your situation ("you got your choice last time, lets go my place today"). Secondly I just think that social pressures count for a lot. If you strongly suggest going somewhere that your friends, they will be less happy and possibly hold that against you. So it's just a completely different situation.
</div><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">- If I don't know enough about the alternatives or questions being<br>decided (for example choosing among candidates I don't know anything
<br>about, voting on whether to retain judges, voting on referendums that<br>I don't know enough about to make a competent decision) then I just<br>leave that ballot item blank, leaving the decision to other, hopefully<br>
better informed voters.</blockquote><div><br>Leaving it blank is one thing. Picking something, but saying you don't want it to count for as much as it could? I see no reason to do that. In a public election, your vote already counts for a tiny, tiny percentage of the total. Why intentionally make it smaller than that? Expecting people in significant numbers to do this is simply absurd.
</div><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">- If I know about the alternatives but just don't care one way or<br>another, then I leave the ballot item blank, leaving the decision to
<br>other voters who DO care.<br><br>- I usually vote for my favorite alternative party candidate under<br>plurality voting when I have the opportunity. I know that there is<br>almost no chance that my favorite could win, so it could be said that
<br>I am wasting my vote or failing to maximize the strength of my vote.<br>(Actually, I don't see it as wasting my vote. Typically, I don't have<br>a strong preference for either of the frontrunners, and I expect that<br>
it is very unlikely that my vote could change the outcome of the<br>election between the frontrunners. So, I figure it is a better use of<br>my vote to support my favorite party's candidates, helping to get a<br>little more attention for that party in future elections, helping
<br>maintain ballot access for the party, etc.)</blockquote><div><br>True, the possibility of your vote changing the outcome is remote. But enough people doing that....well in 2000 presidential election the "favorite alternative" voters caused the system to elect a different candidate than would have been elected had they voted strategically.
<br><br>Plurality is bad, but not voting strategically in a plurality system makes it even worse, in my opinion.<br></div><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
I recommend Range Voting or Approval Voting for primary elections,<br>because of their extreme simplicity/ease of understanding/ease of<br>manually tallying the votes if necessary, and their tendency to pick a<br>winner who has broad support. (Contrast that with plurality or
<br>plurality-with-runoff, which can elect fanatical or special-interest<br>candidates who have strong core support, but who are strongly disliked<br>by most of the rest of the voters. See<br><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_presidential_election%2C_2002">
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_presidential_election%2C_2002</a> for<br>an example of this.) Range Voting has an advantage over Approval<br>Voting in that there are a couple ways that voters can reduce the<br>strength of their votes _if_they_wish_ (it's entirely voluntary).
</blockquote><div><br>Well I guess I just disagree. Reducing the strength of your vote, in my opinion, is a downright silly option to allow. Yes range is probably better than plurality, but I don't think it solves the problems of plurality nearly to the degree that condorcet does. I don't like approval for similar reasons that I don't like range....I think both force the voter to think strategically, while condorcet almost completely removes strategy from the equation.
<br></div></div><br>-rob<br>