<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><FONT SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0">Alex Small wrote in part :<BR>
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"At various points it has been brought up that Condorcet's virtual<BR>
guarantee of centrist victory (when issues are arranged on a 1D axis) is a<BR>
guarantee of monopoly. I later observed that IRV would allow left and<BR>
right to compete in a 1D world, but would almost guarantee the defeat of<BR>
the center. I do share some people's skepticism of centrist monopoly. <BR>
It's one thing to elect the person who finds common ground between<BR>
different points of view. It's another thing to guarantee a single party<BR>
a chokehold on power. So I'm actually more sympathetic to IRV now, as<BR>
long as the world remains 1D."<BR>
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This is my principle objection to Condorcet. A party that positions itself in the centre is extremely hard to defeat under Condorcet ( in my analysis).<BR>
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In Adam's example the Centrist does enjoy substantial support, this is true. I am willing to accept his/her defeat as one of the unfortunate things that can happen in any close election. No system is perfect and different systems produce different unfortunate results in close situations.<BR>
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To repeat ( again ) I honestly and sincerely believe as far as single seats are concerned that:<BR>
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"IRV succeeds, I believe, in striking a balance between the two somewhat conflicting aims of ensuring that a candidate has majority support ( a candidate does not win with a minority of the vote because the opposition is split) and preventing dominance by candidates/parties who position themselves in the centre."<BR>
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James Green-Amytage's original post ( I believe ) had the underlying message that all systems that could be considered some sort of improvement on plurality should be supported. Condorcet and Approval are untested as electoral methods in party competition elections. To prove or disprove my centrist dominance analysis real life testing is necessary of both of them. Therefore in say a local referendum to introduce them they should be supported. I may be proved right or I may be proved wrong.<BR>
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One point I would disagree with Alex on is that IRV would guarantee defeat of the centre or keep it weak. In the 1950's Britain was virtually a two party (Labour/ Conservative) system. The Liberal party held 6 seats out of 600+ throughout this period. From the 1960's onwards the Liberal party began a long and slow recovery ( in the 2001 election its successor the Liberal Democrats gained 52 seats ) and also new parties such as the Scottish National party and Plaid Cymru grew in strength and gained representation. All this happened under plurality. IRV would definitely have been more favourable than plurality towards the Liberals and may have been more favourable towards the Welsh and Scottish Nationalists.<BR>
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David Gamble<BR>
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