<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><HTML><FONT SIZE=2 PTSIZE=10 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">James you wrote in part:<BR>
<BR>
>Let's match some names to the numbers, for fun...<BR>
>45 Bush 100 > Lieberman 10 > Dean 0<BR>
>10 Lieberman 100 > Bush 90 > Dean 0<BR>
>5 Lieberman 100 > Dean 90 > Bush 0<BR>
>40 Dean 100 > Lieberman 10 > Bush 0<BR>
><BR>
> I imagine Joe Lieberman as someone who is not particularly liked by<BR>
>either the Democrats or the Republicans. (I'm immensely glad that he<BR>
>didn't win the primary, and I find it amusing how poorly he did after all<BR>
>his "electable Democrat" bullshit.) <BR>
> I think Lieberman would be a very crappy president. (And I think that he<BR>
>was the kiss of death on Gore's ticket.) Still, if I was convinced that I<BR>
>could only chose between Lieberman and Bush, I'd hold my nose and vote for<BR>
>Lieberman. At least his environmental record is okay...<BR>
<BR>
Some people when faced with a choice between bad and worse will hold their noses and choose bad in order to defeat worse. Other people will refuse to make a choice between bad and worse.<BR>
<BR>
Take the following example:<BR>
<BR>
The results of the first round of the 1969 French Presidential election were:<BR>
<BR>
Pompidou (Gaullist, centre right) 44.0%<BR>
Poher (Centrist) 23.4%<BR>
Duclos (Communist) 21.5%<BR>
Other Left (3) 10.1%<BR>
Other (1) 1.1%<BR>
<BR>
The French Communist party advised its supporters not to vote in the second round run-off between Pompidou and Poher even though Poher was to the left of Pompidou.<BR>
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The reason:<BR>
<BR>
" We refuse to choose between cholera and the plague"<BR>
<BR>
Roland Leroy (member of PCF central committee in late 60's/ 70's) <BR>
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The result- Pompidou won, turnout fell 10% between the rounds and 5% of people won voted in the second round spoilt their ballot papers.<BR>
<BR>
Some people will vote bad to defeat worse, many others will not.<BR>
<BR>
In my original post I was not intending to repeat low utility Condorcet winner arguments or high utility IRV loser arguments. I was trying to make the point that systems based solely on ranking can produce results that look bad when ratings information is taken into account.<BR>
<BR>
Example 1<BR>
<BR>
45 A 100>B 70>C 0<BR>
10 B 100>A 70>C 0<BR>
5 B 100>C 70> A 0<BR>
40 C100>B 70> A 0<BR>
<BR>
Example 2<BR>
<BR>
45 A 100>B 10>C 0<BR>
10 B 100>A 90>C 0<BR>
5 B 100>C 90> A 0<BR>
40 C100>B 10> A 0<BR>
<BR>
For the examples above zero information Approval voting gives the best results- B wins in example 1 and A wins in example 2.<BR>
<BR>
Of course it's easy to construct examples in which zero information Approval also produces bad results:<BR>
<BR>
55 A 100> B 70> C 0<BR>
10 B 100> A 70> C 0<BR>
35 C 100> B 60> A 0<BR>
<BR>
Result:<BR>
<BR>
A 65<BR>
B 100<BR>
C 35<BR>
<BR>
What I'm interested in at the moment is going beyond IRV, Condorcet and Approval towards a single winner system that gives high utility, generally preferred winners.<BR>
<BR>
David Gamble<BR>
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