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I propose and reccomend this single-winner
Condorcet compliant method:<br>
Plain ranked-ballots, equal preferences and truncation ok.<br>
1: Eliminate all candidates who are not members of the Schwartz set.<br>
2: If more than one candidate remains, then based on the symetrically
completed (SC) and reversed rankings,<br>
eliminate the candidate picked by the Alternative Vote (aka IRV).<br>
Repeat steps 1 and 2 until only one candidate (the winner) remains<br>
<br>
In terms of criteria mentioned by Woodall, it has in common with Winning
Votes that it meets the Plurality Criterion,<br>
and because of this (combined with meeting Condorcet) also fails Mono-add-top,
Mono-raise-random, <br>
Mono-sub-top, Mono-raise-delete, and Mono-sub-plunp. <br>
(These criteria are defined here: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/wood1996.pdf">http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/wood1996.pdf</a>
)<br>
Unlike WV, this method meets Symetric Completion, and I believe that
that allows it to meet my <br>
Decisiveness Fairness Standard, which means means meeting Kevin Venzke's
"Earlier-no-harm" and "Earlier-no-help"<br>
criteria (introduced here: <a
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-December/011480.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-December/011480.html</a>
)<br>
<br>
This method makes use of IRV's great resistance to Burying (aka "offensive
order-reversal"), so that in this respect I believe<br>
(with some evidence) that it performs better than Winning Votes.<br>
Some examples (I copied from somewhere):<br>
Sincere preferences are:<br>
44: A>B>C<br>
14: B>C>A<br>
14: B>A>C<br>
28: C>B>A<br>
100 ballots. B is the CW.<br>
<br>
The A voters try to "Bury" B:<br>
44: A>C>B<br>
14: B>C>A<br>
14: B>A>C<br>
28: C>B>A<br>
and it backfires. A is eliminated and C wins. Schulze, Tideman, Simpson,
Raynaud, LeGrand all pick A.<br>
C has the highest Borda score. (Borda is not fit to be used, but is allowed
to comment.)<br>
<br>
An example from a James Green-Armytage posting on Sun.Aug.17,2003<br>
<a
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-August/010653.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-August/010653.html</a><br>
<pre>Sincere preferences
46: A>B
44: B>A
5: C>A
5: C>B
"It is extremely clear here that C seriously does not deserve to win, as he
is ranked last by 90% of the voters. Also, it is clear that A deserves to
win, albeit by a narrow margin.
Now, if the method is Condorcet (minimax, Schwartz / minimax, ranked
pairs, or beatpath), and if everyone voted sincerely, A would win.
However, if the 44 B>A voters strategically vote B>C (offensive order
reversal), a cycle is formed, in which the defeat of B is now the defeat
of least magnitude, and so B wins."
46: A>B
44: B>C
5: C>A
5: C>B
A:B = 51:49
A:C = 46:54
B:C = 90:10
"This is already very unfair, and a clear subversion of the democratic
process.
What can the offended A>B voters do about this? Assuming that the other
preferences are constant they have no way of electing A. Their only
option, other than allowing B to steal the victory, is to truncate or
order-reverse themselves, leading to the election of C."
46: A
44: B>C
5: C>A
5: C>B
A:B = 51:49
A:C = 46:54
B:C = 44:10
"The B-->C defeat is the defeat of least magnitude, and so C wins.
The only hope of A voters is that their truncation will deter the B voters
from their order reversal.
Thus the A and B voters have entered a game of chicken. A voters swerving
is their voting sincerely and allowing B to win. B voters swerving is
their voting sincerely and allowing A to win. The car crash is the
election of C.
The outcome is unpredictable. It is quite possible that C will be elected,
despite the fact that he so clearly does not deserve to win. This is not a
pleasant scenario at all from the point of view of democracy, utility,
majority rule, public trust in government, etc."
In the above example, with the B voters trying to Bury A, and the A voters responding
by truncating, B is eliminated and A wins.
Chris Benham
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