<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><FONT SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">Bart Ingles wrote:<BR>
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>I think when mentioning criteria, it's a good idea to also state why<BR>
>those criteria might be important. For example, to me criteria such as<BR>
>FBC and Participation are important because they relate to a voting<BR>
>system's immunity to the Duverger effect.<BR>
<BR>
>Approval meets both of these criteria, while the Condorcet methods<BR>
>appear to meet them whenever a CW is present. Borda and IRV fail these<BR>
>criteria under a wider variety of conditions, therefore both would tend<BR>
>to reinforce the two-party system, and to restrict the number of viable<BR>
>choices available to voters in non-partisan elections.<BR>
<BR>
In my opinion the first criterion a single seat method must satisfy in order to be acceptable is :<BR>
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If a candidate is the first choice of a majority of voters (50% +) that candidate must win.<BR>
<BR>
IRV, Condorcet, Bucklin and Plurality pass this criterion, Approval and Borda fail it.<BR>
<BR>
Take the example:<BR>
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The voter preferences are:<BR>
<BR>
510 A>B<BR>
145 B>A<BR>
145 B>C<BR>
200 C>B<BR>
<BR>
In the Approval election these voters cast the following votes:<BR>
<BR>
A 387<BR>
AB 123<BR>
BA 44<BR>
B 202<BR>
BC 44<BR>
CB 150<BR>
C 50<BR>
<BR>
A is approved by 554 voters, B is approved by 563 Voters and C is approved by 244 voters. Even though A is the first choice of a majority B wins.<BR>
<BR>
As regards Duverger he said the following:<BR>
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<BLOCKQUOTE TYPE=CITE style="BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px">To these socio-economic and historical factors a technical factor must be added: the electoral system. I expressed its effects in 1946 in the formulation of three sociological laws: (1) a majority vote on one ballot is conducive to a two-party system; (2) proportional representation is conducive to a multiparty system; (3) a majority vote on two ballots is conducive to a multiparty system, inclined toward forming coalitions.</FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff" SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0"></BLOCKQUOTE><BR>
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</FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff" SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">http://www.janda.org/c24/Readings/Duverger/Duverger.htm<BR>
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Majority vote on two ballots (the electoral system of the French Third and Fifth Republics) is extremely similar to IRV and top two runoff.<BR>
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How is participation (surely the winner of the September objective criterion of the month prize under any method) relevant to Duverger ?<BR>
<BR>
David Gamble</FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffffff" SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0"><BR>
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