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Kislanko@aol.com a écrit :
<blockquote TYPE=CITE><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>In a message dated
8/19/03 4:06:08 PM Central Daylight Time, stephane.rouillon@sympatico.ca
writes:</font></font>
<br>
<blockquote TYPE=CITE style="BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>This
can happen with plurality too in a three runners election...</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Expected:</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>A: 34</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>B: 33</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>C: 32</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>D: 1</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Reality:</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>A: 33</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>B: 30</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>C: 34</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>D: 1</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Supposes I am a C>B>A fan.</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>If with a friend, we move our vote
from C to B to block the expected election of A,</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>we could end up making A win!!!</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Expected after "strategy":</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>A: 34</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>B: 35</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>C: 30</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>D: 1</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Unexpected reality:</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>A: 33</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>B: 32</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>C: 32</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>D: 1</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Classify strategies as much as you
want, it is not their nature that is important.</font></font>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>It is their probability of occurence
and their consequences.</font></font></blockquote>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Ok, for us logicians let's try to sort
this out.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>All the example says to me is that
2 people who voted insincerely based upon an inaccurate assumption caused
their candidate to lose instead of win.</font></font></blockquote>
Markus thinks they are sincere, just compromising. He says it is
not manipulation.
<br>I think they are sincere, but still trying to manipulate the outcome.
<br>Sincere manipulation is still manipulation to me.
<blockquote TYPE=CITE><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>That is not a fault
of the METHOD, is it? Seems to me that this only says the 2 voters made
a mistake.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Paul Kislanko</font></font></blockquote>
I would not say it is the fault of the method.
<br>Those people made the fault by their own decision.
<br>But if a method could avoid people making that fault, would not it
be a BETTER method?
<br>Actually, I think no method is strategy-proof. But some have less probability
of being
<br>manipulated and less consequences to manipulation. Thus it gets us
back to the esperance
<br>measure to compare methods, except we still have problems with the
combinatorial obstacle.
<p>Finally, strategy is not only a probabilistic aspect, it includes feeding
false information to
<br>your adversaries in order to affect their voters behavior. I know I
sound like playing a wargame, but we analyse electoral method using game
theory, don't we?
<br>So if you still think that the previous voters were not manipulating
the electoral system by
<br>getting the most of their ballot, do you agree that their could be
manipulated voters?
<br>If there are methods that prevent manipulation of and by voters, I
think those
<br>are BETTER methods.
<br>That's an argument near what Mike Ossipoff was arguing when defending
<br>winning votes over margins and relative margins... Do not let the system
give the opportunity
<br>to voters to try to improve their result with modified votes based
on the expected ballot
<br>distribution. Wether the manipulation is defined as sincere or unsincere
is not really
<br>relevant to me...
<p>Steph
<br>PS: I hope you do not see anything wrong sharing this with the list...</html>