<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><FONT SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">Donald and list<BR>
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The Condorcet v IRV debate on the EM list increasingly reminds me of the a description of debates in the Stormont ( Northern Ireland ) assembly between Unionists and Republicans- " not so much a debating chamber more a gladiatorial arena for the restatement of entrenched positions ".<BR>
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In my original post I wrote:<BR>
<BR>
David: "Actually neither myself nor those who disagree with me can be<BR>
certain as to whether B is really a low utility turkey ( the least worst)<BR>
or a popular compromise (the most best). This is because ranked ballots<BR>
just tell us that the first choice is preferred to the second choice not<BR>
how much the first choice is preferred to the second choice." <BR>
<BR>
You replied:<BR>
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Donald: Only the voters (all of them) can answer those questions and only<BR>
the voters should be allowed to answer those questions.<BR>
<BR>
The idea was to give the voters a ballot on which they could indicate their utilities and a method that would take them into account in deciding the winner.<BR>
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Donald also wrote:<BR>
<BR>
"Donald: How often will your method, `Cardinal [Insidejob] Rating Condorcet<BR>
Loser Elimination' (CIRCLE), elect the ESBS-winner, the standard for all<BR>
single-seat methods?"<BR>
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I will stick my neck out here ( knowing the likelihood of my decapitation ) and say that I think CRCLE will perform quite well against this standard.<BR>
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Take the simplified example:<BR>
<BR>
49 A>B<BR>
3B<BR>
48 C>B<BR>
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For B to win in this situation she/he must have a minimum utility of 0.92 to A>B voters and a minimum utility of 0.96 to C>B voters. To win B has to be highly liked (approved?) by everybody.<BR>
<BR>
49 A1.00 > B0.92<BR>
3 B1.00<BR>
48 C1.00 > B0.96<BR>
<BR>
A versus B 49 v 49.08 B wins<BR>
A versus C 49 v 48 A wins<BR>
B versus C 48.08 v 48 B wins<BR>
<BR>
C is the Condorcet loser and is eliminated.<BR>
<BR>
C's votes transfer to B at a value of 1.00.<BR>
<BR>
B (51) wins against A (49).<BR>
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If debate where allowed between the ESBS voting rounds the voters/ candidates may well realise that everybody rates B highly and elect him/her.<BR>
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In the example:<BR>
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39 A1.00 > B0.30<BR>
14 B1.00 > A0.50<BR>
9 B1.00 > C 0.50<BR>
38 C1.00 > B0.25<BR>
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B has only 30 % of the utility of A to A > B voters and 25% of the utility of C to C > B voters -not liked by either group of voters much, not really any kind of acceptable compromise.<BR>
<BR>
A versus B 39 v 32.5 A wins<BR>
A versus C 46 v 42.5 A wins<BR>
B versus C 34.7 v 38 C wins<BR>
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B is the Condorcet loser and is eliminated.<BR>
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B votes transfer 14 to A and 9 to C at a value of 1.00.<BR>
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A (53) wins against C (47).<BR>
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Again if debate were allowed between the ESBS rounds of voting A and C voters would realise they didn't think much of B, B voters would realise this too and B would either withdraw or lose support until A finally won.<BR>
<BR>
David Gamble<BR>
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Exhaustive Secret Ballots Standard (ESBS): by Donald Davison<BR>
<BR>
* One secret vote per person.<BR>
* If one candidate has a majority on the first ballot, that candidate<BR>
wins - election is over.<BR>
* If no candidate has a majority, then there will be a next ballot, etc,<BR>
until there is a candidate with a majority.<BR>
* No candidates are eliminated, but a candidate is allowed to withdraw<BR>
after any ballot.<BR>
* No voter is forced to change his vote, but any voter is allowed to<BR>
change his vote on the next ballot.<BR>
* The final winner will be the result of the actions taken by the<BR>
candidates and the voters.<BR>
* Whoever is the winner of the ESBS election is the correct winner.<BR>
* While we would not use Exhaustive Ballot for an election, any method<BR>
that is used must be compared to ESBS, that is, does the method elect the<BR>
ESBS-winner?<BR>
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