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<DIV>In a message dated 9/6/2004 1:48:49 PM Central Standard Time,
atarr@purdue.edu writes:</DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: blue 2px solid"><FONT
style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent" face=Arial color=#000000 size=2>Paul
Kislanko wrote:<BR><BR>>The reason I wouldn't have chosen E over B, C, or D
on a ranked ballot <BR>>with A as an alternative is that B, C, D "trumped"
E on every issue that <BR>>was not the single one that A&E agreed
upon.<BR><BR>And yet, you already stated you would prefer E pairwise over any
of the <BR>three. So why, oh why, would you rank E below them? In
what meaningful <BR>sense do you rank any of those three over E?
Agreeing with them on more <BR>issues is irrelevant if the one issue you
support E on trumps all others.</FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV>I thought I'd explained that. Let me try again.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Issue 1 makes A>B>C>D and ties A=E, but that's only one issue.
Issues two through 10 makes B=C=D>E, so since A covers issue 1 and
issues 2-10 and E fails 2-10 and none of B,C,D fail issue 2/3, when A is in
the picture A>B>C>D>E. When A is NOT in the picture, my issue 1
puts E over B,C,D. (I guess I'd have to hold my nose, but that wouldn't mean I
wasn't sincere or logical/rational).</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: blue 2px solid"><FONT
style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent" face=Arial color=#000000
size=2><BR><BR>>But once A is out of the picture, there's one issue that E
trumps B, C, <BR>>and D on. And if A&E are both out of the picture than
my sincere ordering <BR>>of B, C, D could well change.<BR><BR>To which I
once again ask, why? Why does the existence or absence of <BR>another
alternative change how you feel about B relative to C? Note that
<BR>even within a group, such reversal of preferences is not part of
<BR>Condorcet's paradox.</FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV>See above. I've provided an example where one issue trumps all others
because "I" am a radical pro-lifer. As long as there's somebody in the choices
that supports that and a lot of other of my issues, the one who supports attack
weapons and capital punishment is lowest on my totem pole. But take out the one
who supports my position on those three issues, I'll move up the idiot who likes
AK-47s and capital punishment JUST because she also supports anti-abortion
legisletion. You can call me dumb for my original choice, but you can't accuse
me of being irrational if you want to dictate a voting method that ignores my
pairwise choices.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: blue 2px solid"><FONT
style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent" face=Arial color=#000000
size=2><BR><BR>> My original point was that you can;'t infer that I
prefer B>C from a <BR>> ballot that has A>B>C>D>E on it. If
you ask me which I prefer of B and C <BR>> (only) I might say C sincerely
because (in this example) C is the only <BR>> one that is both pro-gun
control and anti-capital punishment.<BR>><BR>>When both of those are
covered by my first choice, I might rank C last <BR>>among B,C,D because of
something else, like fiscal policy.<BR><BR>At which point, I would accuse you
of being illogical. Either you value <BR>the candidates' relative
stances on fiscal policies more, or you value <BR>their relative stances on
gun control/capital punishment more. The <BR>presence of another
candidate who may be great or terrible on both of these <BR>issues should not
change your relative valuations of those issues.</FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV>No, but it would change my evaluation of the CANDIDATES. So to assume when
all issues and all candidates are in play my ranked ballot means I ALWAYS prefer
C>D is unjustified. When comparing C and D based upon their stances on the
issues, I might choose D>C, precise BECAUSE not all issues are in play.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>The point is when comparing C and D the differentiator might be fiscal
policies. The reason that wasn't my top priority when ranking all 5 is that I
had a different highest priority when all 5 are in play. </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: blue 2px solid"><FONT
style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent" face=Arial color=#000000
size=2><BR><BR>>There's no reason to believe you can infer pair-wise wins
from a ranked <BR>>ballot voting method.<BR><BR>Well, that's what folks
have been doing since Condorcet's day. You're <BR>welcome to question
it, and I'm welcome to disagree with you.</FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV>"Since Condercet's day" folks have been poking holes in his approach,
beginning with his contemporary de Borda. The first example of a Condorcet
Winner I saw in literature was the alternative that was despised by 89 percent
of the voters. And we have Ranked Pairs, Beatpath, x-Quatas, etc. etc. etc. to
try to "fix" Condorcet-based methods, and they all give different results.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>We need to axiomitize the study and stop saying "any input that is
illogical within the context of the method" is not worth worrying
about.</DIV></FONT></BODY></HTML>