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<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>It looks like I should get involved here since I
was told in the Talk section of Wikipedia that I've started a storm by a kind
but cryptically named user "<A title=User:Pm67nz
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Pm67nz"><FONT face="Times New Roman"
size=3>Pm67nz</FONT></A>"</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><A
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Voting_system">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Voting_system</A></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>I have not been subscribed to email for the EM
list since May 17 since the <A
href="mailto:election-methods-list@yahoogroups.com"><FONT face="Times New Roman"
size=3>election-methods-list@yahoogroups.com</FONT></A> reflector was shut
down.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Eric Gorr has emailed me directly against the idea
of classifying "one vote" methods as plurality and runoff, while leaving
Condorcet all by itself in a unique category.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Reading some of the replies here, it would appear
what is apparent to me is not apparent to others. The separation of "single
vote" methods and "multiple vote methods" would seem a clear one at least to
me.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>By definition Plurality is "one person, one
vote".</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Runoffs and IRV are also "one person, one vote"
because in any given count every voter can offer at most one vote and in order
for a new count to be made, all previous counts have no effect on the new
count.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>In contrast:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Approval is definitely NOT "one person, one vote"
since we're electing one candidate and voters can support as many candidates as
they like.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Similarly Borda is definitely NOT "one person, one
vote". </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Similarly Bucklin is NOT "one person, one vote"
because if a second round is needed, each voter can simultaneously support two
candidates.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Of these methods Bucklin is the only one that I've
heard was implemented in a political election.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>There's a article online that talks about Bucklin
being implemented and being rejected on constitutional ground. The article is
defending STV and saying previous implementation of ranked ballots using Bucklin
was unconstitutional because it allowed more that one vote, in contrast to STV
which is a single vote system, and therefore constitutional.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><A
href="http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2002/oct02/voting.htm">http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2002/oct02/voting.htm</A></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>************************** SELECTED TEXT FROM LINK
<FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3>*************</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV>
<P><B>Constitutional Challenge</B>. In Minneapolis, advocates of a 2001 charter
amendment to adopt Single Transferable Vote for municipal elections ran into
opposition from the city's charter commission. <STRONG>The commission's attorney
brought a 1915 Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Smallwood 7, to the
body's attention. Several commission members cited this case as a basis for the
body's recommendation against putting the proposed charter amendment question
before the city's voters.<BR><I>Brown v. Smallwood</I> involved a preferential
voting system adopted by the city of Duluth in its 1912 charter and a municipal
judgeship created by the Legislature in 1913. 8 The Duluth system asked voters
to rank the candidates according to their preferences, but did not use the
Single Transferable Vote method to count votes and determine the winner.
Instead, a vote-counting procedure known as "the Bucklin method" was used.9
<BR></STRONG><BR>In the Bucklin vote-counting system, if no candidate received
the majority of first choices, all second choices were added to the first
choices already tallied, and vote totals were checked to see if any candidate
reached the new majority threshold. Thus, in contrast to Single Transferable
Vote, under Bucklin some voters' votes were counted more than once, and a
second-choice vote for a candidate could work as a vote against one's first
choice.<BR><BR>To see how this is true under the Bucklin system, consider a
voter who casts a first vote for candidate A, a second choice vote for candidate
B, and one "additional choice" vote for candidate C. If candidate A had a
plurality, but not a majority, of first choice votes, then the voter's second
choice would be added to the number of first choice votes B received, along with
the second choices of other voters. Thus, the voter's second choice for B has
the effect of undermining his first choice, A by giving B more total votes
(first- plus second-choice votes) than A. This is why, while 12,313 voters cast
ballots in the 1915 Duluth election, the total number of "votes" counted
(including first, second, and additional choices) was 18,860.10 <BR><BR>These
flaws of the Bucklin plan -not present in Single Transferable Vote -- led the
Minnesota Supreme Court to declare the Bucklin system unconstitutional. The
Court first noted that the Minnesota Constitution provided that every male age
21 or older was "entitled to vote" in elections. The Court then said that, when
the Minnesota Constitution was framed, </P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>the word "vote" meant a choice for a candidate by one constitutionally
qualified to exercise a choice. ... It was never meant that the ballot of one
elector, cast for one candidate, could be of greater or less effect than the
ballot of another elector cast for another candidate. It was to be of the same
effect.11</P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>Guided by this definition of "vote," <STRONG>the Court concluded that
Duluth's Bucklin voting system had the effect of giving more than one vote to
some voters and was thus unconstitutional.</STRONG> The Court was particularly
troubled by how the Bucklin system put voters in a position of undermining the
prospects of their first choices when they indicated lower preferences:</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><STRONG>The preferential system directly diminishes the right of an elector
to give an effective vote for the candidate of his choice. If he votes for him
once, his power to help him is exhausted. If he votes for other candidates he
may harm his choice, but cannot help him.</STRONG>12</P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P>In contrast to the unconstitutional Bucklin system, Single Transferable Vote
not only does not share this infirmity, it clearly possesses the qualities the
Court said were required of a voting system. In a similar election under Single
Transferable Vote, each voter would have one vote which would be counted for
each voter's highest preferred candidate who was eligible to receive it. The
total number of votes would never change (except for voters who failed to name a
second or subsequent choice, whose votes would be considered as being exhausted
if their first choice candidate was dropped after the first round of counting).
