<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><HTML><FONT SIZE=2 PTSIZE=10 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">James Gilmour wrote:<BR>
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>David Gamble wrote:<BR>
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>> I would like volunteers to test this model and give their<BR>
>> comments on it. If you would like a copy of the model to test<BR>
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>No test is possible because you have not specified the criteria against which<BR>
>you wish to test the systems.<BR>
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Basically the idea was to attempt to generate a realistic set of votes (one where voters vote principally but not entirely on a single ( left-right ) dimension) and then calculate the results under a variety of different methods to see how they differ. The model can generate other sets of votes based on other realistic scenarios and also (IMHO) completely unrealistic scenarios. I find how results differ under different systems interesting, as surely the entire purpose of reforming an electoral system is to get different and better ( though what constitutes better is highly subjective) results. You can address a number of questions using the model not just proportionality of party. For example:<BR>
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1/ Does using a good Approval strategy generally elect the Condorcet winner if there is one? ( answer yes as far as I can tell so far).<BR>
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2/ is a winning votes cycle resolution method superior to a winning margins cycle resolution method? ( answer yes ).<BR>
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By test I meant does it work ?, are the results in people's opinion realistic?, how could it be improved?<BR>
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One of the things I hoped to get was people's opinion's on what it should show if it were working correctly you wrote:<BR>
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>If your criterion is proportionality of party, all the multi-member systems will perform >better than any of the single member systems, except by chance.<BR>
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Yes It shows that<BR>
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>The degree of deviation in the single-member systems will depend on just how you >allocate the votes to the single-member districts.<BR>
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Yes It shows that as well.<BR>
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>If you want the highest possible degree of proportionality of party, D'Hondt Highest >Average ( 1 fifty member district) will give a better result than D'Hondt Highest >Average (5 member districts) or STV (5 member districts). <BR>
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Yes It shows this also.<BR>
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>If you maximum voter choice among all candidates, STV (5 member districts) will >allow that in a way than none of the other systems will. But that feature will not be >demonstrated in your model.<BR>
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STV was the most problematic system to model and the one I'm least happy with.<BR>
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>Incidentally, I was surprised to see Borda included in your list. Borda is so<BR>
>fundamentally flawed that I don't think anyone will ever use it for public elections - at >least, I hope not. Whether the flaws will be obvious in your model will depend on the >datasets you have chosen and on the allocation of votes to districts. <BR>
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That second preferences count against first preferences under Borda can be seen virtually whatever data set you put in it. It's flaws, though very noticeable, are not quite as bad as some people make out. It is in there because some people ( Donald Saari, Steve Barney) do take it seriously and write books and papers telling us how good it is.<BR>
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David Gamble<BR>
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