<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1">
<title></title>
</head>
<body>
Mike Ossipoff wrote (Thu.Apr.8):<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>Chris Benham posted an archived discussion as a criticism of Bucklin.
Actually Bucklin isn't what is being discussed in that quote, and so it has
no relevance to Bucklin's merit.
By the way, if anyone knows of an example in which Buckling fails
Independence from Clones, would they post it?
Mike Ossipoff</pre>
</blockquote>
Presumably he refers to:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>Dear John B. Hodges,
you wrote (1 Sep 2003):
><i> This method has been called "Generalized Bucklin", and AFAICT
</i>><i> could also be called "Majority Choice Approval". My question,
</i>><i> for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that any
</i>><i> single-winner method has, that this method does not have?
</i>
Condorcet, Condorcet Loser, Consistency, Independence of Clones,
Reversal Symmetry, Smith, later-no-harm, Participation.
Markus Schulze
</pre>
</blockquote>
"Generalized Bucklin" just means Bucklin that allows equal-ranking with
whole votes (precisely the version that Mike<br>
has been talking up). The demonstrations in that post all apply to that method.
John Hodges apparently didn't realise that<br>
the name "Majority Choice Approval" was already taken by a 3-slot method,
that is equivalent to "ER Bucklin (whole)"<br>
when there are three candidates.<br>
<a
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-April/012595.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-April/012595.html</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>Dear John B. Hodges,
the following example demonstrates that Bucklin is
vulnerable to "compromising" (i.e. insincerely ranking
a candidate higher to make him win).
Example:
4 A > B > C
3 B > C > A
2 C > A > B
The unique Bucklin winner is candidate B.
However, if the 2 CAB voters had insincerely voted
ACB then the unique Bucklin winner would have been
candidate A. Since these 2 CAB voters strictly prefer
candidate A to candidate B, voting ACB instead of CAB
to change the winner from candidate B to candidate A
is a useful strategy for them.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>Markus Schulze</pre>
</blockquote>
I think this shows that, without the "AERLO" strategy gimmick, ER-Bucklin(whole)
doesn't meet "strong FBC".<br>
I don't recall it ever being explained exactly how the AERLO operates in
Bucklin (or IRV).<br>
<br>
Mike,<br>
Given your well known standards, I am surprised you haven't shown any
interest in the easy-to-count, clone-proof Bucklin-like<br>
plain Weighted Median Approval (WMA). <br>
To refresh your memory of the rules:<br>
Ranked ballots, equal preferences and truncation ok. Each candidate is given
a weight equal to the number of first preferences<br>
(fractional) they get. The total weight of all the candidates is equal to
the total number of valid ballots.<br>
A candidate whose weight exceeds half the total weight wins outright.<br>
If none do that, then all ballots fully approve the candidate/s they rank
first or equal first. (There are no partial approvals.<br>
All ballots do not approve candidate/s they rank last or equal last.)<br>
(Subject to above) each ballot, starting with the highest-ranked, keeps approving
the most preferred candidates until their <br>
weight equals or exceeds half the total weight of the candidates.<br>
The candidate with the highest approval score wins.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>