<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><HTML><FONT SIZE=2 PTSIZE=10 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">Andrew Myers wrote:<BR>
<BR>
>I implemented the PR-enforcing Condorcet algorithm I described in my recent<BR>
>mail to this list, as part of the CIVS voting web service. If you would like<BR>
>to try it out (and give me some testing!), visit the following URL and vote on<BR>
>the "ice cream assortment" election: <BR>
<BR>
Andrew, could you provide a worked example of your method with say 4 candidates for 2 seats.<BR>
<BR>
Secondly are there any circumstances electing two candidates from four with the vote set:<BR>
<BR>
34 A>B>C>D<BR>
23 B>C>D>A<BR>
22 C>D>B>A<BR>
21 D>B>C>A<BR>
<BR>
in which A is not one of the two winners.<BR>
<BR>
Under the two other Condorcet PR methods I'm familiar with ( Tideman's cpo-stv and Sequential STV) if any candidate has a Droop quota of 1st preference votes that candidate must win.<BR>
<BR>
The reason I ask this is that when I voted in your ice cream PR poll ( for 3 winners) I gave my highest cardinal rating (999) to cherry chocolate chip. My vote was the fourth vote cast in the poll and therefore represented a Droop quota.<BR>
<BR>
Cherry chocolate chip was not one of the three winning flavours.<BR>
<BR>
The only way you get such a result using cpo-stv or Sequential STV would be if each of the 4 voters had given a different flavour as their first choice and there was a 4 way tie which was resolved by selecting 3 of the 4 first choice flavours at random.<BR>
<BR>
David Gamble<BR>
<BR>
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