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<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><font size=2>If you consider the
example <br><br>
10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft <br>
10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft <br>
15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLeft <br>
16% Centrist>Right>Left>FarRight>FarLeft <br>
15% Centrist>Left>Right>FarLeft>FarRight <br>
13% Left>Centrist>FarLeft>Right>FarRight <br>
11% Left>FarLeft>Centrist>Right>FarRight <br>
10% FarLeft>Left>Centrist>Right>FarRight <br><br>
Considering the electorate as 3 factions- Right 35%, Centre 31%, Left 34%
IRV is doing exactly what I want it to do - preventing Centrist
dominance.</font></blockquote><br>
Your general argument is that a centrist can win a Condorcet election
even if he has lukewarm support, which is a reasonable point, although I
would argue it. But here, you are arguing that defeating the
centrist is a virtue unto itself. That's just completely
ridiculous.<br><br>
You seem to have fallen victim to your own rhetoric. You seem so
sure that every difference between Condorcet and IRV can be explained
away by the "weak center" argument that you've ignored what the
voters have said here - that centrist is by any reasonable measure the
strongest candidate. Why all of a sudden are the first place
preferences are no longer especially meaningful?<br><br>
Just to review, Centrist has the most first place votes, the most second
place votes, and the most third place votes, and is the only candidate
not found in fourth or fifth place on any ballot. How can you
possibly argue that centrist isn't the people's choice?<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><font size=2>Under Condorcet the
only way the Right or Left factions could win is if they obtained 50%+ of
the first preference vote.</font></blockquote><br>
I would argue that this amounts to enforcement of majority
rule.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><font size=2> I am prepared to
live with the possibility of your example if it prevents Right 42%,
Centre 17%, Left 41% with the Centre winning.</font></blockquote><br>
So essentially, you are saying that defeating the weak centrist is such a
high priority for you that you are willing to take down the strong
centrist as well. This begs the question, why the bias against
compromise parties? I don't see how the defeat of this strong
centrist is any worse than the victory of your weak centrist. And
the latter scenario has the advantage of the Condorcet argument - that
is, that the winner would win any two-candidate race.<br><br>
-Adam</html>