The practical effect would be no different than having a runoff election to
narrow the number of candidates to two, except that it would occur
instantaneously.13<BR><BR>Thus, a full reading of Brown v. Smallwood shows the
Court invalidated the Bucklin system not because it was a preferential voting
method per se, but because it had the effect of giving some voters more than one
vote, and because it did not permit the voters to fully and effectively support
their first choices. Because Single Transferable Vote does not share this fatal
flaw, there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court would hold that
<I>Brown v. Smallwood</I> would prohibit a city from adopting Single
Transferable Vote for its municipal elections.
<BR>****************************************************</P></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Every method I grouped under "multiple vote" would
have the same constitutional judgment. Granted this case specifically only
refers to Minnesota, but it would appear to be a universal position as well
considering that only "single" vote methods, methods where voters are only
allowed to support a single candidate with a single votes are used in political
elections worldwide.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Does anyone know a single locale anywhere in the
world that has political elections for single winners that uses a "multiple
vote" method?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>If this is true, if "one vote" methods are
exclusively used in politics and "multiple vote" methods exclusively NOT used,
why is this distinction so apparently controversial?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Again, granted that Condorcet I take as a
special case, not clearly fitting in either category.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Perhaps I am wrong to make this distinction second
most important to (number of winners). Perhaps the fact that Condorcet methods
defy the division, some other approach is better. I don't know. I judge
Condorcet is fundamentally different and deserves its own
classification.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>If "number of active votes" is unacceptable
criterion, then I can see value in "Ballot type" and also "Counting type". There
are "single vote", "rank vote", and "rate vote" ballots that are distinct. There
are also "one count" methods and "multiple count" methods.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Specifically </FONT><FONT face=Arial
size=2>Plurality, Borda and Approval are all "one count" methods, a
single number applied immediately to each candidate and top number wins. These
deserve some separate recognition from their more complex alternatives in
each ballot category.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>If I were to group by "ballot type" first and
"number of vote counts" second:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>1. Single vote ballot</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> A.. Single
count</FONT></DIV> * Plurality - count
votes, top wins</FONT></DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<DIV> B. Multiple counts</DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV> I.
Elimination</DIV>
* Two round runoff (keep top
two)</DIV>
<DIV></FONT><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
* Slow elimination runoff (elimination bottom
one)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> II. No
elimination</DIV></FONT>
* Exhaustive Runoff (no forced
elimination)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>2. Rank preference ballot (1,2,3,...)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> A.. Single
count</FONT></DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> *
Borda - count votes by ranking value (Value=MAX_RANK-rank)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> B. Multiple counts</DIV>
<DIV> I. Elimination</DIV>
<DIV> * IRV -
bottom elimination runoff</DIV>
<DIV>
* Supplementary vote - top two runoff</FONT></DIV><FONT face=Arial
size=2>
<DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><FONT face=Arial size=2>
* Coomb - disapproval
elimination runoff</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> II. No
elimination</DIV></FONT>
* Bucklin - approval
runoff</DIV></FONT>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
* Condorcet - fixed
N*(N-1)/2 pairwise vote counts among N
candidates</FONT></DIV>3. Ratings ballot - assign independent values in
range [a,b]</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> A.. Single count - count value
votes, top votes
win.</FONT></DIV> * Approval
Ratings: No/Yes - point value 0 or 1.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> *
Cardinal Ratings - assign independent whole numbers a and b.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> *
Generalized Ratings - any finite real number in range [a,b], effectively
equivalent to real range [0,1]</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<DIV> B. Multiple
counts</DIV> * <FONT
face="Times New Roman" size=3>MCA - like Approval but with range [0,2] and
multiple counting rounds.</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>That might be more acceptable to members on this
list. I added a third level: Multiple counts whether there is forced elimination
involved. (You might argue single count methods have forced elimination also,
but it is irrelevant since there's no recount after the
elimination.)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>I'd still defend the issue of "number of active
votes", between systems as an important issue worthy to
discuss.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Sincerely,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Tom Ruen</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>
<HR>
</FONT></DIV>
<DIV>
<H1>[EM] Wikipedia </H1><!--htdig_noindex--><B>Eric Gorr </B><A
title="[EM] Wikipedia" href="mailto:eric%40ericgorr.net">eric@ericgorr.net
</A><BR><I>Fri Jun 4 21:49:03 2004</I>
<P>
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<HR>
<!--/htdig_noindex--><!--beginarticle--><PRE>At 11:58 PM -0400 6/4/04, James Green-Armytage wrote:
><I>So far, I don't fully understand why is IRV a "single vote method", Borda
</I>><I>count a "multiple vote method", and Condorcet a "pairwise vote method",
</I>><I>when they are all ranked ballot single-winner systems that can be
</I>><I>conducted in a single round. There's probably some justification for it,
</I>><I>but at first look I find it to be more confusing than helpful.
</I>
I am not aware of any justification. These changes seem to have been
made summarily.
><I>I think that the single-winner vs. multiple winner distinction is a good
</I>><I>one to make first.
</I>><I>
</I>><I>Then I'd probably go to the ballot type.
</I>
Are there really more then just three ballot types?
As near as I can tell, every election method has a ballot that would
look like one of these:
Approval - the voter selects one or more candidates
Ratings - the voter assigns a score to one or more candidates
Ranked - the voter only expresses a preference between candidates
I have no idea what might be placed in a miscellaneous category.
What ballot would not be covered by one of these three?
In Plurality, for example, the voter is only allowed to select a
single candidate, putting it in the Approval category.
Approval is not, in my opinion, appropriately assigned to the Ratings
category since the voter does not assign a score to a candidate.
== Eric Gorr ========= <A href="http://www.ericgorr.net/">http://www.ericgorr.net</A> ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
</PRE><!--/htdig_noindex--></DIV></BODY></HTML>