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<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=603012623-22112005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2>This is a more eloquent description of what I've always
been saying. Voters understand "list the candidates you like in order". Approval
makes us uneasy because "list any candidate that isn't one you don't like"
causes is to worry that which we do like better might get an advantage depeding
upon where we decide to stop holding our nose and give up.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=603012623-22112005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=603012623-22112005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2>On the voter side I am confortable with ranking all and
only candidates of which I approve. (That means truncation allowed on the
collection side). Don't make it harder than that.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=603012623-22112005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr align=left><SPAN class=603012623-22112005><FONT face=Arial
color=#0000ff size=2>The ranked ballot form of approval is Bucklin with =
rankings and truncation allowed (assuming the counting-method handles = rankings
correctly). Even if it's not the METHOD, it is a useful tool for analyzing
ranked ballots.</FONT></SPAN></DIV><BR>
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<FONT face=Tahoma size=2><B>From:</B> election-methods-bounces@electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces@electorama.com] <B>On Behalf Of </B>rob
brown<BR><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, November 22, 2005 5:19 PM<BR><B>To:</B> Rob
Lanphier; election-methods@electorama.com<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: [EM] "scored
condorcet", etc<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>On 11/22/05, <B class=gmail_sendername>Rob Lanphier</B> <<A
href="mailto:robla@robla.net">robla@robla.net</A>> wrote:
<DIV><SPAN class=gmail_quote></SPAN>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=gmail_quote
style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: rgb(204,204,204) 1px solid">If
all you're looking for is something better than IRV that can be<BR>boiled
down to a single score, you're better off going with Approval
or<BR>Range. My sense is that by insisting on shoehorning a
Condorcet winner<BR>method into a single score, you're treating the
Condorcet winner <BR>criterion as an absolute priority, while ignoring all
of the others.<BR>There are good reasons to believe that the other criteria
are at least<BR>as important as the Condorcet winner criterion.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR>Hi Rob,<BR><BR>I'm not really all that set on the Condorcet
criterion. However, I do *much* prefer ranked systems than those
employed by range or approval. The advantage of ranked is that it is
easy to explain to people what to do, completely independent of
strategy. Just put them in order of preference. With approval, it
is very ambiguous whether to approve or not approve a non-favorite candidate,
as that is all strategy. I think preferences are by nature relative, but
approval implies they are absolute. Range has similar issues. I wouldn't
know what valus to give the various candidates, and I would find that
frustrating (and expect that those with less knowledge of the process would as
well, likely more so).<BR><BR>I also have problems with approval in that,
whether or not it is true, it *feels* like someone who is approving more
candidates than another voter is having more say. I think people have a
problem with that, and will never accept it for that reason.<BR><BR>Obviously,
I'm a lot more into the psychology of it all than most people here. I
hate the word marketing, because I tend not to be a fan of marketing people,
but still....having a system that is comfortable to regular people counts for
a lot, and I think existing systems (other than plurality, sadly) fail
miserably on this.<BR><BR>Regarding your comment about "shoehorning" scores
onto condorcet: since MinMax *is* condorcet, and does produce
scores....that isn't really shoehorning, is it?<BR><BR>Is MinMax really that
bad? You said yourself that not having a Condorcet winner is rare, so,
that being the case, it seems that in most cases MinMax is just as good as
other Condorcet methods. My guess is that even rarer is the case where
the MinMax winner would differ from the Beatpath winner.<BR><BR>You mentioned
priorities, here are my main priorites (none of which is "meeting the
Condorcet criterion"):<BR><BR>1) Reducing or eliminating the strategic
advantage that clustering into two parties gives (due to vote
splitting). I think this is the most destructive force in US politics,
resulting in a polarized government that spends a ridiculous amount of effort
trying to "bring down the other side", rather than actually running the
government and solving real problems.<BR><BR>2) having a user interface to
voting that is something that people can easily use, and that gives the voter
the feeling that they expressed their true preferences, and that doing so did
not compromise their interests.<BR><BR>3) having results that the public can
easily view and feel that they understand the main gist of what
happened. (this also applies to pre-election polling results)<BR><BR>4)
having no strategic advantage to voting late, after you have seen how others
have voted. This could allow real elections (as opposed to just things
like web based polls) to happen over a longer period of time than a single
day, which could make them far less costly and far more convenient to
voters.<BR><BR>5) having the tabulation method easily explainable to average
people who are not necessarily great at math and logic.<BR><BR>Reasons 2, 3
and 5 have to do as much with marketing as anything. I think if you can
get people to understand the system (and to understand the results of
elections carried out using the system), you are more likely to get the system
put into place for real government elections.<BR><BR>Reason #1, however, is
the main reason I care about all this. My gut feeling is -- and feel
free to dispute this if you disagree -- that a minmax system would address the
destructive partisanship in government pretty much as well as something like
beatpath.<BR><BR>-rob<BR></DIV></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>