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Mike,<br>
You wrote (Tue.Jun.8):<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>><i>From the 3 Australians that I had the opportunity to ask, I heard that it
</i>isn't unusual for preferrers of non-big-2 candidates to insincerely rank in
first place the big-2 candidate whom they like better than the other big-2
candidate, to avoid "wasting [their] vote". Australia has had IRV for a
along time, but parties are still mostly unwilling to run more than 1
candidate per election, contrary to the hopes when IRV was adopted.</pre>
</blockquote>
CB: You are not STILL talking about the apocryphal "3 Australians"? You
don't update the results of your on-going survey<br>
of reports by Australians about how IRV operates there very often, do you?
Let me refresh you memory of an on-list discussion<br>
you had with the Australian Albert Langer in December 1998 with some excerpts.<br>
<br>
This from a post dated Fri.Dec.4, 1998 ("IRO" means IRV, and "VA" stands
for "Votes Against" and refers to Condorcet,<br>
Winning Votes.)<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
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<tt>[AL]<br>
In Australia IRO makes the support for third parties highly visible.<br>
NOBODY who would vote for them under Approval or VA fails to vote for<br>
them as a result of strategic considerations concerning IRO.<br>
Nevertheless, since they never win any seats they don't get to build<br>
their support in the way that they would if they were represented.<br>
<br>
Of course they wouldn't dominate a PR Parliament either. They would<br>
simply be represented, which is all that PR supporters have ever claimed<br>
for PR. As a result of being represented they might build their support,<br>
so the two party monopoly makes damn sure they aren't.<br>
<br>
<snip><br>
<br>
[MO]<br>
</tt><tt> With IRO something _does_ prevent people from registering their
support<br>
for a less winnable alternative: The fact that while their vote is<br>
on their favorite, a needed compromise might get eliminated, resulting<br>
in the victory of one's most despised last choice.<br>
<br>
[AL]<br>
Nope. That is just your speculation. Ask any Australian of any political<br>
persuasion and you'll find that this just isn't a factor in the way<br>
people actually vote here (as opposed to the way parties plan their<br>
campaigns). <snip></tt></blockquote>
You wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>You continued:
..., voters and political parties would hate approval.
I reply:
Why would voters hate Approval more than Plurality? Because it lets them
always vote for their favorite instead of having to strategically abandon
hir? Because it gives them the freedom to vote for and show support for
people they like better than their Plurailty compromise?
Your claim is not only unjustified, it's absurd.</pre>
</blockquote>
CB: This thread is "Approval vs. IRV", not "Approval vs. Plurality". Of
course Approval is an unambiguous improvement<br>
on Plurality, and those voters who notice any difference will (probably)
prefer it. Why will small parties prefer IRV to Approval?<br>
Because small parties like it to be possible that all indications from published
polls and previous elections are wrong, and this time<br>
the voters will vote as they reccomend and vote them in to office. Under
Approval, that means either continuing to vote as in <br>
Plurality and foregoing any say among the real contenders (and opening
the door to the election of the Condorcet or even<br>
Majority loser) or completely abandoning the fantasy and saying, in effect,
"We want the result to be a tie between us and one of<br>
the major parties" , which is false and ridiculous. Under IRV, they are not
in that bind. They can say "Vote for us as your unique<br>
favourite, so that if enough of you do we will win, but if we are eliminated
then you can still have your say among the main contenders", plus they get
some clout that can arise if they are seen as having the power to "direct
preferences".<br>
<br>
>From the point-of-view of voters that aren't interested in strategising,
Approval doesn't "guarrantee" anything. You seem to assume<br>
that the voters all fall into one of two categories:<br>
(1) partially-informed strategists who know that if they don't compromise
by voting Middle first (in IRV) then there is a danger<br>
that Worst will win, but don't know that Favourite can't win if they vote
sincerely; so maybe they'd like to vote maximum clout<br>
against Worst and leave it to other voters to decide which of Favourite
and Middle actually *wins* .<br>
(2) "semi-strategists" who are perfectly happy and comfortable voting compromises
equal to their sincere unique favourite, but<br>
are squeamish about voting a compromise above their sincere favourite.<br>
<br>
In the case of IRV, the voter might SOMETIMES be, as you say, be "strategically
forced" (in the setting of a US presidential election)<br>
to Compromise and falsely vote Middle above Favourite. But that is versus
having to falsely vote compromises equal to sincere<br>
Favourite in Approval, ALL THE TIME. That is fine if you think that order-reversal
is terrible, but order-compression is nothing.<br>
But if you consider them both bad, and order-reversal is only about two
or three times worse than order-compression; then IRV<br>
looks like the much more attractive way of voting.<br>
<br>
Consider these further categories of voters:<br>
(3) voters who are not be interested in strategy, and so just want a clear-cut
way of voting sincerely. Under IRV, this category <br>
would be much larger than it is under Purality, when voters appreciate IRV's
"majority for solid coalitions" and Condorcet Loser<br>
guarrantees. This is the group who would not be Approval fans.<br>
(4) well informed strategists, who don't mind Compromise-strategy order-reversal.
("betraying" their favourite).This group<br>
has no real reason to prefer Approval over IRV.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
PS , another interesting excerpt from your chat with Albert Langer (posted
Wed.Dec2,1998):<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<title></title>
<tt>[MO]<br>
Speak for yourself. Duverger's law is about Plurality, and doesn't<br>
accurately apply to single-winner methods in general.<br>
<br>
Maybe some<br>
like Plurality because it produces a 2-party system, but a better<br>
single-winner method, one that lets people vote sincerely, wouldn't<br>
produce a 2-party system. I claim that even the simple, modest<br>
Approval method would bust the artificial 2-party system wide open.<br>
<br>
[AL]<br>
I always do, and obviously was, speaking for myself (even when I wrote<br>
"edit" meaning "edict" :-). Du Verger's law would not apply to "Random<br>
Ballot" but it certainly does apply to IRO as proved for more than half<br>
a century of experience in Australia and you have not advanced anything<br>
resembling an argument as to why it would not apply to Approval. I<br>
cannot even guess what your argument might be. People overwhelmingly do<br>
vote "sincerely" (ie naively) at least as regards first preferences<br>
under IRO in Australia and haven't got the foggiest clue about the fact<br>
that there is something fundamentally absurd about the way votes are<br>
counted. 20% of them sincerely vote for other parties as their first<br>
preference and are not in the least surprised that the two major parties<br>
always win because they understand the elementary logic that if there is<br>
going to be only 1 winner it is going to come from one or other of the<br>
two big parties and not from 1 of the small ones. Any fancy system that<br>
produced a different result would be rightly perceived as just plain<br>
anti-democratic. How could one possibly argue against parties that have<br>
80% of the vote not reliably winning a seat? (Certainly not by<br>
persuading them that a lottery should be used to prevent that obvious<br>
outcome, not by pretending that some weird way of counting votes could<br>
result in 1 or other of 2 parties with 80% support between them winning<br>
the seat rather than 1 or other of the reamaining parties or<br>
independents with 20% support).<br>
<br>
If you want representation of other parties then you have to go for PR<br>
as in Europe.<br>
This is just plain obvious and not worth arguing about further.<br>
</tt></blockquote>
<a
href="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/2739">http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/2739</a><br>
<br>
<a
href="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/2805">http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/2805</a><br>
<br>
Something very odd, December 98 seems to be missing from the Electorama EM
archive.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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