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<TITLE>Re: [Condorcet] A "Condorcet" by any other name still smells as sweet?</TITLE>
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<DIV id=idOWAReplyText63216 dir=ltr><FONT size=2>Markus wrote ...</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr><FONT size=2>
<DIV dir=ltr><BR>"To be honest, I believe that whatever Condorcet method<BR>we
will propose, the chances that the state of Washington<BR>will adopt the
proposed Condorcet method are not very<BR>good."</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>Unfortunately, I think that this is a realistic assessment. We don't stand a chance unless we are ready to
make some drastic simplifications, especially in the ballot design.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>If we cannot improve on IRV in ballot design, then we have no
better hope of success than the IRV supporters have met with, since this is the
major hurdle in both cases.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>We have to get creative here or abandon ranked ballot methods in
favor of two or three slot methods like Approval or three slot Equal Rank
Bucklin a.k.a. Majority Choice Approval (MCA).</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>Approval is unacceptable to voter psychology because once you
approve Compromise, you erase the ballot distinction between Favorite and
Compromise. That's why ordinary Approval is not a viable ballot
proposal.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>What does that leave?</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>1. Creative use of simple ballots to get voter rankings, as (for
example) in Jobst's DFC proposal.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>2. Ranked or not, ballots have to allow distinction of
Favorite without strong incentive to rate or rank Compromise with the
distinctive mark along with (or in place of) Favorite. This means that the
distinctive mark has to be mostly expressive or symbolic, with very weak
instrumentality, such as having a role in breaking ties.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>After Asset Voting, Approval Plus (A+) is the simplest such a
proposal.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>Approval Plus is Approval with the ability to distinguish one
candidate with a plus.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>Along with the approval tally, there is a tally of each candidate's
plusses.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>When the max approval candidate is unique, that candidate is
elected.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>When two or more candidates are tied for max approval, then the
plus tally for each candidate is used to determine how many marbles will
correspond to that candidate in an urn full of different colored marbles (one
color for each candidate).</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>A marble is drawn. The candidate owning the drawn marble
picks the winner from among the tied candidates.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>This plus feature can be grafted onto any method where the
candidates are supposed to become representatives of the voters, but is
especially relevant if the method already satisfies the FBC.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>So we have can have MCA+, MDDA+, MDDB+,
MMPO+, ICA+, ERBucklinWhole+, etc.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>My favorite of these is MCA+ which has three main slots plus the
"+" mark.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>MCA+ :</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>The main ballot choices for the voter are (blank),
"good," and "better," so that "better plus" is synonomous with
"best."</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>If any candidate is marked "better" (with or without the "+") on
more than fifty percent of the ballots, then the candidate with the most
"better" marks is the winner. Otherwise the candidate that is rated good
or better on the greatest number of ballots is the winner.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>In case of a tie, a ballot is drawn at random, and the candidate
marked plus on that ballot picks from among the tied candidates. [Or the
equivalent marble experiment is carried out as described above, so that the
ballots don't have to be mixed around in a compost turner.]</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>In this formulation MCA+ would set the tone for positive
campaigning.</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr>Forest</DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr> </DIV></FONT></DIV>
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