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A good old fashioned flame war here. I'm going to sidestep the vast
majority of this but I'll make a couple comments.<br><br>
David Gamble wrote:<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><font size=2>You
continued:<br><br>
I've said many time, but apparently must again repeat, that, though
IRV<br>
doesn't have offensive order-reversal, it requires, without any
offensive<br>
strategy being done, a much more drastic defensive strategy than
Condorcet<br>
wv does. IRV will make the need for defensive favorite-burial. That
need<br>
happens without anyone using offensive strategy. That's the mark of a
really<br>
poor method. IRV and Plurality have that in common.<br><br>
At worst, in a really devious electorate, where there are many who'd like
to<br>
do offensive order-reversal, Condorcet then begins to have a
strategy<br>
problem. But that strategy problem isn't like IRV's strategy problem.
IRV<br>
requires defensive favorite-burial. But offensive order-reversal can
be<br>
deterred by mere defensive truncation.<br><br>
I reply:<br><br>
How important strategy criteria are depends on whether the voters use
strategy and to what extent they use strategy. I've spent years
encouraging voters to use the very simple strategy of vote for the
candidate of the party most likely to defeat the Conservative. With some
people who aren't very politically minded and some who are it can,
for a whole variety of reasons ( foremost amongst them a desire to vote
sincerely) be an uphill struggle.</font></blockquote><br>
Which is, of course, exactly the point of advocating winning votes
Condorcet. It is very hard to convince large sections of the
electorate into voting insincerely, and insofar as it would be I believe
that it would be far easier to convince them to "bullet vote"
(i.e. only vote their favorite) than it would be to convince them to bury
their favorite or otherwise swap expressed preferences. These are
my assumptions about human nature, but they match both my experiences and
your own.<br><br>
Under these conditions (where the only strategy employed is selectively
truncating your ballot), winning votes Condorcet has basically no
strategic issues. It is possible (in situations I regard as
extremely unlikely) for truncation to have a positive impact, but winning
votes Condorcet performs far better than margins Condorcet in preventing
the strategic problems that I view as likely. IRV is worse than
margins Condorcet in this respect.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><font size=2>Mike, you website
gives the impression that it is an objective evaluation of election
methods. I have not objection to people advocating a certain system, that
is their right but to pass it off as impartial, balanced and objective
when it is not is something I find really
annoying.</font></blockquote><br>
Mike's website seems pretty unambiguous in its advocacy of
Condorcet. I'm not sure why you think he's hiding it.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><font size=2>One person, one vote,
when it comes down to it in the end my opinion is as valid as any
other.</font></blockquote><br>
Please, not 1p/1v again. ;)<br><br>
-Adam</html>