<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1">
<title></title>
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#ffffff">
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid20040528122201.6755.8135.Mailman@geronimo.dreamhost.com">
<pre wrap="">Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:31:18 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:bartman@netgate.net"><bartman@netgate.net></a>
Ken Johnson wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 21:55:40 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:bartman@netgate.net"><bartman@netgate.net></a>
...
IRNR seems equivalent to repeated runoff elections. In a zero-info
election with five candidates, where my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, I
would vote something like:
A(1.0) > B(0.001) > C(0.000001) > D(0.000000001) > E(0.0)
The idea is that subsequent ratings are low enough that they don't
detract much from my first-choice vote in each round. And if my first
choice is ever eliminated, the bulk of my voting power always goes to my
highest remaining choice.
...
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Bart,
It seems to me that a limitation of this strategy is that if candidate A
is left standing in the last round, then you have very little say in who
A is running against. What if you have very high, and nearly equal,
sincere ratings of A, B, C, and D, and a very low rating for E? Your
highest priority is to ensure that E is eliminated. What then would be
your strategy?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
The same. ...
</pre>
</blockquote>
Bart,<br>
<br>
Let's look at this in simpler terms. Suppose my ONLY objective is to
eliminate E. I have no preference between A, B, C, and D. Consider the
following two IRNR strategy options:<br>
(1) A(1.0) > B(0.001) > C(0.000001) > D(0.000000001) >
E(0.0)<br>
(2) A(1.0) = B(1.0) = C(1.0) = D(1.0) > E(0.0)<br>
Can you illustrate a situation in which the first strategy, but not the
second, would result in E's defeat?<br>
<br>
More generally, if my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, what would
be wrong with the following strategy?<br>
<br>
A(1.0) > B(0.999999999) > C(0.999999) > D(0.999) > E(0.0)<br>
<br>
The ideas is that the ratings other than the last are close enough that
they don't detract much from by last-choice vote in each round. And if
my last choice is ever eliminated, the bulk of my (negative) voting
power always goes to my lowest remaining choice.<br>
<br>
Ken Johnson<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>